681.003/201
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 19.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that in compliance with the Department’s instruction No. 898 of July 12, 1935, regarding the modification of the customs régime in the French Zone of Morocco, the Embassy has informed the Foreign Office orally and in confidence of the substance of that instruction, the contents of an outline of the note of April 6th last, to the French Government, which it contained, and the substance of the portion of the Department’s instruction to the Embassy at Paris, No. 669 of December 18, 1934,88 described in the Department’s instruction under reference.
The Foreign Office expressed its thanks for the information conveyed, and made the following observations. The treaties which it feared that France might be tempted to ignore, as out of date, were only those treaties which prevented France from raising the Moroccan customs tariffs. This applied quite definitely to the two British treaties of 1856 and the Spanish treaty of 1861. The Foreign Office felt that, while it was arguable that the Act of Algeciras could be construed as implying that France could not raise Moroccan tariffs without the consent of the Powers, it was mainly the old British and Spanish treaties which were in fact restraining France, and it was therefore these treaties which France was likely to challenge.
[Page 994]In this relation the Foreign Office said that the French and Spanish were now holding discussions on Morocco, but they did not know whether these discussions were confined to economic questions or included extraterritoriality as well. Since Great Britain’s extraterritorial rights in Morocco also depend partly upon the 1856 treaties, the Foreign Office is doubly anxious that France should renew its recognition of those treaties. On the other hand, the question of extraterritoriality is precisely the same in both the French and Spanish Morocco, and France and Spain are at least in analogous positions as regards customs tariffs in their respective zones. Thus the Foreign Office could not expect that Spain would necessarily take a vigorous stand in maintaining its treaty of 1861. And since, therefore, in the last analysis the British treaties of 1856 afforded the only safe check on France, the Foreign Office regards it as important that France should not be placed in a position where, in order to increase Morocco’s customs revenue and protect Moroccan industries, she might be tempted to challenge the older treaties. The Foreign Office fears that such a step is not unlikely unless some relief is forthcoming, and once such a step is taken tariffs would in all probability be greatly increased and capitulations attacked.
In the last paragraph on page 2 of the Department’s above mentioned instruction to the Embassy at Paris, No. 669, December 18, 1934, the Department suggests that a possible solution would be a reasonable increase in customs duties, uniform, void of discrimination in their application and agreed to by all the Powers signatory to the Act of Algéciras. Commenting on this suggestion, the Foreign Office felt that this would be a greater concession to France than that contained in the above mentioned Anglo-French arrangement, since the latter only provides for an increase in duties on a few articles. The Foreign Office also asked whether the above mentioned possible solution was actually suggested to the French by our Embassy in Paris and, if so, in what terms and what did the French say in reply. The Embassy said it would refer the inquiry to the Department.
Respectfully yours,