765.84/2284: Telegram
The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State
562. I am informed by an authoritative source as follows respecting certain elements in the Italo-Abyssinian situation:
1. Respecting Franco-British exchanges, London presented a formal communication to Paris which stated in effect that Great Britain greatly wished to bring about a détente between London and Rome which it was believed France also would feel to be desirable. As having in part a bearing on the accomplishment of such a purpose, the following were proposed:
- (a)
- France to accord British naval units facilities, including docking repairs and refueling in French ports, particularly to include Toulon and Bizerta.
- (b)
- Should Great Britain withdraw naval units from the Mediterranean equivalent French naval units would take their place, the French to maintain their ship dispositions in a manner to keep a strategic check on Italian naval movements and further to keep the British naval authorities informed of all such dispositions.
- (c)
- The French and British naval authorities to work out a plan for the strategic cooperation of the two navies in cases of a hostile act of Italy against her.
- (d)
- British and French air authorities to cooperate in respect of Italian frontier dispositions of French aircraft.
The communication further informed Paris that London would make a proposal to Rome that Great Britain would withdraw certain naval units from the Mediterranean on condition that Italy withdraw two army divisions from Libya, but that Rome would be informed at the same time that since, even with the withdrawal of the two divisions, Italian forces in Libya would remain superior to British forces in Egypt, Great Britain could not undertake not to send reinforcements to Egypt.
2. Drummond93 took up this proposal with Mussolini but received a heated refusal. This is assumed to be the reason why apparently important British naval units have not been withdrawn from the Mediterranean.
[Page 677]3. Respecting the proposals on Mediterranean naval arrangements made to France, Paris accepted.
4. In return for their acceptance, the French asked and the British agreed to enter into a general staff arrangement with the French to include land, air, and naval forces for the protection of France’s eastern frontier. The British general staff is now engaged on plans of that character. Whether the British and French general staffs are yet working in cooperation in this is not clear.
5. In respect of the Franco-British-Italian diplomatic exchanges, concerning a settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, which have been reported in the press, it appears that what Italy desires and what London will accept as a basis of negotiations have not undergone any substantial changes. The Italian demands are, in substance, the same as embodied in Aloisi’s reply94 to the inquiry of the Committee of Five in Geneva and the British basis of negotiations is, in substance, that of the Paris offer of August.95 There is thus a wide gap between the two positions. The British have not recently discussed these matters direct with Italy, but relations with Rome have rested with Paris. In the recent Franco-British experts’ conversations in Paris, the French proposed a compromise consisting of a complicated system of mandates over various portions of Abyssinia which presumably in the end might result in Italy’s gaining absolute control of the country. The British rejected a compromise in this form, stating that they preferred that any transfer of territory, as was indeed envisaged in the Paris offer, should be absolute and not compromise the future.
6. The present status of the Franco-British relationship is naturally not viewed as a complete agreement as to policy. There is on the other hand reciprocal acceptance, believed to be to some degree, of the guarantees of mutual support outlined above and the immediate arrangement that should Italy move against Great Britain in the Mediterranean, France will grant full armed support.
The détente sought by Great Britain in respect of Italy is desired by Great Britain at this time in view of British public opinion which objects to the Government’s reporting Great Britain’s attitude toward Italy as animated by Great Britain’s concept of her individual interests and for strategic reasons to make the Italian issue common to all League states. Fundamentally, the British-Italian relations are felt by the British to be at a very serious stage.