761.93/1552
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 13.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Department’s instruction No. 1638 of April 22, 1935, regarding an agreement alleged to have been made in 1932 between the then Governor of Sinkiang, Chin Shu-jen, and the U. S. S. R., and to comment on the situation existing in that province.
As reported in Hankow’s Political Report for September 193389 (page 21), the alleged text of a treaty was about that time printed in the China press. The date of the treaty was variously given as October 1 and October 31, 1931. The text, as reported by the Ta Kung Poo (L’Impartial, Tientsin) of September 12, 1933, is enclosed in English translation.89
The treaty as printed seems to be primarily a trade agreement, and inquiry at the Soviet Embassy in Peiping elicited the opinion that such an agreement may actually have been signed between Governor Chin Shu-jen and a Soviet trade organization for the purpose of facilitating commerce between Sinkiang and the U. S. S. R. In view of the State character of the Soviet official trade agencies, the distinction would seem unimportant. In actual fact, Chin Shu-jen was tried in Nanking on the grounds of usurping authority and negotiating international agreements with foreign countries, and his recent conviction and sentence to prison would indicate that he had been guilty as charged.
The situation is somewhat different as regards the relationship between General Sheng Shih-ts’ai, Provincial Defence Commissioner, and the U. S. S. R. As reported in the Legation’s despatch No. 3450 of March 22, 1935,89 the incumbent Provincial Chairman, Li Yung, is but a figure-head, the Defence Commissioner being in actual dictatorial control of the administration of the province. Evidently, as has been outlined in the above-mentioned despatch, Sheng Shih-ts’ai was able to maintain himself in power after his initial seizure of power [Page 259] only by reason of assistance rendered by Soviet Russians (not necessarily by the Government of the U. S. S. R. directly) from December onwards.
It would be assumed, under the present circumstances, that Sheng Shih-ts’ai would perforce regard any previous trade agreements between Sinkiang and the U. S. S. R. as remaining in effect. Soviet advisers have evidently been engaged, and an agreement reached for a Soviet loan to Sinkiang. These measures would probably constitute the present means of implementing the close relationship that has been established between that border province and the U. S. S. R., disguised in that rather mild form to avoid possible repercussions in Great Britain. As yet, south Sinkiang apparently occupies a position independent from the régime established in Tihua.
A Chinese official stated in conversation that the Sinkiang Commissioner for Reconstruction, Kao Hsi-ping, who arrived in China at the beginning of the year presumably to make a report on current affairs in Sinkiang, in fact escaped from Tihua, with no intention to return, by convincing General Sheng Shih-ts’ai that his connections in the Nanking Government would enable him to negotiate a large loan there for the benefit of the Tihua régime. The same source affirms that Ma Chung-ying, who offered a serious threat to Sheng Shih-ts’ai in the troubled period previous to December 1933, is now actually in a foreign concession in Tientsin, planning with “influential circles” for a return to power in Sinkiang. Money and military support are said to be forthcoming for such a venture, and the implication seemed to be that the program was known to, and had the approval of, the Nanking Government. According to informed quarters in the British Legation, however, the evidence is that Ma Chung-ying is interned in the U. S. S. R. and it could not reasonably be expected that he would return from there to Sinkiang unless it were as an instrument of the Soviets. It may be remarked, incidentally, that it appears to be the belief at the Soviet Embassy in Peiping that Ma Chung-ying is still in the U. S. S. R.
M. Duboscq’s analysis of the Sinkiang situation, as outlined in the article enclosed in the Department’s instruction, would thus seem to approximate the truth of the matter. In general, Sinkiang now occupies, as it has for most of its history, a position with only very tenuous relations to China. The construction of the Turksib Railway and the economic development of neighboring regions of the U. S. S. R. have tended more than ever to bring about the orientation of Sinkiang toward that country instead of in the direction of China, to which it nominally maintains allegiance. This development of a closer relationship between Sinkiang and the U. S. S. R. has of recent [Page 260] years been partly by the medium of trade relations between the U. S. S. R. and the Kirghiz tribes in west Sinkiang, and the extension of those trade relations has led to concrete changes in the political complexion of Sinkiang.
On one point of M. Duboscq’s speculations regarding the future an objection would seem, from the Far-Eastern point of view, to be warranted. M. Duboscq appears to believe that the development of Soviet influence in Sinkiang indicates a Russian pressure southward that would eventually aggravate the historical conflict between the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain in that part of the world, and that Japan would view such a development with equanimity in return for Soviet “encouragement” of Japanese expansion in east Asia. It would appear to the Legation that the European situation has brought the U. S. S. R. and Great Britain to a better understanding than has at times prevailed between the two countries, and that this development has changed somewhat the character of Soviet-British relationships in central Asia. If this belief is correct, it is probable that Soviet policy in Sinkiang will be designed to avoid giving offense to the British in India and Tibet. That this may be so seems to be indicated in Soviet Russia’s failure, thus far, to penetrate into south Sinkiang where the existence of Soviet influence would be certain to arouse British suspicions. It would appear more probable that the U. S. S. R., suspicious instead of complacent regarding Japanese plans in east Asia, would attempt to further the development in Sinkiang of a political organization that, having close relationships with and being friendly toward the U. S. S. R., would constitute a barrier against a flanking movement by Japan against the Soviet Union. In such a hypothetical political organization (which seems actually to exist in its beginnings under the leadership of Sheng Shih-ts’ai), political sovereignty would still reside technically with the Republic of China. In actual fact, the semi-independent character of China’s last border province would be accentuated, especially should national or international problems faced by the Nanking Government be of such intensity as to engage all its energies, so that it would in many respects be closer to the U. S. S. R. than to China both as regards commerce and international policies. Presumably, however, Sinkiang would not proceed along the same road as that taken by Outer Mongolia, by reason of the consideration Moscow at present holds for British political susceptibilities.
As of possible further interest, there is enclosed a copy of a Tass news despatch of May 17, 1935,90 regarding a conference reported to have taken place at Tihua on April 10 of this year. Sheng Shih-ts’ai, [Page 261] according to the report, outlined the Provincial Government’s policy as being one of resisting “imperialist attacks” and maintaining China’s sovereign control in the province. The despatch is perhaps most interesting for its tone, which is of exactly the same quality as that characterizing news reports regarding affairs in the U. S. S. R. itself.
It is being suggested to the Legation at Nanking that it may prove possible to obtain additional information there regarding the general subject of the relationship existing between Sinkiang and the U. S. S. R.
Respectfully yours,