793.94/7400: Telegram
The Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Atcheson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 19—10:10 a.m.]
90. I have just been confidentially informed by a departmental director of the Foreign Office that the situation in North China is expected to crystallize, if not tomorrow, then very shortly thereafter. He stated that the Kwantung Army has made preparations to take over the customs as well as the Shanhaikwan-Peiping section of the railway in case Sung Che-yuan and other Chinese officials whom the Japanese military have been pressing do not take action to set up an autonomous five province regime or to separate North China into autonomous sectional regimes. He said that Japanese troops have been concentrated at Chinchow and Shanhaikwan both as a threat to Sung and other North China officials and as a weapon to employ in case those officials do not comply with Japanese desires that North China undertake its own administration.
- 2.
- As the probable leaders of an autonomous movement in North China, he named the officials listed in my 89, November 19, 2 p.m. with [Page 424] the exception of Han Fu-chu whose refusal to capitulate to the Japanese he said was still hoped for. He excused Sung Che-yuan and Shang Chen for any part they may have to play in a new regime because “they have been between the devil and the sea” and said that Sung, whom he considers the most likely leader of a new regime, must either (1) conform to Japanese wishes; (2) resist the Japanese with force, or (3) resign. He did not think Sung or any other Chinese military official in the North would fight the Japanese “at this time” and added that Sung’s resignation would not help the National Government because the Japanese would select some other official to replace him.
- 3.
- He said the Chinese Government was taking no action in the matter although several leaders were pressing Chiang Kai-shek to take a definite and open stand. He added that “every one knew” that war between China and Japan was inevitable but he doubted if Chiang [would force?] the issue now, and the officials in the North were being allowed to drift about in their own difficulties because the Government’s only policy, “if it could be called that”, was to “play with the Japanese to gain time”.
- 4.
- To the Department, Shanghai for the Ambassador, and Peiping, summarized to Tokyo by mail.