793.94/6909
The Counselor of Legation in China ( Peck ) to the Chargé in China ( Gauss )20
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this office’s confidential despatch No. L–575 of January 23, 1935,21 on the subject of Japanese policy vis-à-vis China and mentioning that Mr. Y. Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation resident in Nanking, had called on General Chiang Kai-shek on January 21 and on General Huang Fu on January 22 concerning current Sino-Japanese issues.
A foreign newspaper correspondent stationed in Nanking called at this office on the afternoon of January 23 to describe two interviews he had had with Mr. Suma following the latter’s conversations with high leaders of the Chinese Government, the substance of Mr. Suma’s remarks being as follows:
Mr. Suma stated that he had talked with Dr. Wang Ching-wei as well as with General Chiang Kai-shek, General Huang Fu and other leaders, and that the conversations with the first three had each lasted from two to four hours. Mr. Suma did not repeat what he had said to the individual officials named, but he made to the newspaper correspondent a careful and lengthy statement, which appeared to have been premeditated and was apparently designed to convey the general tenor of his official discourses.
Mr. Suma said that it was true that various “minor questions” such as the establishment of through traffic between Peiping and Mukden, the resumption of postal relations, and the arrangement for custom houses along the Great Wall had been settled by negotiations, but the fundamental issues between China and Japan which had brought about the Tangku Truce of May 1933 remained unchanged. By an involved process of reasoning Mr. Suma argued that the Tangku Truce was the result of the attitude of the Chinese toward Japan. That is, the truce had been sought by the Chinese as a means of satisfying the Japanese military sufficiently to make them willing to refrain from occupying North China, and the prior necessity for such occupation, as envisaged by the Japanese, had arisen because of the general [Page 17] Chinese attitude toward Japan. In other words the truce had failed to alter the Chinese attitude and the Chinese persisted in their attitude of resistance and antagonism toward Japan. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, for example, “talked negotiation on the one hand” and advocated resistance on the other. (Parenthetically, it is of passing interest in this connection that Dr. Wang in his recently published work China’s Problems and Their Solution does advocate resistance against the Japanese.)
What he, Mr. Suma, was now attempting to accomplish was to persuade the leaders of the Chinese Government to make up their minds, formulate a definite Chinese policy toward Japan and then to adhere to that policy. The trouble was that China really had no policy. China should either embark upon a policy of cooperation with Japan, and announce it, or embark upon a policy of resisting the Japanese and say so. What China’s ultimate destiny is, in respect to this question of the relationship between the two nations, Mr. Suma observed, should be obvious; and he said that both the Generalissimo and General Huang Fu realized that eventually China must cooperate with Japan. As for other leaders of the Government, such as the Ministers of Finance and of Industries, Mr. Suma said he had pointed out to them that embarrassments would probably arise if they did not accept what is China’s destiny and cut their cloth accordingly.
In emphasizing these considerations Mr. Suma made it clear that in his opinion there could be no question but that China was destined to work with Japan and that if the Chinese Government did not adapt itself without undue delay to the workings of fate, it was very likely that circumstances would conspire to produce complications of a serious nature. He referred more than once to the possibility that failure to solve this fundamental issue would automatically occasion some regrettable “incident” between the two nations.
By way of comment on what precedes, I have the honor to recall that the Japanese Government has made no secret of its view of what should be the relationship of China to Japan. There is enclosed a copy of a press despatch bearing the date line Tokyo, May 23, 1934, in which occurs the following illuminating paragraph:
“Mr. Hirota is reported to have requested Mr. Ariyoshi22 to press Chinese leaders for their recognition of Japan’s Oriental policy, which, the Foreign Minister said, is based on the mutual existence of Japan and China. Japan is willing to assist China toward her unification and prosperity, if China will understand Japan’s responsibility for Oriental peace. Furthermore, Mr. Ariyoshi was requested to explain to Chinese leaders that Japan must oppose any action by any third country which may harm Japanese-Chinese relations.”
Presumably this press despatch received the approval of the Japanese censor.
It has been impossible, as yet, to learn what sort of response Mr. Suma has received to the representations made by him to the Chinese leaders.
Respectfully yours,