765.84/922: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State

397. I venture to elaborate on the Cabinet decisions dealing with the immediate future reported in my 392, August 22, 7 p.m.66 The arms embargo, which is one of those measures, as stated in my 391, August 22, 4 p.m., on which the Cabinet was divided, was not lifted in compliance with strong representations from the French Government that all measures provocative to Mussolini should be avoided as far as possible, prior to the September meeting of the Council. The [Page 638] French also stressed the point, that since the League cannot impose sanctions until Italy has been named an aggressor the discussion of sanctions at this time was also provocative. From a purely commercial point of view, I understand the French indicated that premature discussion of economic sanctions would also result in the fostering of closer economic ties between Italy and Germany. The British Cabinet accepted this occasion to fall in with the French views; at the same time the immediate offensive of the British Government will be to persuade France that the two nations must really meet this threat together at Geneva, for the reason that if Mussolini’s defiance succeeds, a similar defiance by Hitler must follow, and if, in these present circumstances the League is virtually destroyed as a means of meeting such aggression, then British public opinion, which will only permit England to enter European affairs under the aegis of the League, will force a policy of isolation on Great Britain vis-à-vis the Continent, and therefore Great Britain’s support to France will be curtailed.

In delegating authority to a special Cabinet group, as announced yesterday, the Cabinet empowered this body, in conjunction with the Committee on Imperial Defence, to make any required rearrangement of forces affecting the fleet, air force and troops, especially since British Mediterranean policy has in the past been predicated on a friendly Italy.

Atherton
  1. Not printed.