792.94/16
The Minister in Siam (Baker) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the subject of the development of rapprochement between Siam and Japan, regarding which rumors have persisted for the last two years, with a recent tendency to increase, and to submit the following report regarding the character of the rumors, the evidences of such a trend of policy on Siam’s part as they imply, and the influences tending to promote or curb a rapprochement between the two nations.
Upon the accomplishment of the coup d’etat of June 24, 1932, it was generally feared by certain European nations that their influence in Siamese affairs would be greatly diminished, and the possibility of communism and other radical policies was discussed in foreign publications (Legation’s despatch No. 59, of May 1, 1934, entitled, “Comments on article of Baron de Lapomarède in the ‘Contemporary Review’ ”47). The new régime is obviously averse to relying in the former measure on advisors from abroad, employing foreign educators, and sending its students abroad; it likewise shows a desire to admit no further foreign industries and to replace foreign industries by government enterprises, but it has as yet done little toward realizing this desire. A solution of fiscal problems seems to account in part for these particular aspects of antiforeignism. In any event, the extent to which Siam has undertaken to shake off European influence appears overstated in the world news; it should be considered that Siam is still a member of the League of Nations and has uniquely included a clause in its constitution reading, “A declaration of war will only be made when it is not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.” While a definite statement or any assurance as to the trend of the Siamese Government is even yet impossible to make, it may be safely said that the rumors were exaggerated and the misgivings were but partially justified, for although [Page 171] foreign trade has suffered and much legislation has been passed showing little regard for foreign interests, if not deliberately unfavorable to them, the new administration has up to the present followed a comparatively cautious policy and shown no strong tendency to elude the influences to which it has been subject in the past.
In the early part of the constitutional régime, conjectures arose as to whether Siam under the new spirit of nationalism might become interested in a Pan-Asiatic movement and become leagued in its international policies with other oriental states. As there are only two nations, China and Japan, with which a linking of interests might be suspected and there were good reasons to believe that Siam would not be strongly drawn to either, little basis at first could be found for these surmises, but the primary position of Japan in Siam’s import trade, the increased frequency of missions of various types, an apparent emulation of Japanese militarism by the military group in control of the Siamese Government, and an assiduous promotion of the idea through publicity in Japan now give support to the belief that a general rapprochement between Siam and Japan is developing. It is believed that a careful consideration of all the facts available will show that the aim of rapprochement has been fostered almost entirely by the Japanese side; the Siamese response has been little more than passive.
The first favorable act of the Siamese régime that brought attention to the possible development of increased good will between Siam and Japan was the abstention of the Siamese delegate to the League of Nations on February 24, 1933, from voting on the League’s recommendation regarding the Manchurian dispute. While the abstention was apparently neutral in character and the favorable Japanese market for Siamese rice at the time would have made a vote against Japan rather indiscreet, the Japanese press proceeded promptly to magnify the importance of Siam’s vote, if only to seek a way out of its own humiliation and understate the moral judgment which the passage of the resolution implied. The following news items appeared in the Bangkok Daily Mail of February 27, 1933:
Japan Thanks Siam for not Voting on Manchurian Report
(By Transocean Radio)
Tokyo, Feb. 25—The Parliamentary Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs passed a resolution expressing their thanks to Siam for having abstained from voting in the League Assembly at Friday’s sitting.
(By Reuters Service)
Tokyo, Feb. 26—Profound gratification was expressed in the Lower House by the Committee in a session on Siam’s action in abstaining from voting against Japan.
[Page 172](By Rengo Radio)
Tokyo, Feb. 25—Tokyo gives prominence to a Geneva message that the Siamese delegate abstained from voting on the League’s recommendations regarding the Manchurian dispute at yesterday’s League Assembly.
This friendly gesture towards Japan by Siam, the only independent State in the Orient except Japan and China, is greeted with a keen appreciation not only by the Pan-Asiatic League here but by the people in the general and the officials, who are convinced that only Asiatics can appreciate Japan’s legitimate position.
A study of the information available in the Legation’s records shows few signs of any effort on the part of either Siam or Japan to promote the friendly relations between them before the beginning of 1934. Even in 1931 Japanese propaganda was evident in Siam for the purpose of offsetting disapproval of Japan’s operations in Manchuria. Following the Mukden incident (September 18, 1931) and throughout 1932 the boycott of Japanese goods by the local Chinese on an effective scale seemed probable; appeals of the local Japanese Legation were apparently effective, though it cannot be stated whether the Siamese Government was influenced by sympathy or by prudence in suppressing the boycott. In October 1932 a Japanese fisheries vessel visited Siam and permission was sought for Japanese fishing in Siamese waters; vigorous opposition of the industry prevented granting of the right. There were some subsequent occasions (from 1932 to 1935) of arrest of Japanese fishers poaching in Siamese waters; full reports were seldom given as to punishment, but rumors, perhaps true, circulated to the effect that punishment was alleviated by protests from the Japanese Legation.
In the twelvemonth following the abstention from voting so much appreciated by Japan, the restriction of rice imports by that country, instituted in October 1933, and the poaching of Japanese fishers tended to strain relations from the Siamese standpoint. On the other hand, in August 1933 a statement appeared in a Siamese newspaper that Japan had promised to help Siam in case of foreign intervention in Siam’s affairs; a communiqué denying the report was promptly issued by the Siamese Government.
Early in 1934 two rumors affecting the relations of the two countries gained prominence in newspapers of southeastern Asia. One of these rumors alleged an agreement for the building of a canal across the Kra peninsula by Japanese interests; it had its origin in Singapore and may have had the purpose of stimulating interest of the British public in the Singapore naval base at a time when appropriations were under consideration in London. (Reference is made to my despatch No. 80, of May 29, 1934,48 regarding the Kra canal project.) This rumor was [Page 173] emphatically denied by the Siamese Government. The other rumor reported plans for the smelting of Siamese tin by a Japanese smeltery to be established in Indochina; it emanated from Penang and was disturbing principally to British interests. Neither of these rumors was ever satisfactorily verified.
Among later rumors it was reported that a Japanese air service would soon be established between Tokyo and Singapore, including Bangkok as a station.
During 1934 and 1935 the activities of delegations from the one country to the other and Japanese naval visits have attracted note. Since February 1934 Siam has received one major trade delegation and three naval visits from Japan; on the last naval visit the existence of good will in the history of the two nations was stressed and plans were made for the erection in Bangkok of a monument to Yamata Nagamasa (called in Siamese Chao Phya Nagara), a Japanese of some note in Siamese history, to commemorate the good will of the two nations, the cost to be provided by contributions of the Japanese. In the same period a number of Siamese delegations have visited Japan; these include Siamese officials sent at Government expense to the Conference of Pan-Pacific Buddhist Associations held at Tokyo and Kyoto in July 1934 and a trade delegation sent by the new Siamese Chamber of Commerce to attend the Commercial Exhibition at Osaka in October 1934. Early in 1935 some forty officials of the Siamese Government were granted funds for visiting neighboring countries for purposes of study and observation in their special fields; many of these officials will spend part of their time in the Philippines, but practically all of them will visit Japan, where considerable publicity regarding Siamese interest in things Japanese will naturally be forthcoming. A group of Siamese dancers left Bangkok for Japan in March 1935, planning to give exhibitions there; it is authoritatively stated that the venture was financed and originally promoted in Japan. Since the new Siamese leaders have a military background and are interested in promoting the military efficiency of the country, they have tended to emulate Japan, and on this account have assigned military and naval officers to study in Japan; it should be noted, incidentally, that the first Minister appointed to Japan by the new régime, Major General Phya Indra Vijit, appointed August 22, 1932, had previously followed a military career. (The present Minister to Japan, Phra Mitrakarm Raksha, has followed a career under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) The extent to which the Siamese Government has taken initiative or merely responded to invitations in sending officials to Japan may be variously interpreted; while it may be confuted that the Siamese Government is more than mildly inclined to any interest in a trade rapprochement or a political rapprochement, it is quite evident that the Siamese leaders, [Page 174] who won their position in national affairs by military force and are devoted to a militaristic policy, have followed the military trend in Japan attentively, hoping perhaps to profit by the Japanese example rather than sympathizing with Japanese aspirations. Phra Mitrakarm Raksha’s reference to Japan as the “big brother” of Siam on his arrival at Kobe last June to assume the post of Siamese Minister is perhaps the most extreme utterance of a Siamese official suggestive of a common interest.
Certain developments in the official missions of the two countries pointing to increased interest in their relations with each other occurred in 1934. In August 1934 a member of the Japanese Naval General Staff assumed his duties as Naval Attaché to the Japanese Legation; the Legation also has a resident Military Attaché. No other country maintains a naval attaché in Bangkok, and only one other, France, has in recent years maintained a resident military attaché. In the same month Phra Pramonda Panya was appointed as first Siamese Trade Commissioner to Japan; Phra Pramonda was at the time Acting Director General of the Siamese Department of Commerce (under the Ministry of Economic Affairs) and was well qualified for the assignment.
The deteriorated condition of the Siamese press, effected by adverse business conditions and by censorship, has been a harmful factor in influencing the Siamese viewpoint regarding affairs abroad. The attitude of both the general public and state officials toward foreign nations is naturally dependent upon the character of foreign news disseminated here. A limited educational background in rural Siam renders a large portion of the country’s population negligible in the force of public opinion. In general, public opinion would be exerted by the officials and employees of the Siamese Government, in Bangkok and also throughout Siam, and by the Chinese and Siamo-Chinese, largely urban; further reference will be made to this point.
The Rengo agency, reported to be subsidized by the Japanese Government, has supplied Bangkok newspapers with much propaganda in the last few years; the volume of Japanese news compared with European and American news, not to mention its quality, might create an unduly high estimate of Japan’s place among the nations; as to substance, the news deals primarily with developments creditable to Japan, the unflinching determination of that nation and each triumphant step in relation to the sale of the erstwhile Chinese Eastern Railway, withdrawal from the League of Nations, retention of the Mandated South Sea Islands, relations with Manchukuo, and the like, being reiterated with unnecessary frequency while the subject remains in the foreground. A difference with France on some small [Page 175] islands claimed by Japan was several times reported with assurance that Japan would never give them up, but no final report of the disposition of these islands was ever provided. Such matters as occupation of southern Chinese ports by Japanese troops and the visit of General Doihara to Hong Kong are never reported in the newspapers of Siam, and it appears quite reasonable that Japan should not desire to have such news published in Siam.
While a copious supply of Rengo news of the nature specified might create a false perspective among the Siamese as regards Japan, it is well to consider that the portion of Siam’s population interested in foreign affairs sufficiently to read the news is largely Chinese and Siamo-Chinese. Occasional statements that Siam’s population is one sixth Chinese are subject to question; however, estimates of a million Chinese of pure stock (including those born in Siam) and an equal number of Siamo-Chinese at least half of Chinese stock are not unreasonable. The number of Siamese who are interested in foreign affairs by the same standards probably does not exceed two million, Assuming an attitude of hostility on the part of the local Chinese and Siamo-Chinese toward any rapprochement with Japan, there is little probability that close cooperation will develop. Although the political leaders of Siam are somewhat free at present from any necessity of taking public opinion into consideration, this situation makes rapprochement with Japan in a major aspect highly improbable.
Most of the leaders of present-day Siam have been educated in Europe and America; while it is reported that Siamese students are turning to the Japanese universities, the extent and significance of this trend have not yet been ascertained. While rumors have been circulated that Siam was considering the employment of Japanese advisers, experts, and educators, there has been only one instance of employment of a Japanese, an American-educated teacher, and further employment of Japanese seems unlikely. The problem of language is an important consideration in such matters.
The trade situation as regards Siam’s imports is no doubt the most serious grievance of European nations at present respecting the relations of Siam and Japan. Statistics showing the proportion of the Siamese import trade taken by various nations are annexed.49 Exchange fluctuations and the variation of commodity prices make an analysis of the import trade for recent years difficult, as no general reports are readily available dealing with the subject. The statistics reveal unmistakably, however, that Japan has made inroads on the trade of other nations. There is no indication that the Siamese authorities are favoring Japanese trade; so long as the import restrictions [Page 176] of Japan which have kept the Japanese market practically closed to Siamese rice since October 1933 remain in effect, there is no likelihood of a trade rapprochement. Recent hints have been wired from Tokyo (political report for March 1933 [1935])50 that the restrictions may be abolished. Siamese exports to Japan for recent years are stated as follows:
| Year | Amount in Ticals | Amount in Dollars | Percentage of Total Exports | |
| B. E. | 2473 (1930–31) | 8,188,795 | 3,562,126 | 5.1% |
| “ | 2474 (1931–32) | 8,012,299 | 3,445,289 | 6.0% |
| “ | 2475 (1932–33) | 9,099,904 | 2,957,469 | 6.0% |
| “ | 2476 (1933–34) | 4,253,397 | 1,743,893 | 2.9% |
A review of this despatch will reveal my view that the recent promotion of good will between Siam and Japan has been fostered almost entirely by Japan, with little more than passive response on the part of Siam, that there are no present signs of trade rapprochement, that the Chinese element in Siam tends to insure exclusion of any generally supported political rapprochement, and that the prospects of rapprochement have been unduly publicized in Japan.
Responsible officials of the Siamese Government are quick to deny any reports to the effect that rapprochement with Japan exists in any way. A recent report to the effect that Siam had ordered thirty war vessels from a Siamese [Japanese?] shipbuilding concern was officially denied as ridiculous. I am inclined to believe that the denial is genuine and that the report had its origin entirely in Japan, where the motive for representing Siam as a friendly nation is patent.
Incidentally, there is little likelihood that Siam will recognize Manchukuo, as a strong protest from local Chinese would arise immediately if the subject were considered. There has been no report that this subject has ever been discussed by the Siamese Government.
It may be said in a general way that Japan and Siam have little in common, the cultures and the nature and ways of the two people differing widely. Their religions are less similar than is supposed. Historically, the two nations have had very little contact until quite recently. Their language of common approach is English. The position of the English language in Siam will in itself insure a reliance of Siam upon the West for many years of the future, and it is only the matter of trade and the present militaristic aspect of Japan’s national life that give foundation to any prospects of rapprochement between the two nations.
The features of Siam’s relations with Japan which are of most direct interest to the United States, apart from present trade trends, [Page 177] are probably the efforts of Japanese interests to encourage cotton growing in Siam and the possible influence which success of the Japanese oil policies affecting the petroleum market in Japan and in Manchukuo may have upon the course taken by the Siamese Government concerning the oil industry.
A list of references to the relations of Siam and Japan in the Legation’s political reports since September 1931 is enclosed.51
Further developments on this subject will be closely followed by the Legation and any occurrences of interest will be reported promptly to the Department.
Respectfully,