760N.00/116
Memorandum by the Chargé in Latvia (Cole)56
Recent Developments Concerning an Eastern European Security Pact
1. Soviet Démarche Regarding an Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance Without Germany and Poland.
On April 6, the Soviet Ministers in Riga, Kaunas and Tallinn, inquired of the local governments what their attitude would be toward an Eastern European pact of mutual assistance to include Soviet Russia, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States, but without Poland and Germany. A reply was requested by April 10, in order that Litvinov could discuss the matter with Laval at Stresa.
The Foreign Offices of Latvia and Estonia immediately communicated with each other by telephone and later, got in touch with Lithuania, which, it had been learned, was on the point of a favorable reply. The Soviet Government was informed by each of the three countries that no reply to its inquiry could be made until all the principals of the Baltic Entente had consulted. The matter was considered so urgent and serious that the Undersecretaries for Foreign Affairs of Estonia and Lithuania came to Riga, and a conference was held on April 11. At this conference, Lithuania was persuaded to delay replying to the Soviet inquiry until after the Baltic Entente Conference of May 5.
[Page 301]It would appear that the Soviet approach to the Baltic States was made primarily to strengthen its position in the negotiations with France for a bi-lateral pact of mutual assistance, and, secondarily, in the hope that Lithuania might accept and thereby create a serious split in the Baltic Entente. The chief significance of the démarche was that it indicated that Soviet Russia had abandoned the hope of successfully concluding an Eastern Pact on the original lines, including Germany and Poland.
2. Developments Between the Riga Conference of April 11, and the Kaunas Conference of May 5.
To the Baltic States, the chief significance of the Stresa conference of April 11–14 was the statement by Sir John Simon that Germany was prepared to join an Eastern Pact of non-aggression.57 This step made it probable that future plans for security in Eastern Europe would be based on a pact of non-aggression instead of mutual assistance.
On April 19, the Governments of England, France and Italy addressed Lithuania in identic terms regarding the failure to observe the provisions of the Memel statute. While this step was a considerable blow to the prestige of Lithuania, it nevertheless removed, for a time, the danger of German intervention. The action of the signatory powers also encouraged Estonia and Latvia in their efforts to persuade Lithuania to modify its policy regarding Memel.
It would appear, however, that Estonia and Latvia were not successful in persuading Lithuania to adopt a more conciliatory attitude in the Memel question, and the unsatisfactory Lithuanian reply of May 3 to the note of the signatory powers regarding Memel removed any hope of an early settlement of the dispute between Lithuania and Germany, and again made the Memel question the crucial feature of the Eastern European political situation.
The meeting of the Council of the League of Nations from April 15 to 17, was without special significance from an Eastern European viewpoint, but the action of Poland in voting for the resolution condemning Germany created further doubts as to the actual relations between Germany and Poland.
The signing of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance on May 2, was an event of capital importance to the Baltic States. The prolonged difficulties in negotiating the pact and the extremely involved and cautious text emphasized the disadvantageous features of mutual assistance pacts. Comments in the German press made it quite clear that Germany regarded such pacts of mutual assistance as merely military alliances directed against itself. The obvious fact [Page 302] that Russia could only assist France in a practical manner in case of aggression by Germany by an attack through Poland or the Baltic States also received wide publicity in the Baltic press.
3. The Conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
The conference of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, held in Kaunas May 5–8, was devoted almost exclusively to a discussion of the policy to be followed by the members of the Baltic Entente towards the various proposals for the protection of Eastern European security. The representatives of Latvia and Estonia were apparently successful in convincing Lithuania that the best interests of the Baltic States would not be served by entering into a pact of mutual assistance with Russia, and that an independent neutral policy should be followed. The conference was thus successful in avoiding the danger of a break-up of the Baltic Entente which had arisen from the basically opposed points of view of Latvia and Estonia on one hand and Lithuania on the other regarding the Russian proposals for a pact of mutual assistance.
4. Developments Since the Kaunas Conference and Other Factors Bearing on the Present Situation.
The Secretary General of the Latvian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Munters, published an article entitled “The Baltic Entente,” in a special edition of the Prager Presse, Prague, Czechoslovakia, dated May 19, 1935. This article was of considerable significance because of the prominent role played by Mr. Munters in the foreign policy of Latvia and the Baltic Entente. It was in part obviously aimed at Lithuania and its stubbornness in regard to the Vilna and Memel questions since Lithuania is the only member of the Baltic Entente which has any special problems.
Mr. Munters stated that the policy of the Baltic Entente should be limited to fundamental and vital interests. The first of such interests mentioned is the maintenance of separation from Russia. He then goes on to point out that Lithuania has forgotten this interest, first because of the Vilna question and, more recently, because of the Memel question.
His statement that “there is no reason on the other hand to suppose that one or the other of the two great neighbors desires to attack the Baltic Entente, because the present balance of power in Northeast Europe is best guaranteed by the existence of an independent, neutral Baltic bloc,” is of considerable importance. It is in direct opposition to the present opinion in Lithuania, which is convinced that Germany has aggressive tendencies against Lithuania and probably against [Page 303] the other Baltic States. The use of the word “neutral” in the quotation given is of interest in view of the recent suggestion in Estonia that the Baltic States should be neutralized in somewhat the same manner as Switzerland is at the present time. In the final paragraph, Mr. Munters mentions the necessity of continuing a parallel independent foreign policy which may be considered to mean that he is not in favor of the Baltic Entente joining any regional pacts of mutual assistance.
The newspaper interview of Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laretai, of Estonia published in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Berlin, on May 26, 1935, in which he advanced the suggestion that the Baltic States should endeavor to obtain a guaranteed neutral status, created considerable interest in the Baltic States. He suggested that because of their weakness and exposed position, the members of the Baltic Entente should endeavor to be freed from those obligations under the League of Nations which would conflict with a strictly neutral status.
The death of Marshal Pilsudski of Poland, on May 12, injected a new factor of uncertainty into the situation because of its possible effects on the foreign policy of Poland. It also caused an increase in various rumors regarding new efforts to settle the Vilna dispute between Lithuania and Poland. It is apparent that certain cautious steps have recently been taken, but newspaper and official comments in Lithuania have not been encouraging.
5. The Polish Factor.
There have been a number of interesting developments in connection with Poland’s attitude towards the Baltic States. The most important event was probably the statement of Foreign Minister Beck that Poland would not permit the passage of foreign troops either across or around Poland. There have also been recent references in the Polish press to Poland’s special interests in the Baltic States.
The present Polish relations with Estonia are extremely close. Provisional President Päts of Estonia recently spent a month’s holiday in Poland. During his visit in Poland, he acted as the intermediary between Poland and Lithuania in the arrangements for the transportation of the remains of Pilsudski’s mother to Vilna.
Polish relations with Latvia are cordial. A group of Latvian journalists, headed by the Chief of the Press Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, have recently paid a visit to Poland where they were very cordially received.
The recent feelers put out toward the possibility of a settlement of the Vilna dispute have apparently been of Polish origin. These attempts probably represent a new attempt to put through the old [Page 304] Polish plan for the formation of a larger Baltic Bloc in which Polish influence should be predominant. Poland also has the added incentive at the present time of preventing the Baltic States from being drawn within the sphere of either Russia or Germany.
The success of Polish aims in the Baltic would appear to be dependent upon arriving at some settlement of the Vilna dispute before either the Memel question is settled or becomes so serious that Lithuania is thrown into the hands of Russia.
A puzzling development is the Polish newspaper campaign against Latvian treatment of the Polish minority, which started just after the return of the Latvian journalists from Poland. The Latvian press replied to this campaign in a rather sharp manner. It represents a sudden flare-up of the old minority troubles which have been dormant for some time. The Polish Chargé here has told a member of the Legation staff that the chief reason was the refusal of the Latvian authorities to admit Polish newspapers. The Chargé added that as a result of the protests the prohibition has been or would shortly be lifted. He also mentioned as a Polish grievance the fact that the only Polish agricultural school in Latvia had been closed and that the Polish high school in Riga, which had 300 pupils, had been closed although German, Russian and Jewish minority schools remained.
6. Hitler’s Speech.
Hitler’s speech of May 21 was read and discussed with great interest in the Baltic States, especially his remarks regarding Russia and the Eastern European Security plans. Lithuania was naturally incensed over his statement that no non-aggression pact would be signed with Lithuania until the signatory powers had taken steps to force observance of the Memel statute. In Latvia and Estonia the speech was generally favorably received, but the extremely sharp nature of the remarks regarding Soviet Russia aroused some uneasiness and it was noted that his offer to conclude pacts of non-aggression and nonassistance to the aggressor was restricted to neighboring states. This would make difficult the fulfillment of the plans for a general Eastern European non-aggression pact which Russia and France were understood to be preparing and which it is believed the Baltic States would be willing to accept.
7. The British-German Naval Agreement
The British-German Naval Agreement of June 18 at first received favorable comment in the Latvian and Estonian press as a constructive step towards disarmament. Shortly thereafter, however, the tone changed. The Latvian Government became panicky and on or about the middle of June sounded out the Estonian Government in regard to concluding a mutual assistance pact with Russia under the first [Page 305] influence of apprehensions that Great Britain had “abandoned Latvia”. This particular phase of the Baltic situation was one of the main topics of conversation at the Conference of the Ministers Plenipotentiary of Latvia which met in Riga on June 28th.* It was at this time also that the impression prevailed in Riga that were the Soviet Union to propose a mutual assistance pact Latvia would be very much disposed to enter it. Whether as a result of the discussions at the conference or later reports made to the Government here, a very authoritative official of the Latvian Foreign Office recently stated to a member of the Legation staff that the Eastern European Pact of Mutual Assistance was dead.
Newspapers in both Riga and Tallinn have inquired, “Why does Germany need a navy of 400,000 tons and what does she expect to do with it?” and a recent Latvian newspaper editorial stated that the Baltic States must increase their naval and coast defenses. No steps in this direction, however, are under immediate consideration in Latvia. Scandinavian papers have been widely quoted regarding the change in the balance of power in the Baltic and North Seas and the measures which must be taken to meet the new situation.
8. The Memel Question.
It may be taken that the French declaration may be roughly called one of “disinterestedness in the Memel question” following the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact and which is not as complete as it seems although it justifies Baltic politicians in saying that “France has withdrawn from the Baltic.” This is so without any reference to the fact that France is one of the guarantors of the Memel Statute. Having come to agreement with Soviet Russia against Germany, France has merely handed to its new ally its former interest in supporting Lithuania against Germany. This would unquestionably be in accord with Soviet desires. Regardless of the suggestion recently made to a member of the Legation staff by a very authoritative Latvian official that even if Germany were to seize the Memel territory Russia would not violate either Polish or Latvian sovereignty in order to put troops into Lithuania it may well be believed that the Soviet Union is not displeased to have a plausible casus belli on or near its western borders and on the road to Berlin. In order to obtain Rumanian cooperation in forging the ring around Germany, and as a corridor to Czechoslovakia, Russia may well make permanent renunciation of its Bessarabian grievance against Rumania. Regardless of any treaties or system of treaties, it is utterly impossible to conceive that the Soviet Union would at any time accept with equanimity the seizure of the [Page 306] Memel territory by Germany, and it is extremely difficult to believe that it would not take active steps in such a case. The Memel question indeed furnishes Soviet Russia with a much more effective excuse for active armed interference in Eastern European affairs than did Bessarabia since, as has been said, it lies on the direct line between Moscow-Berlin and, moreover, fits very neatly into the whole propaganda edifice which is being so assiduously and continuously built up by Moscow both for international and internal propaganda purposes. This propaganda edifice rests on two twin pillars, the supposed imminence of Hitler’s “march to the East,” and the Soviet “Peace Policy.”
9. Present Situation.
The Latvian and Estonian Governments still desire to avoid, if possible, any mutual assistance pacts and especially any pact not including Germany and Poland and have, so far, been successful, having been able to hold Lithuania in line. Both Estonia and Latvia realize clearly the restriction on their foreign policy due to their entente with Lithuania and it is obvious that they desire a settlement, or at least an appeasement, of the Vilna and Memel questions. They are, however, unable to take any open steps in this direction due to the fact that the Vilna dispute was specifically excluded from the competency of the Baltic Entente while Lithuania maintains that the Memel question is a purely internal problem.