765.84/870
The British Embassy to the Department of State 56a
Aide-Mémoire
The United States Embassy in London having informed the Foreign Office that the United States Government would be glad to receive any information available regarding developments in connection [Page 629] with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute, His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires has been instructed in a telegram from Sir Samuel Hoare to convey to the Secretary of State the following account of the recent course of events.
The following is a summary of the proceedings at Paris up to date for the confidential information of the United States Government.
Baron Aloisi proposed to Monsieur Laval as the basis of the conversations:—
- 1.
- French and British recognition of Italian political and economic preponderance in Abyssinia.
- 2.
- A declaration by both countries of their recognition of Italian need of expansion.
- 3.
- In the event of agreement on the above two Points an assurance of Italian cooperation at Geneva.
Baron Aloisi explained that a Class C Mandate over Abyssinia was what Italy really wanted.
Monsieur Laval replied that he could not accept the idea of a Mandate. Nor could he accept these Points, of which 1 and 3 were very indefinite, as the initial basis of negotiation. He suggested that an attempt be made to secure, under the terms of a treaty to be signed by France, Great Britain, Italy and Abyssinia, certain economic concessions and the appointment of some Italian technical advisers. These advantages, combined with rights of settlement in certain parts of Abyssinian territory, should ensure to Italy by peaceful means a good deal of what she might seek to obtain by means of war. Baron Aloisi did not reject this proposal out of hand and it was then worked out on paper.
At the first session of the Conference Mr. Eden, who was supported by Monsieur Laval, said that the Italian proposal that the two countries should endorse Italian political as well as economic preponderance in Abyssinia could not be accepted as a basis of the conversations. (Monsieur Laval had previously informed Baron Aloisi that France had already (? declared) her economic disinterestedness in Abyssinia and that he had no doubt of a similar disposition on the British side.) He and Mr. Eden then urged further examination of Monsieur Laval’s above-mentioned tentative proposals. But when the draft prepared by the Quai d’Orsay was produced, Baron Aloisi rejected it and Monsieur Laval and Mr. Eden said that they, too, could not accept it. But it was agreed that the experts should produce an amended draft in order to make a beginning.
Meanwhile Signor Mussolini in Rome was warned through the French Embassy that proposals would shortly be submitted to him and that, although neither the French nor British Governments had accepted them, they represented the limit of (--------) efforts to establish a basis of agreement. Signor Mussolini should therefore [Page 630] examine them very carefully and should bear in mind that in the event of his rejection of them, Monsieur Laval would probably have no further proposals to offer and would be obliged to range himself alongside his British friends. Monsieur Laval gave the impression that he appreciated the real British attitude (which both he himself and Mr. Eden had explained to Baron Aloisi as being impersonal and based on (--------) the League). He had already explained to Baron Aloisi that French policy was based on the League and that France could not contemplate the possibility of a revulsion of British public opinion from cooperation in European affairs. Lastly Monsieur Laval intimated that he proposed himself to telephone to Signor Mussolini.
At the resumed Conference the same evening Baron Aloisi at first refused even to communicate the amended draft proposals to Rome, but later, under pressure, agreed to try to secure Signor Mussolini’s authority (? to) discuss them. His chief objections were to references to the independence and integrity of Abyssinia and to the open door in Abyssinia and to the absence of sufficiently clear provision for Italian political predominance in Abyssinia. He had already been informed by Mr. Eden, in reply to a previous remark that economic concessions would be useless without reinforcement by Italian garrisons, that Abyssinia could not make any such concession.
The French Ambassador in Rome had an interview with Signor Mussolini on August 13th. His intention had been to discuss the proposed Danubian Pact, but the conversation turned almost entirely on Abyssinia. The French Ambassador urged Signor Mussolini that sufficient progress be made in the matter of the Danubian Pact to allow of an early conference at Rome. Signor Mussolini said that while he desired to keep European politics apart from the Abyssinian question, he could not accept this proposal. His main difficulty was that he was under a threat of economic sanctions, if they were not already in operation. For example he was unable to obtain such materials as coal and copper from British sources except against gold payments and he regarded this as a preliminary form of sanctions. (The French Ambassador was not aware of the fact that the reluctance of British exporters is solely due to their fears that payment will be indefinitely postponed unless it is secured in gold.) Signor Mussolini added that there had been somewhat similar difficulties in regard to the United States and that there was also some trouble over the lira in the Near East. But, he said, his chief cause for anxiety was the situation between Italy and Great Britain. He informed the Ambassador that he did not intend to leave (? the League) but that he reserved the right to be represented at Geneva even if his only purpose was to find out who was on his side and who on the side of Abyssinia. In reply to an enquiry by the Ambassador, Signor Mussolini [Page 631] said that France could best help Italy in this grave situation by persuading Great Britain to be more favorable to the Italian demands.
He mentioned in the course of the interview that he had 160,000 men in Africa, but this may have included workmen as well as soldiers.
The French Ambassador found Signor Mussolini looking rather tired, greatly preoccupied and inclined to harp continually on the question of sanctions and on the supposed hostility of Great Britain, with whom he even seemed to contemplate the possibility of a definite breach.
Mr. Osborne57 has been instructed to invite the Secretary of State’s special attention to this conversation between Signor Mussolini and the French Ambassador in Rome and to its implication that Italy is feeling the effect of economic difficulties and is nervous of economic pressure, which may, consequently, perhaps form an effective means of restraining her.