793.94/6990
The Second Secretary of Legation in China (Atcheson) to the Minister in China (Johnson)28
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my confidential telegram of April 25, 12 noon (No. 83 to the Department), reporting remarks made to me by the vice-head of a National Government Ministry in regard to the present Sino-Japanese situation.
1. Certain of the informant’s remarks seem to approach the truth:
That in their démarche which began in January 1935 the Japanese have so far made no presentation of formal demands but have “mentioned” their desires in respect to present and future relations between China and Japan;
That following the suppression of the anti-Japanese boycott, the Chinese Government has been taking no concrete action toward meeting those desires and is resting on the belief that the Japanese will not make any concerted move toward pressing forward their program for Sino-Japanese cooperation until some time during the coming summer after the communist-bandit situation in Szechwan and Kweichow (and Yunnan) is liquidated and General Chiang Kai-shek takes summer residence at Kuling; and
That something more officially articulate by the Japanese than the mere mentioning of desires is to be expected with certainty before the summer shall have passed.
The statements of this Vice Minister have acted in my mind to confirm a conviction that the Japanese protagonists in the present drama have not formally presented any list of formal demands and that the nearest approach to a demand, as the term is generally understood, have been oral representations, doubtless strongly emphasized and perhaps repeated, looking to an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations and suppression of the anti-Japanese boycott. In my opinion, the suggestions and proposals which Japanese officials have made to Chinese officials in conversation have for the most part been much milder in tone than the descriptions of Japanese requirements which the Japanese Foreign Office has used the foreign and other news correspondents in Tokyo to make clearly known to China and the world. A review of the conversations which this office has had with Chinese officials and others tends to support this conviction. I refer particularly to the statements made in confidence by subordinate officials. Speaking as personal friends and knowing that they would [Page 126] remain anonymous, their statements in general point with fair clearness toward the truth.
It has been apparent that the conduct of the Japanese-Chinese conversations concerning a rapprochement have since January been chiefly in the hands of representatives of the Japanese Foreign Office and this is undoubtedly a strong indication, in the light of the known phases of the conflict in respect to China policy which goes on between the Foreign Office and the Japanese military, that the Japanese diplomatic agents have employed a less abrupt and more indirect approach than would have been the case if the military party in Japan had not decided, as seems true, to give the Foreign Office a chance to show what it could accomplish.
2. The Japanese have of late shown a striking lack of vigor in pushing their program with the Chinese. This lowering of the pressure is providing the Chinese an excuse to procrastinate in meeting their wishes and is, one may believe, predicated upon a policy of temporary patience, following the initial and somewhat bombastic stage of the démarche. The Japanese are giving the Chinese an opportunity to pave the way among themselves to bring about the kind of rapprochement which the Japanese have conceived. In other words, the Japanese are marking time.
The present lull in important conversations between Japanese and Chinese officials has perhaps been a logical sequel to the bee-hive activity at the end of January and through February, of Mr. Y. Suma, First Secretary of the Japanese Legation and Consul General in Nanking, in describing Japanese hopes for Sino-Japanese cooperation to General Chiang Kai-shek, Dr. Wang Ching-wei, Dr. Sun Fo, General Huang Fu, and other Government leaders, great and small. One takes the example of Mr. Suma because, except for some conversations elsewhere concerning pending North China affairs, Nanking is the nerve center of developments affecting the National Government and has now, it is believed, become the center of Japanese political activities in accordance with Japanese pronouncements that Japan would concentrate diplomatic activities in the capital rather than continue to attempt “local settlements” in other places. To venture an explanation of Mr. Suma’s descriptive contribution to the journalese jargon of Far Eastern diplomacy, the former “water fowl policy” of the Japanese, characterized by a smooth surface with busy paddling underneath and propulsion hither and yon, has been changed to a “woodpecker policy” under which the woodpecker sits in one place and pecks away until he has accomplished his purpose.
3. The Minister of the informant, who was quoted in the telegram under reference, some days previously in conversation described the present Sino-Japanese situation as a “deadlock” but this can scarcely [Page 127] be accepted as accurate. The term deadlock smacks too much of face saving; it implies something of an equality in strength between China and Japan in the discussions initiated and prolonged by the Japanese; and the Chinese are not, of course, in the fortunate position of an equal in the contest. This fact goes a long way to explain the general pessimism which throughout the past three months has characterized the outlook of Chinese officials upon the future of China in respect to relations with Japan. They realize the helplessness of their Government in its present predicament. They know that it can do little but delay, and then not for too long, in meeting Japanese desires. They reasonably fear that if the Japanese are pacified too readily or too successfully, the incumbent Government cannot survive the wrath of its internal enemies. The dilemma is indirectly expressed in the Government’s attempt to explain its policy or lack of policy to the Chinese people by reversing, with characteristic sophistry, one of the specious political slogans the Chinese delight in: the former political philosophy was an nei jan wai (roughly, pacify the internal enemies—the Southwest, et cetera—and repel the external, meaning the Japanese) and this has now been changed to jan nei an wai (conciliate the external enemy and suppress the internal, meaning the Communists). Neither of these formulas is satisfactory; the Government itself knows that it cannot hope to endure unless it defeats both the external and internal enemies or unless it conciliates both; and it knows that the accomplishment of either double task is an impossibility.
4. Out of the situation brought about by the Japanese démarche, there are beginning to appear manifestations of a profound change in the Chinese official mind. It is acquiring something of what the Japanese, using the phrase in a different sense, have often spoken of with respect to their pre-1931 difficulties in Manchuria as a sense of the realities. There have been many times in China’s history when the Chinese have realized that they must give in to superior force and have, in their own fashion, capitulated before superior force as a temporary device adopted of necessity but with hope that in the end the enemy would be circumvented or overcome. There are few Chinese officials at present who see any prospect of China ever equalling Japan in effective military strength, of successfully competing with Japanese goods, of winning effective support from the League of Nations or other countries against the Japanese. It is safe to say that there are now not any who can simulate to themselves any hope of satisfying the Japanese by much less than actualities. For the first time, perhaps, Chinese officialdom has generally become perspicacious enough to know that equivocation is useless. The rapidity and apparent success with which the Chinese Government suppressed the anti-Japanese boycott, so long officially described as an uncontrollable manifestation [Page 128] of spontaneous popular feeling, is significantly indicative. The Japanese Minister, during a call on April 15 on the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs prior to departing for Japan, complimented the Chinese Government upon its success. The Chinese Government in this has done the concrete thing and has not, as has so often been the case in the past, depended upon the semblance instead of the reality. The Chinese have come to a pitiful pass and they are not able to deny the truth to themselves. Turning from practical politics to the more spiritual phases of the profound change that has been worked in the Chinese mind, there is no more poignant example than the complaints recently appearing in the vernacular press against the Japanese air of superiority. The Chinese press “demands” that the Japanese treat as equals a people who have traditionally indulged themselves in a sense of superiority over foreigners of every nationality.
Being without hope, the Chinese appear nevertheless to be making an attempt to soften as much as possible the blows they expect. While delaying further action in meeting Japanese wishes, they look to be manoeuvring for a position which might enable them to make a show of bargaining with some semblance of equality in the contest that is looming before them. Whether with false hopes or not in this particular connection, they seem to be making a strong play for Japanese good will. This has been indicated in various ways—in the pronouncements of Dr. Wang Ching-wei and General Chiang Kai-shek and generally in the cordiality which Government officials here exhibit toward Japanese officials. The cordiality of Chinese officials was very noticeable at Mr. Suma’s reception on March 21 for the Tokyo Asahi “goodwill” fliers which was attended by a large number of them, including the Nanking Garrison Commander and a large staff of officers. The one remarkable exception was the then Mayor of Nanking, Mr. Shih Ying, who refused to participate in or hold any functions for the fliers, although instructed to do so, and shortly thereafter his resignation was accepted. While opinions differ as to whether his recalcitrance on this occasion was the determining cause of losing his office (he has lacked important political backing and was replaced by a henchman of Dr. Sun Fo), Mr. Suma informed me after the appointment of a new Mayor that the Japanese were very displeased over his lack of official courtesy to the fliers and had had various previous difficulties with Mr. Shih. He added that he had nevertheless not “requested” Mr. Shih’s retirement but his manner of making this statement carried broad intimations, (and incidentally manifested the feeling of power enjoyed by the Japanese in respect to their present position in this country).
A startling evidence of the desire to placate the Japanese was the remark made to the American Minister by Mr. Tang Yu-jen, Administrative [Page 129] Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, on February 23, 1935, that the Chinese and Japanese Governments were in tacit agreement that the question of Manchuria should not be discussed now because any settlement of it was impossible (vide Nanking office’s despatch to Peiping Number L–632 Diplomatic, February 28, 193529). That the Chinese Government, in the face of the press, Party and Southwest storms about the “lost provinces”, should admit the insolubility of the Manchurian question and be willing to ignore it in discussions with the Japanese concerning Sino-Japanese relations, tells its own story.
Along the same line was a Foreign Office denial, published by the Central News Agency at Nanking on April 9, of the United Press account of an interview which Mr. John R. Morris, United Press correspondent, had with Dr. Wang Ching-wei on April 1 at Nanking. According to Mr. Morris,
“While he (Dr. Wang) declared no Sino-Japanese rapprochement had been reached and added such a rapprochement in the sense of a complete understanding was unattainable while Japanese troops occupied Manchuria and Jehol, President Wang said he believed Japanese opposition had played no part in reducing the prospects of early international financial assistance.”
This was evidently considered too strong a statement in public print and was emasculated by the Foreign Office spokesman, quoted by the Central News Agency eight days later:
“Mr. Morris asked whether relations between China and Japan had turned for the better. Mr. Wang replied that this was a fact. Mr. Morris asked whether a settlement had already been reached in respect of the problem of the Four Eastern Provinces. To this Mr. Wang replied that with regard to this question both China and Japan were still holding the views to which they each had hitherto maintained. Mr. Morris said that in that case the so-called turn for the better had not taken any concrete form. Mr. Wang said that in order to secure a turn for the better in Sino-Japanese relations steps must first be taken to adjust other questions. Mr. Morris asked whether Japan had objected to China’s contracting for an international loan. Mr. Wang replied that the Japanese Government had not given any expression of that nature.”
5. Whether the statement cited in my telegram of April 25, 12 noon, that the Chinese Government anticipates no further definite moves on the part of the Japanese until the conclusion of the Communist campaign may be taken as an indication that Mr. Hirota will not visit China in the near future, I should not venture to say. I do not think so. I think rather that the superfinal dilatoriness of the Japanese is a case of waiting, not only to give the Chinese Government a chance to meet their wishes, but of waiting also until General Chiang is physically [Page 130] and mentally more accessible than he is in Chungking or flying between that place and Kweiyang and Yunnanfu. It has been considered strange by some observers that the Japanese should not press their case strenuously at this time while the Generalissimo’s military organization is heavily engaged by the communist bandits. It has been argued that this cannot be kindness on the part of the Japanese and there have even circulated rumors that General Chiang has bargained with them to let him alone at this time. A sounder explanation, I believe, is that the Japanese entertain hopes that the Chinese will come to their point of view as regards Sino-Japanese cooperation and their apparent patience is designed to let the Chinese capitulate to their wishes without the appearance of coercion. It is possible, too, that the Japanese look to the clearsightedness of General Chiang Kai-shek in grasping the “realities”, his actual leadership of the Government (with Madame Chiang Kai-shek), and the courage and decisiveness of character which he might be hoped to exhibit in the task if he decides to “cooperate” with them. It will be recalled that the first intimation at the end of January that the Japanese had made a new and far-reaching move in Far Eastern affairs was an account of a meeting with Shanghai bankers at which General Chiang Kai-shek proposed accepting financial assistance from Japan. The other arguments, however, should not be ignored completely. If it is at all true, as the Vice Minister was quoted as saying in the telegram under reference, that the present inaction of the Japanese is giving the National Government an opportunity to come to agreement with the Southwest, there is to be considered the fact that any change which may have occurred in the attitude of the Canton clique has occurred since the visit to Canton about the middle of March of General Doihara.
6. If the Japanese find it possible to persuade the Chinese Government, without public threat or overt action, to cooperate with them as they desire, the future of the present or any future Government working along those lines will depend in large measure upon the reaction of the people as fostered by the political enemies of those in power. It is doubtful whether the peasants and lower classes generally care to any great extent so long as their livelihood is not adversely affected and a growing spirit of something like patriotism, based upon a realization of the actualities, may in the end bring some of the most powerful non-Government figures into the Governmental fold. One of these is Mr. T. V. Soong and only last evening I was informed by a reliable American of standing who has known Mr. Soong well for several years and has seen him within the last few days that his opposition to the Government’s policy of conciliation toward Japan which has kept him from again taking active part in the Government is disappearing.
[Page 131]There are many reasons why reasoning Chinese other than Government officials might incline to favor a program of cooperation with Japan if they could do so without stigma. If Japanese financial assistance could pull China from her present deplorable condition, if Japanese money could develop the North China cotton industry to a point where the Japanese would fill their needs from the Chinese crop instead of the American, if Chinese wool could replace Australian wool in the Japanese market, if Chinese spinning mills could operate profitably for Chinese investors with Japanese assistance, if various Chinese industries could be “rationalized” as Japanese industries have been and sell their products successfully in the world’s markets, there would be reason to consider economic cooperation favorably. And many of these “ifs” could become realities.
With all their business genius, the Chinese have signally failed in many branches of trade. Outstanding examples are the loss of the onetime great tea trade; the conspicuous lack of success attending the greatest of Chinese shipping enterprises, the China Merchants Steamship Company; the adverse effects of dilution and other elements upon the trade in wood-oil; the recent auctioning in Shanghai of one of the mills of the Sung Sing Cotton Weaving and Spinning Company. The export trade in Tientsin and Peiping rugs is largely in foreign hands although there was no reason, in the days of good markets in the United States, why an efficient Chinese organization should not have been able to design and make and sell abroad as successfully. Sausage-casings, wool, hides and skin, straw braid, egg products and many other exports go abroad chiefly through foreign firms.
The reasons for Japanese success in industry, and particularly in producing certain cheap articles which successfully compete abroad with native articles are too numerous and complicated to warrant discussion here. One of the most important reasons why Chinese industries, if efficiently operated, often do not succeed is that, unlike the Japanese, they do not receive Government support either in the way of subsidies or of low taxes. As one Chinese informant remarked to me recently, there is no possibility that the industrialization of China will enable Chinese to compete in their own market with cheap articles imported from Japan because the Chinese Government will continue to “tax industry to death” in this country. The Chinese Government is chronically short of funds, a condition which may be expected to endure, and there is little hope that industries will ever have the encouragement of reduced taxes.
7. It is a temptation to speculate upon the future of the foreigner and his interests in China in case the Chinese mind should come to accept economic cooperation with Japan along the lines conceived by [Page 132] the Japanese and whether out of such relationship between the two peoples the pan-Asia idea might not flower into something more than a Utopian kind of concept in the minds of Oriental visionaries. But it is doubtful whether, if they attain their own way with China, the Japanese will develop the ability to restrain the manifestations of their own inferiority complex and accord the Chinese the friendly treatment as equals that would be necessary to win the Chinese to a real sense that their destinies are joined together.
Respectfully yours,