765.84/3212: Telegram
The Chargé in Ethiopia (Engert) to the Secretary of State
246. Legation’s 243, December 19, 5 p.m. With the rejection of the Franco-British proposals the Italo-Ethiopian conflict enters upon a new phase, and although the absence of the Emperor and other high officials renders it difficult to obtain first hand impressions, the following comments are based on conversations with persons close to the Emperor who have recently seen him at Dessie, as well as on a careful personal study of the whole situation:
1. To say that Ethiopia is grievously disappointed is putting it very mildly. If the proposals had come from France alone she could have understood it but to see Great Britain associated with them has filled her with dismay. Great Britain had been looked upon as the only great power sincerely anxious to make the League of Nations a reality and the one steady driving force behind League action in the present crisis. See the Legation’s telegram 102, September 26, 11 a.m.29 But now profound skepticism as to the purity of British motives is beginning to be felt in view of Great Britain’s apparent weakening on the question of principle.
2. Although Hoare declared some time ago that there was no question of “sidetracking the League” or of a “disreputable deal” with Italy, the unusual degree of secrecy surrounding the recent peace making efforts of British and French experts in Paris inspired no confidence in Ethiopia. See also Legation’s 154, November 3, 10 p.m. While it was claimed that these negotiations were entirely within the framework of the League and had the blessing of the Coordination Committee, their results are looked upon here as a betrayal of the Covenant and a breach of faith with Ethiopia. Having all along realized the great risk of relying on League action the proposals now [Page 721] submitted by Great Britain and France confirm the worst fears of Abyssinians by what seems to them virtual dismemberment of their country under League auspices.
If all powers, it may be argued, place political and economic nationalism above the preservation of world peace or if every small and weak nation is to be sacrificed in order to prevent ill-feeling between the large ones it will encourage treaty breaking in the future that neither the League nor any other form of collective security will ever recover from the blow.
3. Great difficulty is experienced in understanding British mentality which allowed itself to become co-sponsor of terms it must have known would be unacceptable to Ethiopia for the British Legation here had repeatedly warned its Foreign Office that such tentative proposals stood no chance of acceptance. It is clear now that the step was a mistake involving serious danger to British prestige not only in this country but in Europe as well, for it looked as if England had been frightened into bringing pressure to bear on Ethiopia and while the enemy was in occupation of part of her territory. And the resignation of Hoare proved that British public opinion would not stand for this kind of diplomatic scene shifting. My contacts with the British Legation lead me to believe that London, nettled by increasing anti-British resentment in Italy which imputed to her a desire to force upon Italy the choice between diplomatic humiliation or a European war, was eager to prove readiness to go to extremes in seeking a compromise which might end the war without further embittering her relations with Italy.
4. But as France is regarded as holding the balance in Geneva her constant and more or less surreptitious parleying with Rome has not Unnaturally led to the firm belief here that Laval bears largest share of responsibility both for the war and the recent abortive peace proposals (see also Legation’s 190, November 27, 8 p.m.30). The latter are interpreted to be a last desperate effort to save Mussolini’s face by persuading London that to extend sanctions to oil, iron, copper, et cetera, meant war with Italy and all that it implied. From members of French Legation and others, I gain impression that Laval has been harassed by dissatisfaction of French business and industrial circles at the prospect of repercussions on foreign trade from drastic sanctions and also alarmed by Italian troop movements to the French border, not to mention serious internal political crisis and opposition from the Right to the extension of embargoes which many here feel Laval may not much longer survive, although Herriot’s resignation as party leader is frankly not understood. The Emperor is privately reported to have said a few days ago that France would never be [Page 722] interested in the punishment of an aggressor unless Germany were the aggressor and that so long as she was afraid of throwing Mussolini into Hitler’s arms she would continue to be over tender to Italian feelings.
5. The definite collapse of the concerted Franco-British approach to the problem of conciliation probably means that no fresh efforts to find a solution through diplomatic negotiations will be made in the near future. Even if Italy had given the proposals her unqualified approval—which she apparently did not—it might merely have strengthened France’s hand in opposing more extensive embargoes but would not have influenced the Ethiopian Government in the least. The Emperor’s attitude has been consistent throughout; he has pleaded his case with great cogency, he never obstructed direct diplomatic negotiations when the latter were still possible.
He demanded arbitration from the beginning and showed a commendable spirit of conciliation when he accepted in principle the recommendations of the Committee of Five. But he has never allowed himself to be intimidated and he will never consent to any compromises consisting of annexations in disguise.
6. At the present time the gulf between Mussolini’s idea of an acceptable basis of settlement and what Ethiopia might be prepared to concede is beyond all hope of bridging. Although Italy has never publicly declared what her ultimate and real intentions are, it is obvious that [from?] the Duce’s speeches that he is out to teach the Abyssinians a lesson which somehow is to bring about a radical and permanent settlement of the East African question. The whole problem is, therefore, squarely back on the doorstep of the League but unless the sanctions to be applied are powerful enough to paralyze the war effort of the aggressor, or his communications are cut by closing the Suez Canal, Ethiopia is sure to be left in the lurch. However, she is by now quite reconciled to the thought of a bitter and single-handed trial of arms and feels today far more confident of the outcome than when the war began.