761.94/834

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 1331

Sir: I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 500 of March 25, 1935, from the Embassy in Moscow63 on the subject of Soviet-Japanese Relations in which the belief of Mr. Demaree Bess64 and Mr. Walter Duranty65 that “considerable progress is being made between the Soviet Union and Japan in respect of a détente and a mutual understanding with regard to their respective interests” was reported to the Department. Despite recent improvement the Soviet-Japanese situation does not appear fundamentally to be entirely satisfactory to Japanese military leaders, especially in the Kwantung Army. As this Embassy has reported before, the Japanese Government does not think or act as a unit and, even in the special field of the Foreign Office, the attitude of the military limits the freedom of action of Mr. Hirota and his colleagues. At the present time it is perhaps pertinent to discuss the attitude of the military towards the USSR in so far as it has been revealed.

Although the Japanese Army is genuinely motivated by idealistic sentiments which envisage an exalted role for the Empire, the army’s interest in Soviet-Japanese relations falls into two general categories. One of these is the conventional role of an army, the problem of defending the national territories and dependencies. The other derives from the circumstance that through its constitutional prerogative of direct appeal to the Throne the army occupies a position of such weight and independence that it may have and, in certain instances, may carry into effect (as it did in 1931) policies quite separate from those conceived in the Foreign Office. From this fact arises a second, extraordinary role, largely political in nature, which devolves from the army’s efforts to preserve its preeminent position in the national life.

In so far as the conventional role of the army is concerned, the defense of “Manchukuo” against the USSR is a technical and strategic problem. The army is now responsible for the defense of the whole area of Manchuria as well as the Japanese Empire and this situation presents certain new aspects. For the first time there is no buffer region militarily speaking, between Russia and Japan; for the first time there is a long continental frontier. Before leaving Tokyo on his present trip to Manchuria the War Minister, General Hayashi, is [Page 194] reliably reported to have stated that one of the objectives of his trip was to study the problem of the defense, delimitation, and demilitarization of this frontier. Incidentally he told one of the local correspondents of the American press that he favored the reduction of Soviet troops along the border to the strength of the Japanese forces on the Manchurian side. Accordingly, were the Japanese Army content to limit its activity to the military exigencies of the Soviet-Japanese-“Manchukuo” situation, a détente or pact such as Messrs. Bess and Duranty seem to envisage would not be faced with extraordinary difficulties. In fact it would tend to facilitate the discharge of the army’s duty of ensuring the defense of “Manchukuo”. However, the maintenance of the army’s traditional position within Japan as well as its present predominance within the Government complicates the situation.

Turning then to the extraordinary role of the army in Japan, there are three general factors of perennial importance which render unlikely the acceptance by the army of any pact or mutual understanding with Soviet Russia. They tend to align the army against the Foreign Office; they made it impossible for the Foreign Office to accept Russia’s offer of a non-aggression pact in 1931; and they greatly influenced Mr. Hirota in his choice of a policy of settling specific Soviet-Japanese problems one by one. The three factors are:

1.
The annual compilation of the budget is at hand and it is said that the army intends to seek an even larger appropriation for 1936–1937 and thereby to improve the present military machine.
2.
The perpetuation of the predominant position of the army in Japanese national life depends in some measure upon the existence of a potential enemy or menace, and Russia is the traditional and logical country to fulfill this role.
3.
The army does not intend to bind itself by restrictions which might limit any course of action deemed advisable in future; it remains suspicious of the USSR.

To justify its position in accordance with the foregoing three factors one would expect the appearance of anti-Soviet propaganda. The following items are pertinent in this connection:

On April 23 the Chugai Shogyo asserted that the army had sounded a warning against excessive optimism for the future of Soviet-Japanese relations merely because of the transfer of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The article pointed out that the Soviets were not withdrawing troops from the Far East to Europe despite the settlement of the railway question, remarked on the increased capacity of the transportation system of the USSR in the Far East through double tracking, discussed the progress of Russian heavy industry producing war material, and charged the Soviets with seizing the delta between the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and erecting strong [Page 195] fortifications there. On the same day Major General Itagaki, Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, told newspaper men that the Soviet menace had not yet passed. On April 25 a rumor was given wide publicity that the Soviet authorities are shortly to commence construction work on a new railway linking Chita and Urga, a move which the army is said to interpret as indicative of a more aggressive policy in Outer Mongolia. On April 28 another article was circulated by Rengo and Nippon Dempo in which certain views allegedly held by the military were set forth. According to this article it was stated that a new proposal for a non-aggression pact on the part of the USSR would meet with no more favorable reception than did the original proposal of December 1931. It was further claimed that the military had discovered that the Soviets were spending some of the proceeds of the sale of the CER for the expansion of their influence in Sinkiang, that many communists formerly in North Manchuria had now been ordered to North China to foment trouble, and that the military preparations of the USSR were more intensive than ever and pointed to the danger of aggression against “Manchukuo”. On May 8 a Rengo despatch was circulated which claimed that the defense of Vladivostok had been greatly improved, that the Soviets were concentrating their efforts on construction of submarines for the Far Eastern fleet, and that the number of Russian army planes in active service in the Far East now exceeds 800. On May 17 a despatch from Hsinking reported that information current in “certain circles” (i. e. the Kwantung Army) indicated that the Soviet authorities had appropriated proceeds of the sale of the CER for construction of a new network of railways linking Siberia with Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia.

More important evidence of the attitude of the Japanese military is the recent report concerning a new pamphlet which, according to a Rengo article of May 13, has been in course of preparation by the War Office to deal with the existence of the Soviet menace. According to the report 100,000 copies of this pamphlet are to be distributed throughout the country. It is said that the pamphlet is divided into a historical analysis of the Russian invasion of the Far East, a presentation of the extent of the Soviet military preparations in this region, and an argument proving that a state of crisis still exists in Soviet-Japanese relations.

The foregoing propaganda is fairly clear indication that, in certain respects at least, the Japanese Army is displeased with the striking improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations; that really cordial relations would not be welcomed by the military; and that the negotiation of a general pact with the USSR remains unlikely. In this connection the tenet held by so many military men in Japan that [Page 196] Russia must some day be pushed back to Baikal should be remembered. In view of the attitude of the Japanese military therefore it may be stated that Mr. Hirota’s policy of settling individual problems with the Soviet Union one by one is the only one open to him. Moreover it may be stated that no reason is yet seen to modify the belief previously expressed* that Soviet-Japanese relations are entering a phase less acute because less vital to Japan. The force of Japanese activities appears to be, for the time being at least, directed elsewhere.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
  1. Not printed.
  2. Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor.
  3. Special correspondent of the New York Times.
  4. Embassy’s despatch No. 1236, April 5, 1935. [Footnote in the original; despatch printed on p. 106.]