793.94/6996
The Minister in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 1.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegram No. 126 of March 23, 12 noon, 1935, in which I expressed the opinion that recent Sino-Japanese conversations which had been the subject of widespread speculation were primarily for the purpose of an improvement of a general character in those relations and that there would be gradually apparent evidence that such improvement was being effected, and to supplement this view, which is apparently becoming more and more widely held by Chinese and Japanese observers, with comment made to me April 26 by Mr. T. V. Soong, Chairman of the National Economic Council, and to a member of my staff on April 27 by Mr. S. Matsumoto, a Japanese liberal who has been the head of the Rengo (Japanese) News Agency in China for the past two years. (A copy of a memorandum of my conversation with Mr. Soong is enclosed.41)
Mr. Soong informed me that the Japanese were now concentrating on working out some plan for economic cooperation with China and that there were no demands being made in this connection. He said that the Japanese, however, were pressing the Chinese very hard along certain lines. It would seem that these Japanese desiderata did not play an essential part, with one exception, in the now famous conversations, as I shall indicate in listing them as Mr. Soong gave them to me. It would also seem that these desiderata may be considered as among those developments which may be expected gradually to take place, at least in some measure, as an outcome of improved relations.
Mr. Soong said that the Japanese were pressing the Chinese in respect to five matters.
- (1)
- The Japanese wish to establish a Sino-Japanese air transportation company with the right to operate air lines in provinces of North China. (Heretofore both Chinese and Japanese informants have [Page 161] stated that the Japanese wish, under the terms of an agreement reached at the time of the signing of the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, to establish aerial connection between Manchuria and North China. It is possible that Mr. Soong is mistaken in the extent of the service desired by the Japanese. At least it would seem to belong to the consequences of the Tangku Truce rather than to any new developments.)
- (2)
- The Japanese wish to construct a railway from Shihkiachuang, near the Shansi coal fields, northeastward to connect with the Tientsin-Pukow line at a point near Tsinan (Tsangchow). (As reported by the Legation to the Department last summer, the question of construction of this line has long been a subject of conversation between interested Chinese and Japanese.)
- (3)
- The Japanese wish to effect cooperative exploitation of cotton-growing in North China. According to Mr. Soong, the idea of the Japanese is not to purchase Chinese cotton outright but to advance money, seed, and machinery to Chinese farmers, export their labor through cropping arrangements, and obtain control over the cotton in order that it may be sold in whatever market is best. (This question has also long been known as under discussion, presumably between industrialists rather than between representatives of the governments of the two countries.)
- (4)
- The Japanese wish to have China accept Japanese advisers, especially in the Ministries of Finance and of War. (This question, it is believed, figured in the recent conversations above-referred to, although it is by no means a new one, and I shall discuss it more in detail later in this despatch.)
- (5)
- The Japanese Navy, through the Government [Governor?] General of Formosa, is pressing on the Fukien Provincial Administration a loan of $40,000,000 (Chinese currency) for “reconstruction purposes”. (This would seem to me to be probably a question not dealt with by the two central governments but a local question pushed by the Japanese Navy and another evidence of sectional dealing by the Japanese with provincial Chinese authorities.) Mr. Soong added that the National Government was unwilling to authorize the Chairman of the Fukien Provincial Administration to agree to this arrangement and that the Japanese were adopting a threatening attitude as a result.
From what Mr. Soong said, it would seem that the recent conversations were primarily intended by the Japanese for a general improvement of relations which would make it possible for the Japanese to obtain eventually various agreements on such questions as those reviewed above.
Mr. S. Matsumoto informed a member of my staff that the gist of the significant conversations for cooperation was as follows: the Japanese Minister had called on General Chiang Kai-shek in January and had asked General Chiang to declare himself either for or against the Japanese and, in case he was “for the Japanese”, to put down anti-Japanese activities in order that Sino-Japanese trade might revive. Mr. Matsumoto said that Japanese diplomats had presented no other [Page 162] “demands” but that at about the same time a Japanese military officer had called on a Chinese military officer (presumably General Suzuki, then Japanese Military Attaché, and General Chiang Kai-shek) and had stated that the Japanese would like to have the Chinese employ Japanese advisers.
When asked about the aims of the Japanese military and of the Japanese diplomats, Mr. Matsumoto replied that the Japanese military were not interested in economic questions but in strategic questions, and that their primary object was to make certain that the Chinese army would not become a menace to Japan, an object which they believed they could obtain through the appointment of advisers. Such appointment, he said, would result in the adoption by the Chinese military of Japanese military tactics and strategy and the use of Japanese-made equipment. He summed up the situation by saying that the Japanese military wished to establish a relationship with the Japanese [Chinese?] military similar to that existing between the navies of the two countries. According to Mr. Matsumoto, the object of the Japanese Foreign Office was an improvement of feeling between the two countries which would make possible greater economic cooperation.
Mr. Matsumoto also said that the Kwantung Army (or “Manchukuo”) regards China as a foreign country which it may possibly be necessary to conquer, while the military and the civilian officials in Tokyo believe that Sino-Japanese friendship is requisite. He added, however, that he does not expect the Kwantung Army to take military action in China because he believes that it will be kept contented by gradual developments, including the appointment of Japanese advisers and the establishment of aerial connection between North China and Manchuria.
From this and other information obtained from both Chinese and Japanese sources, it would seem that the less reactionary Japanese are insisting on the stamping out of anti-Japanese feeling in the hope that good relations may bring about an improvement in Japan’s economic situation, which will help to solve Japan’s population and food problems, while the Japanese military are at the same time working toward the end of keeping China subservient to Japan militarily. It may well be that the end of either policy, as far as China is concerned, will be the same. Both policies imply infringement of Chinese independence.
It seems at present that the reactionary Japanese military are willing for the time being to permit the more liberal Japanese to try out their policy of achieving their end through diplomacy, a development which scarcely seems to mean, however, that the more liberal Japanese element is stronger than it has been since the Manchurian incident. [Page 163] Rather, it would appear that the liberal element is now permitted to act on sufferance of the reactionary military.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩