765.84/892: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 20—8 p.m.]
384. Sir Samuel Hoare sent for me this evening and first mentioned that through its telegram of Saturday afternoon60 the Foreign Office had kept you informed of the Paris negotiations, and that in effect the proposed terms for negotiation were tantamount to a concession to Mussolini of all he had looked for earlier, and indeed had he accepted them, he might well have claimed a decisive victory. The Foreign Secretary obviously resented the fact that with the knowledge that the Paris proposals were being formulated and that Laval was to telephone to him Mussolini absented himself from all communication with the outside world by going to his troops, leaving Suvich merely to reply that none of the propositions from the tripartite negotiations were acceptable. Sir Samuel Hoare then added it was clear the man was approaching a form of madness in which he conceived he was going to reconstruct the old Roman Empire and in fact the Italians very candidly said in Paris that England had lost its power and that Italy was going to be the new dominating force in Europe. The Foreign Secretary said that in his opinion Mussolini was bound to undertake military action in Abyssinia. Nothing could stop it. England had now to consider her position and there would be a meeting this week of the Cabinet upon Mr. Baldwin’s return but the position as the Foreign Secretary saw it was as follows: at Geneva England would go as far as France was willing to go, but no further. (My 381, August 19, 6 p.m.61). How far France would go, the Foreign Secretary said he could not say at the moment, but he did realize that the French considered one of the solid things they had in Europe was the Franco-Italian understanding and in his opinion it meant far, far more to France than the so-called Franco-Soviet alliance. He felt the League procedure might be more protracted than was generally realized, in that after the Council met on September 4th an inquiry would have to be instituted and out of that inquiry would follow the consideration of the imposition of sanctions more especially economic. Thus it might be the end of September or later before that definite phase arose. Whether the imposition of economic sanctions was feasible in the modern world was another question, but without making any suggestions the Foreign Secretary said he hoped it was realized how important it would be in such an [Page 634] eventuality to know what position the United States would take. There was also another eventuality which, again without making any suggestion, the Foreign Secretary said was something in which his Government was vitally interested, namely, whether there would be united Anglo-American support for a meeting called under the Pact of Paris. The third eventuality which the Foreign Secretary said he had under consideration, arose out of the presumption that Italy would start her Abyssinian campaign some time after the middle of September. Reports the British were receiving from Italian African possessions now indicated the utmost confusion in the army preparations and the British were not at all convinced that the Italians could achieve the conquest of Abyssinia easily. But if they were permitted to undertake the campaign unchecked, reaching Adowa and gaining anything that could be claimed as a victory, the immediate resultant effect upon Mussolini and Italy would be of such a triumphant character that there would be no stopping the Italians in their demands in Abyssinia and for that matter in other spheres as well. Therefore, Sir Samuel Hoare felt that the United States and England, together with France and other nations, must consider how to unite world opinion in condemnation of Italy at the earliest possible moment after she starts the military conquest of Abyssinia. This Sir Samuel felt might check Mussolini’s pretensions, and even with a military victory to his credit, make him realize it was a more hollow achievement than he was leading his people to believe.
In conclusion, the Foreign Secretary said that he was conscious of the many problems that confronted the United States Government, both internal and external, and therefore in indicating to me certain world aspects of the present question, which naturally concerned the United States, he was in no way making suggestions but he did believe if the United States Government was thinking along the lines he had indicated as being the considerations the British Cabinet must have in mind, it might lead to a clearer definition of the possibilities of close Anglo-American cooperation to meet this threat to world peace.
In press conversations today Foreign Office has stated Great Britain would at no time consider sending troops in to Lake Tsana, but further indicated that one of the first problems facing the Cabinet would be the question of lifting the embargo on arms to both Abyssinia and Italy. On this particular question the Italian Naval Attaché today stated definitely but in strict confidence that in the event of shipment of arms to Abyssinia, Italy would consider what method she must be prepared to undertake to prevent their reaching their destination.