893.01 Outer Mongolia/34

The Consul General at Harbin ( Adams ) to the Ambassador in China ( Johnson )94

No. 133

Sir: I have the honor to enclose three newspaper reports (two in translation) regarding relations between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia which, when considered together, arouse considerable thought and attention.

The first, from the Manchu Nichi Nichi (Dairen) of September 22, reports that on September 21 an important conference was held at Hsinking to discuss matters in connection with “Manchukuo’s” borders. This was attended by high officials of the Hsinking Government and the Kwantung Army, and by representatives of the Tokyo Foreign and War Offices. The article states that the meeting attached great importance to the apparent fact that the Soviets are wielding considerable influence in Outer Mongolia, and that the outcome of the Manchuli Conference will accordingly influence the proposed Japan-”Manchukuo”-Soviet border commission. “Some of the stronger faction”, the article continued, went so far as to insist that therefore Outer Mongolia should be considered as a part of China, that its troops should be treated as Chinese communist levies, and that the whole Outer Mongolian problem should henceforth be considered in that light.

[Page 358]

The second news despatch appeared as a Shanghai report in the Harbin Nichi Nichi of September 28. It stated that the Nanking Government is negotiating with the Soviet Ambassador to China some kind of agreement envisaging the ultimate recognition of the independence of Outer Mongolia by both countries.

The third press report enclosed herewith is a portion of a Kokutsu release of September 29 with reference to the arrival at Mukden of Major General K. Doihara from an extended visit to Chahar and Jehol. The soldier-diplomat is reported as conferring with General Minami regarding “the prevention of sovietization” of North China and Chahar. Further in the same report (not enclosed) the general is said to have informed reporters that he had important conversations with chiefs of the Silingol Mongols.

While the Consulate General does not have sufficient information to interpret the real meaning of these reports, if they are true, there are nevertheless certain conclusions which may be drawn with reasonable certainty.

It can be taken as almost axiomatic that both Japan and Soviet Russia are vitally interested in Outer Mongolia, and are doing everything possible to extend their power and influence in that region. So far, the Soviets have the upper hand; the Japanese on more than one occasion have reluctantly admitted as much. The further south the Soviet influence extends, the more alarmed Japan grows; while as Japanese influence in Inner Mongolia strengthens, the Soviets in their turn become apprehensive. At the Manchuli Conference it became more and more evident that despite the fairly free action the Kwantung Army can take in Chahar and north China, it has no such liberty with regard to Outer Mongolia. Obviously the Outer Mongolians themselves cannot thus keep the Japanese in check; and just as obviously it must have been the knowledge that the Soviets would, probably with force, obstruct any advance, which kept the Kwantung Army from taking the “decisive measures” it once threatened.

It must also be remembered that Japan and “Manchukuo” are in the midst of important negotiations with Soviet Russia concerning the boundary formed by the Amur and Ussuri rivers. This problem has no connection with the Outer Mongolian problem. It is much more clear and well-defined, and it would be greatly to Japan’s advantage (in order to achieve a reasonable settlement along the Amur) not to offend the Soviets too much in Mongolia at the present time.

Although the Consulate General admits the idea to be pure speculation, it is not improbable to suppose that the position advocated by the “stronger faction” to consider Outer Mongolia as a part of China and its troops as Chinese communists, is aimed at the separation of the two [Page 359] problems. The Japanese know that any direct advance into Outer Mongolia from Manchuria will arouse Soviet opposition; they likewise do not desire, at this juncture, to arouse Soviet indignation while the Amur-Ussuri disputes remain unsettled. Consequently, it might be possible to jockey the situation in north China into such a position that the Chinese, with Japanese “assistance”, would advance against the seditious communist troops in Outer Mongolia. If the moves were made correctly, it is possible that Soviet Russia would have no grounds for asserting Japanese connivance, and the extension of influence in the direction of Urga might be brought about. To accomplish this, the assistance of the several banners of Inner Mongolia is necessary, and the recent sojourn of General Doihara in that region might have been made to arrange the necessary cooperation.

It may be readily surmised that the reported negotiations between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Embassy regarding the recognition by China of the independence of Outer Mongolia created disquiet in Tokyo and Hsinking. Japanese pressure on China for military action, possibly with Japanese assistance, in Mongolia similar to that being carried on against communists in other parts of China might easily encourage the Chinese Government to listen to Russian proposals regarding the independence of Outer Mongolia in order to escape such pressure. China, or a semi-independent state of north China, would have no excuse to despatch a punitive expedition into Outer Mongolia if that area were recognized as an independent country. Therefore, as the Harbin Nichi Nichi has editorially pointed out, the alleged Sino-Soviet conversations have great importance for “Manchukuo” and Japan, which, above all things, desire “to keep the peace in the Far East.”

As this despatch was being written, the Manchuria Daily News of September 30 arrived, containing the following statement, credited to a special Tokyo despatch appearing in the Manshu Nichi Nichi:

“China’s voluntary recognition of Manchoukuo, conversion of North China into a special area, Manchoukuo’s participation in the economic development of North China and a joint drive by the three countries against Communism form the principles of Japan’s new China policy to be enforced shortly, states a special Tokyo dispatch to the local Manshu Nichi Nichi Shimbun

Respectfully yours,

Walter A. Adams
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General at Harbin in his despatch No. 231, October 3; received November 4.