862.20/951
The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 24.]
Sir: In continuation of despatch No. 1924 dated April 11th91 on the subject of general peace negotiations, I have the honor to report that following the Stresa Conference and prior to the continuation of the peace proceedings in Geneva there is a general feeling in Berlin that something was accomplished by the Conference, even though it may have been but Germany’s acquiescence on a point which she believed unnecessary, in order to satisfy the suspicions of France, the well-known mutual assistance clause in the proposed Eastern Pact.
Whether it was cleverly planned or not does not seem material, but the fact remains that the mere inquiry from the Conference by telephone via the British Embassy in Berlin, as to Germany’s attitude towards mutual assistance clauses binding on other signatories of an Eastern Pact, and her position in general at the movement, [Page 245] produced the feeling here that the German views were being given due (equal) consideration. An immediate reply was dispatched which was published in the Sunday (April 14) press as an official communiqué, translation of which is transmitted herewith as Enclosure No. 1.92
In some quarters it is believed that an important concession was made by Germany in the implication that whereas she would not be willing to agree to mutual assistance, she saw no objection to such agreements between other powers provided they were not linked with non-aggression pacts. Germany’s logical, perhaps too realistic, argument was that with general non-aggression agreements, mutual assistance was not necessary. The pertinent portion of the official statement is quoted below:
“To this view as well, the German Government still adheres to-day. Just as it is, therefore, not in a position to join a pact which contains such military obligations as an essential element of its contents and thus of its existence, so such agreements outside of this pact cannot hinder the German Government from concluding, on its part, non-aggression pacts on the basis fixed above.
“This is the sense of the reply of the German Government to the question of the Royal British Ambassador whether Germany was prepared to conclude an Eastern Pact on the basis she herself had indicated, even in case other countries had concluded or were to conclude further agreements amongst themselves.”
The balance of the communiqué patently reiterates Germany’s policy and is generally known. In official quarters, however, even the portion considered as Germany’s concession is stated to have been part of the policy from its inception. However, it does not appear to have been stressed previously, if mentioned at all, and one of the most hopefully significant indications is the apparent satisfaction with which the “concession” was received by France. According to the press, the protest of France to the League against Germany’s unilateral action will probably now be confined to formal registration and a suggestion that provision be made against such action in the future. In other words, if this is true, there would seem to be a disposition on the part of all powers sincerely to arrive at some working agreement. Germany, by agreeing to mutual assistance among other powers stops herself from any possibility of making a stand against the new Franco-Russian agreement or any other similar understanding. That she does not like such agreements is obvious, and is illustrated in the following excerpt from the D.D.–P.K.93 of April 11:
“The new Franco-Russian agreement explicitly refers to the Covenant of the League and aims at a more precise interpretation of certain [Page 246] of its articles with a view to action against a possible disturber of the peace. Outwardly, it is therefore apparently a part of the efforts towards effective organization of peace. In fact, however, the Franco-Russian agreement threatens to have the opposite effect since it really weakens the League as may be seen from the fact, that while referring in form to the League, it really permits the two countries in question to determine their action independently, in case no unanimous decision concerning who is to blame for a conflict is reached at Geneva. As France and Russia are permanent members of the Council of the League, unanimity is impossible if their politics run counter to the views of the other members. Lack of unanimity is, therefore, not a mere possibility but presupposed as the actual basis of the new agreement. Thus France and Russia are enabled to exert political pressure which practically robs the League of its freedom of decision. ‘A League which would regard such an agreement as compatible with its Covenant, resigns in advance.’ It would either have to agree to all Franco-Soviet views or give these nations an excuse for realizing their plans which they had determined in advance. By way of a ‘definition of the aggressor’ especially agreed upon, they evidently desire to secure the right to determine independently, at any given moment, whether, and from which quarter, an act of aggression has occurred, and to adopt measures before the announcement of a Geneva decision, or at least independent thereof. Thus, putting the apparatus of the League out of action, one reverts to ‘mutual assistance’ and the ‘automatic initiation’ of warlike activity.…”
There is strong official opinion that if France will not press her protest to the League against Germany’s unilateral action, and provided the Little Entente and Russia do not force anti-German action, the Conference to be held in Rome next month will see all powers represented, after which Germany’s return to the League is likely. Whatever Germany may have in mind for the future, it is becoming clearer that she desires at least a temporary settlement of her European peace problem; expediency is assuredly an element and in this regard it is interesting to note a quickening towards a settlement caused by the Danzig election set-back and the consequent strengthening of the Foreign Office vis-à-vis the party.
Prior to the Stresa Conference and in spite of a tendency to disregard the serious aspects of France’s protest to the League, there was considerable anxiety as to the attitude which the League might take in the matter. The press therefore built up arguments against it, as is illustrated in the rejoinder to the note, translation of which is transmitted herewith as Enclosure No. 2.94
There is also transmitted as Enclosure No. 394 press reaction on the Stresa Conference.
Respectfully yours,
First Secretary of Embassy