765.84/1211: Telegram
The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 18—5:50 a.m.]
303. I had a conversation with Beneš76 today of which I give the following resume of the latter’s observations. He said that in order to clarify his own thoughts he would like to try to tell me how he weighs probabilities and to give me his best guess as to the future.
Mussolini and Beneš have known each other well since 1918. Mussolini won his way to the front and kept control of Italy through one thing only—his conviction of the innate cowardice of humanity. Mussolini is not an intelligent man but his instincts often lead him to the same results as would intelligence. There are no counsellors whose advice he follows. His actions and decisions are absolutely unpredictable. Hence, the unexpected may happen and Mussolini take a sudden decision which would improve the situation or vice versa. There is another factor which is of real importance, namely, the growing disaffection to Mussolini in Italy. Balbo77 is against him, so are the King and the General Staff. The Army apparently sees little glory to be gained in this war and tremendous risks to be taken. Balbo is beginning to show his opposition in the hope that he would be Mussolini’s successor should the latter fall. Balbo is not man enough to win the succession. It is more likely that the King in the event of Mussolini’s fall would summon a group of generals to take over immediate control perhaps only provisionally. What effect this disaffection will have before hostilities begin is problematic. After they are in progress and especially after prolonged hostilities its influence will undoubtedly be felt.
As to League procedure the Assembly cannot continue indefinitely. Presumably hostilities will begin shortly after the meeting closes. The Council will at once be convoked but will probably refer the matter to a special Assembly. This Assembly will unquestionably decide that a violation of the Covenant has been committed and that Italy is the aggressor. Here is where Mussolini’s belief in the cowardice of mankind is going to play him false. It does not take much courage to join a band of 50 nations especially if they are given the lead by Great Britain and France. That France will act with Great Britain in the final analysis there is no likeliness of a doubt. After the declaration of the aggressor by the Assembly the Council will meet again to consider the steps to be taken. While the French may make suggestions of further effort towards conciliation the British [Page 654] will push for sanctions and will receive such complete backing that sanctions will be applied.
France and England are at present discussing sanctions and are keeping certain other members of the League informed. If sanctions are applied they will be in the nature of economic and financial restrictions. Germany will not march with the League in this matter. On the other hand, Germany will not side with Italy. Hitler meant what he said in his Nurnberg speech about keeping out of trouble which does not concern him. In any case, owing to the difficult financial situations in which both Germany and Italy find themselves with respect to foreign credit and exchange it is very doubtful whether German markets could be of much assistance to Italy. Thus economic and financial sanctions can be quite efficacious without German participation.
Once hostilities have begun and after an Italian victory Mussolini [would?] possibly appeal to France and England to negotiate a settlement using as a point of departure the offer that will be made to Italy by the Committee of Five and claiming something in addition on the strength of his victory. How the great powers would feel about such an offer is problematical but as a loyal supporter of the League of Nations Beneš would never vote for its acceptance by the League. However, if negotiations were carried on by the two powers outside the League of Nations the settlement would be their responsibility and not involve the League as such. It is sincerely to be hoped that the American attitude would not be too discouraging to Great Britain in particular. Hoare had told Beneš that so far the American attitude had been most helpful. This was all to the good and it was to be hoped that when the test came the United States in particular would not feel that it had to stand in the way of what the states of Europe felt they must do.
Cipher to London, Rome, Paris.