Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1935, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/7436

The Consul General at Mukden (Ballantine) to the Ambassador in China (Johnson)²⁴

No. 167

Mukden, October 28, 1935.

Sir: I have the honor to refer to a leading article in the October 19 issue of the Mamma Hyoron (Manchuria Mongolia Review), a Japanese language weekly, entitled “Fundamental Considerations on China and the North China Question”, which deals with the recent Tada interview and the pamphlet which appeared on that occasion.

The belief is expressed that the North China question is not merely a matter of “securing the life line of Japan’s national defense”; it represents the application of Japan’s fundamental continental policy, which

(1) provides for the expansion (not necessarily in a territorial sense) of Japan

(2) and for the liberation of oppressed peoples,

(3) accords them security of livelihood,

(4) maintains the self-respect of all peoples and their independence.

(5) which will enable them to cooperate in attaining friendly relations with Japan,

(6) and render possible the establishment of political, economic and even military relations of inseparability with the Empire.

The article concludes from its examination of the Tada pamphlet that Japan will use its efforts to make common cause with the Chinese people, first in North China, to promote the security and peace of Japanese residents and the Chinese people. The view is expressed that conditions in North China are favorable to a speedy realization of this aim and that this movement, which had its beginnings with the “Manchuria Incident” of 1931, will be gradually extended from North China southwards eventually to include all China, and it is anticipated that if the people of North China make a beginning of considering the North China question sympathetically they may bring it to the fore at the plenary session of the Central Executive and Supervisory Committees in Nanking next month.

Those who do not appreciate how one-sided and even naive the Japanese can sometimes be in their outlook on foreign affairs and who are unfamiliar with current Japanese comment may not be inclined to take the foregoing observations seriously, but it is believed that they must be taken into account in any appraisal of the moral support which the Empire’s present so-called “Continental Policy” enjoys among the Japanese public.

In many of its aspects the present period in Japan has its counterpart in moments in the history of other peoples when a consciousness of national destiny or religious fervor or both spurred them on to a career of conquest and colonization. Although the Japanese have never manifested as a people a zeal for religious proselytizing, there is in their nature a strong vein of idealism or sentimentalism, and they are capable of concentrating collectively upon a given objective with an intensity of purpose which produces the same effect as religious fanaticism. It is not to be doubted that a large number among the articulate elements are now sincerely convinced that it is their mission as a nation to deliver the Chinese people from the tyranny of warlords, and the menace of communism, and that freed from these the Chinese will eventually see the advantage of joining hands with Japan in an economic alliance which would establish the mutual prosperity of the two nations on a permanent basis.

The Japanese attitude towards any disposition on the part of Chinese to reject this creed is not dissimilar to that which used generally to prevail in the Occident on religious questions before the advent of the present era of tolerance. So convinced are the Japanese that theirs is the true faith that they ascribe the perversity of Chinese to ignorance, to their being misled by their leaders, and to the malign influence of Western powers. It matters not therefore if the Chinese as yet refuse to cooperate, the end seems so desirable to the Japanese that they are determined to go ahead, and they justify any means they may be called upon to employ.

There are not a few Japanese who have made sacrifices to come to Manchuria for the purpose of serving the ideal of bringing about a new order here. Unfortunately, among the idealists in positions to influence governmental policy and action are many fanatics—men with fixed ideas and narrow vision who insist upon cutting the Manchurian cloth to fit the Japanese pattern, and who, oblivious to the differences in racial temperament, conceive of what is good for the Chinese in terms of what has been found good for Japanese. They are impatient at the non-cooperative attitude of the Chinese, are disposed to adopt inquisitorial methods in seeking out suspects of heresy against the doctrine of the “Kingly Way” and are responsible for a policy of ruthless suppression of the slightest opposition to the present regime.

Another detriment to conciliation with the native population, which must be the basis of any real and permanent stability and progress, is the host of Japanese petty officials, chiefly among the gendarmerie and civilian police, who in their contacts with the Chinese are generally unsympathetic, arrogant, arbitrary and even brutal. Then too, among the civilian Japanese community, there is an undue proportion of the most lawless elements in Japan: professional thugs, petty swindlers. narcotic peddlers and other adventurers, who do much to discredit the Empire with the Chinese. Furthermore, there is a disposition among Japanese residents as a whole to regard Manchuria as theirs, having bought it at a heavy sacrifice of blood and treasure, and to expect that their interests must be given preferment over those of the Chinese. The more liberal and fair minded among the Japanese leaders themselves recognize and deplore the attitude and actions of so many of their countrymen, but so far they have been powerless to counteract it effectively.

It is galling to Chinese pride to witness the rapid tightening by the Japanese of their control over the country, but the sensible ones consider it wise to hold their peace over the facetious Japanese assertion that “Manchukuo” was created by the spontaneous will of thirty million people, for fear is the dominating note in the Chinese feeling towards the Japanese. Thus the breach between the two peoples arising from natural antipathies is widening in Manchuria as a result of closer contact.

The thought envisaged by some alarmists that Japan will some day lead the Orient to challenge the supremacy of the Occident is no more than a chimera. It takes more than the possession of a common script and racial similarity to make for mutual understanding and sympathy. The Japanese have so far failed to reveal the moral qualities which are likely to gain the respect of the Chinese people; their methods have rather aroused to the full the remarkable Chinese capacity for opposition through passive non-cooperation and obstructionary tactics.

The prophets of the Japanese “Continental Policy” disclaim any desire for conquest, but it is difficult to conceive of its making headway on account of Chinese opposition except through the gaining by Japan of control of the political machinery in China. The relationship of “inseparability” between “Manchukuo” and Japan exists only through the presence here of the Kwantung Army. Another “Manchukuo” may be created in North China or one embracing all China, and the application of force may not be necessary for this purpose so long as there is a presence of force with a will to apply it. In any event, any regime that may be set up in China having relations of “inseparability” with Japan will be established and maintained by the will of Japan and not of the Chinese people.

While a temporary military domination of a part or the whole of China by Japan is by no means a remote possibility, unless in the meantime external factors intervene or the force of the Japanese thrust exhausts itself against the solid wall of Chinese passive resistance, it is unlikely that such an occupation would last long. Even in Manchuria, even apart from its relations with China Proper and possible complications with Soviet Russia, it is difficult to conceive of 30,000,000 Chinese remaining permanently under the subjection of another race no more virile and possessing no greater inherent capacity either mental or moral. There have been many instances in history where a people having a temporary advantage because of superior political cohesion or of better preparedness for war have been able to gain for a time ascendancy over others, but only races which are weak in numbers or inferior in stamina or intellect have been held permanently in subjection. Many observers agree that man to man the Chinese is at least the equal of the Japanese in inherent intelligence and decidedly superior in self-reliance. The capacity which the Japanese have developed for organized and coordinated activity has given them a temporary advantage. If they are successful in implanting their organization in Manchuria, there is no reason why the Chinese who form a part of it will not eventually be able to take a lesson from the Japanese book. While the Chinese are undoubtedly more easy going and less resolute than the Japanese, their desire to rid themselves of Japanese domination may furnish them with the determination to learn their lesson well and put it into practice.

Were it not for the blundering methods adopted by the Japanese in their march of progress, arising from a blind disregard of the point of view of others and a disposition to take themselves too seriously, there is no apparent reason why the two peoples should not live side by side harmoniously; in fact, they have much to gain by a closer partnership, but what the Japanese fail to appreciate is that to be successful the partnership must be on a basis of equality. Admittedly the Chinese can gain much from emulating the innate orderliness and intensity of purpose of the Japanese; this would enable them to put their national house in order. On the other hand, the Japanese would do well to temper their dourness of character with the urbanity of the Chinese and develop their personality with some of the Chinese individuality.

A harmonious fusion is not likely to result under Japanese hegemony; but dark as the picture now looks for the stability and peace of the Far East, the temporary political domination of Chinese populations by Japan may result in their being able subsequently to assert their self-determination more effectively, and when they succeed in doing this it will mean the discrediting in Japan of its military clique. In this way the emancipation of both peoples may be brought about.

The eventual adjustment of the two races to one another must inevitably be a long process, which, however, can only be retarded or temporarily suspended by the intervention of third parties. In relation to Japan such intervention, not necessarily in a military sense, would only serve to stiffen the resolve to go ahead, since the Japanese have a tendency when confronted with foreign opposition to sink their internal differences and present a united front. In relation to China intervention would serve only to confirm the Chinese in their belief in the efficacy of their traditional policy of “controlling barbarians with barbarians”. Not until the Chinese realize that their hope of national salvation lies only in their own efforts and that national destruction will be the inevitable result of their continuing to shirk their responsibility towards the maintenance of political integrity will it be possible to expect their regeneration.

Respectfully yours,

J. W. Ballantine

24. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General in his unnumbered despatch of October 28; received November 26.