765.84/3034: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
356. I just had a talk with Eden. He told me that he had been on the point of sending a message to Lindsay, for your information, when he learned that I was here.
Hoare had gone to Paris determined to play to get an accord with the French. Repeated reports from Rome had given rise at least to the apprehension that Mussolini would attack Great Britain if the oil embargo was established, this despite the fact he appeared to know that he was beaten before he started but he seemed to prefer to be beaten by the British Empire than by the League of Nations. There was no question, Eden continued, as to the commitments of the French Government to back up Great Britain in this eventuality but with the best will in the world Laval seemed doubtful as to whether he could lead France into participation in hostilities. I may add parenthetically that a number of good observers have questioned whether France would march even if the Government so desired. Furthermore, Eden said the British had been trying out others of the most willing participants in sanctions as to their attitude in the eventuality of hostilities and the reply had not been highly satisfactory.
He also expressed concern regarding “the result of fleet action in narrow seas.”
The British Government therefore felt that it was essential to make the greatest possible efforts towards conciliation. Obviously if conciliation fails they are in a better position to demand from the others precisions as to their attitude in the event that hostilities arise from the continuation of the application of sanctions. The British Government, Eden claims, has not changed its policy. It has been part of its objective from the first to endeavor to bring about an agreement, if possible, and it is prepared to continue with the League in the application of sanctions and the extension of sanctions if this attempt fails.
He says it is by no means sure that Mussolini will accept. Indeed, very confidentially, the latest reports from Drummond threw extreme [Page 709] doubt on his acceptance. Eden is most concerned as to the situation in which they would find themselves if Mussolini accepts and the Negus refuses. The British Government could not contemplate bringing pressure to bear on Abyssinia to accept these terms.
He then sketched to me the terms of agreement. Relying on my memory I repeat as accurately as I can: in the North, Adowa (excluding Aksum) and a portion of the Danakil Desert are transferred to Italy. A section of Eritrea northwest of French Somaliland including Assab considerably more than a “corridor” is ceded by Italy to Ethiopia. In the South there is a rectification of the frontier of Ogaden. The territory bounded on the North by the eighth latitude and on the West by the 36th longitude to be sanctioned by the League without surrender of Ethiopian sovereignty, in which administration Italy plays a prominent part, including colonizing and economic rights. The status of the territory is not discussed in detail, although obviously the matter of policing will be the critical feature. While the plan on which Peterson17 had been working had provided for approximately the same exchange of territories in the North, in the South it had provided for territorial exchanges only.
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