Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, General, The Near East and Africa, Volume I

862.20/998

The Acting Chairman of the American Delegation to the Disarmament Conference (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

No. 113

Geneva, April 17, 1935.
[Received May 3.]

Sir: Supplementing my telegram No. 1038, April 17, 6 p.m.,⁹⁷ I have the honor to transmit herewith the complete memorandum of my conversation with Sir John Simon, which was summarized in the telegram under reference.

Respectfully yours,

Hugh R. Wilson

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Wilson) of a Conversation With the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Simon), April 16, 1935

Hitler

Sir John Simon described Hitler as a man with four or five ideas for Germany—the racial theory, equality of treatment, strong defense forces, pride of manhood, etc.—simple conceptions. There is nothing complex about the man. Simon contrasted Hitler with Mussolini: the latter like a good boxer, shifting position from one side of the ring to the other, always ready to confront his opponent in any argument; while the former merely measures every thought brought to him by the yardstick of his preconceived theses for Germany. If these thoughts cannot be measured by his yardstick, they are rejected. Simon further characterized Hitler as: a lover of his country; a lover of music; a man of straight life from a sexual standpoint; not interested in anything except his government and his music; mobile musician’s hands, fine eyes; otherwise insignificant.

I said to Sir John that I imagined the historian will take note of the fact that Mussolini turned anti-German following his meeting with Hitler and completely reversed Italy’s previous policy of sympathy with German aims; and that after his, Sir John’s, visit to Hitler had occurred Stresa, indicating solidarity between England, France and Italy. This was followed the next day by their joint presentation of the resolution before the Council. Sir John said, apparently thinking deeply, “You are right, chronologically, about Mussolini; I cannot speak for his thoughts. You are right both chronologically and psychologically about me.”

Impressions in Berlin

Sir John did not add very much in detail to the information I already had about the talks at Berlin, but gave me impressions which were important.

He is convinced that Hitler is not a man susceptible to argument; and Simon failed, he fears, to make any impression by his arguments. Simon felt that Hitler was a man so convinced of the might of Germany and of the Tightness of its cause that he could afford to tell Sir John exactly what Germany had to have. This was not done by argument, but through mere declaration of Germany’s wants. According to Simon, Hitler did not argue as to his needs, he simply told him. Hitler made no particular objection in principle to returning to the League of Nations and to the concert of Europe, but told Sir John that in all honesty he was going to tell him exactly what they had to have in every direction in order to be satisfied. He gave no impression of trying to negotiate, but merely told Simon what he had to have. Hence his remarks about navy and colonies, which didn’t strictly appertain to the discussion they were holding.

Austria

Hitler said that every Austrian had countless relatives in Germany; every German had relatives in Austria. They had a common history, common culture, common music. Hitler does not desire that any members of any other race should come within the Nazi boundaries. Austria is a different matter. Hitler believes that no matter what anyone does, Austria will eventually gravitate to Germany and to Naziism. Hitler stated he was so convinced of this that he was willing to sign any agreement for non-interference, but pointed out the difficulty of finding a definition for non-interference. For instance, he had asked: is it interference for the Little Entente to say that Austria shall not have a Habsburg ruler? Is it interference for Italy to loan Austria money on the condition that Austria makes no arrangement of an economic nature with Germany? Is it interference for Italy to mobilize three army corps on the Austrian frontier during a period of disorder within the country? Nevertheless, if a formula for non-interference, which appeared feasible, could be found, Hitler would agree to it.

Memel

Sir John said that he had taken occasion at Stresa to argue earnestly with Mussolini and Laval that Germany had a real grievance in Memel and that the three Powers at Stresa, plus Japan, were primarily responsible for the administration of the Statute of Memel.⁹⁸ They were in duty bound to see that the administration of the territory was fairly carried out; and that, furthermore, it would have a very fine effect in Germany and in the world at large to prove that their policy was not anti-Germany, but was anti-abuses, by sending a stiff memorandum to Lithuania on the Memel question. Sir John was happy to say that he had just initialed a stiff protest which would be sent conjointly by the three Powers to Lithuania and that they had determined to keep Lithuania in order and make it obey the Statute. Parenthetically, Sir John added that the message sent by Hitler to Stresa with respect to the Eastern Non-Aggression Pact did not alter Hitler’s attitude towards Lithuania. This attitude was that a nonaggression pact could not be negotiated until the Memel matter was settled. Once that was settled Hitler had no objection to concluding a non-aggression pact with Lithuania.

Rearmament of Austria and Hungary

The rearmament of Austria and Hungary, said Sir John, had been an amusing episode throughout. He explained that Mussolini had pushed hard for an agreement by the three States at Stresa to permit the rearmament of these two countries on the ground that it was unfair to States which had lived up to their obligations to be given less privilege than one which had taken the law into its own hands. Of course, Sir John added, this represented solely Mussolini’s desire to have an armed force in Austria to repel a possible putsch by the Nazis. Sir John had pointed out to Mussolini that one never knew what the future might hold and it might be very disadvantageous to increase the armed forces of Austria if later on they could be counted on the German side. Further, Simon pointed out that the three Powers could not assume the responsibility of declaring that the treaties should be revised. This belonged to the neighboring States primarily. It was finally decided at Stresa that this matter could well be brought up in the conference to be held at Rome at the end of May⁹⁹ and should form part of the agenda thereof. Now that the decision had been reached, Laval had made a public statement showing to his “little friends” how well he had defended their interests in this matter. Sir John was rather sardonic about this.

Stalin

Lord Cranborne,¹ who accompanied Eden to Moscow, told me that the latter had been much impressed by the personality of Stalin. Stalin was born in Georgia, had never or at least not for over twenty years, visited Western Europe. Nevertheless, he showed a remarkable grasp of the European situation. He not only showed sympathy and understanding of the problems of France, but, what was more remarkable, of Germany also. He showed none of the detestation and blind fear of Germany which characterized Litvinov. Cranborne described Litvinov’s attitude as “largely racial”.

Disarmament

I said to Sir John that he and Eden had gone to Berlin with the primary object in mind of talking disarmament matters. Since that visit the whole emphasis had shifted to other problems in Europe and disarmament had gone into the background. What did he foresee, if anything, in the immediate future on disarmament?

Sir John replied that Henderson² asked him that question yesterday and that he had told “the poor old fellow” that there seemed to be three ways of treating the disarmament problem: First, to call the Bureau and the General Commission and hold a funeral for the Conference; second, to call a Bureau meeting and see what could be done either now or in the coming month; third, to keep the Conference alive in the hope that sometime in the future the constant kaleidoscope of the European situation would present an opportunity when something useful might be done. Of the three methods he had urged the third upon Henderson as the only one he could see as practical and useful at the moment.

Manufacture of Arms

Simon asked me how I thought the negotiations with respect to the manufacture of arms convention had gone. I replied that they had gone as well as could have been expected in view of the divergent theses, and that we have before us two texts to choose from—ours and theirs. They were well worked out and would require very little additional technical elaboration once we had agreed upon a compromise, if any. He asked whether I did not feel that their project was the only one possible under the circumstances. I replied that I didn’t have to tell him, since I told him before in London, that our project was not an American project in the sense that it was an American conception, but that it was an attempt by us so to formulate the work already done as to give the possibility of universal acceptance. As to whether their project was a possibility, I could not speak at all for the French except to give my impression that they will be extremely reluctant to take so little. I explained I had not consulted my Government, but that I was sure in my own mind that unless the project contained some provision for numbers on guns above 155 mm., tanks, aeroplanes and ships, we would find it difficult to see that the project was worth writing. He asked me whether the British thesis had been to repudiate all mention of numbers, and seemed surprised thereat. I replied that it had most distinctly been and that this had been one of the elements preventing any possibility of compromise. I then said: “Sir John, this may be an indiscreet question, but I would like to put it nevertheless. Do you really want a treaty? Do you really think such a treaty as you propose would be useful?” Sir John replied most emphatically that he thought it would be highly useful as there were hopes of bringing both Germany and Japan into such a treaty; that he very much hoped that we could get together on it. On this point, however, I didn’t go further because I didn’t consider that the time was ripe without consultation with Washington. I merely agreed that I hoped so too.

Sir John added that Hitler has said that he would accept permanent and automatic inspection in connection with any “limitation agreement”. Sir John deduced that he would not accept it for “manufacture”.

The Present Situation

Sir John said that he didn’t have to reiterate to me his conviction that the only salvation of Europe lay in getting Germany into the community. This was his own as well as his Government’s conviction, and as far as he personally was concerned, there would be no toleration of any attempt to isolate and surround Germany. Hitler was a man not susceptible to argument but he might be susceptible if he were confronted by the fact that his action³ had shocked Great Britain, France, Italy and most of the States of Europe. Sir John deplored that the French had ever brought the matter before the Council but once having brought it, he didn’t see how Great Britain could dissociate itself from France completely. He had had a very difficult decision to make. Yesterday there had been thought of appointing Madariaga⁴ as rapporteur, but Madariaga, as I knew, was a man who held decided ideas, and in contemplating the acceptance, he had shown that his conception of the job was to question all parties and then write his own form of resolution. This, according to Sir John, would have brought about complete discord and the French would not tolerate it. Laval had said last night that he would put in the resolution worked out at Stresa. Sir John had considered the matter during the night and had telephoned the Prime Minister this morning and finally reached the decision that it was better to go in on a joint resolution than at once to destroy the appearance of harmony worked out at Stresa. By accepting the joint resolution he had been able to modify the draft considerably and give real comfort to the French. For instance, he had eliminated with Laval a clause which spoke of “persistent and deliberate violation of treaty” on the part of Germany.

He asked me to ask him any questions, as responses to such questions would clarify his thoughts. I said: “The British position has been, and you state it is your own position, that the essential thing is to bring Germany back into the concert of nations. Isn’t the joint resolution proposed to-day incompatible with such policy?” He replied that he didn’t wonder that I asked such a question and certainly it troubled him no end to think that there was a danger of provoking violent reaction in Germany; but he reiterated that Hitler was not in a negotiable frame of mind at the moment; that soft words would not make him more amenable. There might be a chance that realization of the state of mind that he had provoked in the world would give him pause. As for any conviction that British action in associating itself with the resolution might give to France that it now had England in its pocket for a policy of encirclement and armed alliance against Germany, this would be speedily dissipated, as the British public would not tolerate such a policy. There was no inconsistency in this, Sir John continued, because he thought it was perfectly consistent to say that you disapproved of an action which threatened the peace but at the same time were going to exert every means to bring the recalcitrant State back into the concert of nations and into harmonious discussions for a solution of the difficulties. He declared his belief that they would get the votes of all but a couple of the members of the Council and that this could not fail to impress Hitler and make the task of negotiating more easy. At the same time he did not hide his concern at the necessity for the joint resolution and again pointed out that a flagrant and open disagreement with France now was a more dangerous thing than the risks involved in the joint resolution.

In summarizing, my own impression is that Sir John is very unhappy, first, over the French having called the Council;⁵ second, over any phraseology in the resolution which involves condemnation of Germany; third, at the necessity—as he calls it—of sponsoring this resolution on behalf of England. I also have the impression that he is fully alive to the dangers which this step might initiate, but that he has carefully weighed that danger and became convinced that a breach with France on this subject was still more dangerous.

H[ugh] R. W[ilson]

97. Not printed.
98. League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxix, p. 86.
99. The projected conference at Rome on the Danubian Pact was never held.
1. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal.
2. Arthur Henderson, President of the General Disarmament Conference.
3. Repudiation of the disarmament clauses, Part V, Treaty of Versailles, in conflict with the German rearmament program; for correspondence, see vol. ii, pp. 294 ff.
4. Salvador de Madariaga, Spanish permanent delegate to the League of Nations.
5. Eighty-fifth (extraordinary) session of the Council of the League of Nations, April 15–17, 1935.