500.A15A4 General Committee (Arms)/157
Memorandum by the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton)44
I called on Sir John Simon by appointment this afternoon and he informed me that due to Hitler’s illness, which he believed was far more serious than the German communiqué allowed, his trip to Berlin had been postponed. Simon regretted this, he said, in the first instance [Page 195] because on his recent trip to Paris he had discussed the Berlin visit and secondly it did not enable him to dispose of the question as to whether a British Cabinet officer would visit Moscow or not (am reliably informed that although Moscow has issued no invitation for a British representative to proceed there, it will only be prepared to do so on previous understanding that a British Cabinet officer will accept the invitation, which would debar Eden from proceeding to Moscow alone). Simon then continued his account of the progress of the London conversations since our last conversation reported in my 54 of February 5, 8 p.m.,45 very much as outlined in my 78 of February 21, 7 p.m.46 He said that on his recent visit to Paris he had had a welcome from Laval that almost led him to think, he laughingly said, Anglo-French relations were too cordial. He pointed out in this connection that Mussolini had swung from his violent pro-Germanism of a year ago, to an intensely anti-Germanism now that was almost embarrassing, and Sir John modestly added that if a dictator could be jealous he felt too intensive Anglo-French courtship might arouse some such emotion in Mussolini. He stated that in the negotiations for the proposed Air Pact he hoped to include in the preamble some reference to the abolition of air bombing. He also added that this Air Pact would be an Air Locarno in that it would include all the Locarno signatories with, however, some proviso that Italy would not have to come to the defence of England or England to the defence of Italy. He said that in his forthcoming visit to Berlin besides the Air Pact there were a great many technical questions which would arise, but these technical questions all were based on political considerations and he had to achieve in his conversations with Hitler an understanding of Hitler’s political outlook. He pointed out Hitler had suggested he was prepared to do many things, including bilateral pacts, etc., which at the moment were mere protestations on Hitler’s part because he had made no attempt to conclude them. He said in his Paris conversations with Laval last week he had touched on the Eastern European Pact, and the French had pointed out one of the particular reasons they were desirous of the conclusion of this was that they did not want to be forced into a Franco-Soviet pact. In fact, the conclusion of any such agreement would be against their present policy. Therefore again they stressed the importance of an Eastern European Pact, and Simon felt that on his Berlin visit Hitler might agree to an Eastern European Pact including non-interference and consultation, but there was absolutely no possibility of Germany’s [Page 196] accepting an Eastern European Pact containing clauses of mutual assistance. Simon obviously felt that if in Berlin he could secure an Eastern European Pact of non-interference and consultation, France would accept it and it would be a great personal victory for Simon. He pointed out here that French drafting would be able in a Franco-Soviet agreement to cover a bilateral pact of mutual assistance as a corollary to this Eastern European Pact.
He then referred to the Italian-Abyssinian question,47 in which he said Britain had a concern since last autumn in Geneva both Abyssinia and Italy had asked that this matter be settled locally, but he was not conscious of any local attempt being made at the moment, and was obviously fearful of Italian objectives. One of his causes of concern was that Abyssinia is a land-locked country and any war supplies going into Abyssinia would have to pass through the possessions of a neutral country. This he felt might arouse many questions which would precipitate larger issues. He felt that Abyssinia would be wiser to cut off her arm rather than permit creeping paralysis to set in.
[Here follows section of memorandum reported in telegram No. 91, March 5, 6 p.m., from the Chargé in the United Kingdom, printed on page 29.]
In conclusion I touched very briefly on the Far Eastern situation and the recent discussions of Ambassador Lindsay with Mr. Phillips (Department’s 41, of March 2, 4 p.m.48). Simon said the matter in a nutshell was this: The Chinese Minister had come to him a short time ago and very ably pointed out the critical condition of China. Simon had replied he was most sympathetic but he did not have any idea of inviting discussions merely on China. He accordingly desired the Chinese Minister to understand that he would be very glad to consider any Chinese proposals which he had to present, and he would undertake on his part to inform the Japanese and American Governments that England was interested in the solution of the Far Eastern problem. Since that time the Chinese Minister had brought no further word from Nanking, and British action in their present frame of mind was dependent on this. I asked him whether he did not believe Japanese representations in Nanking at the present time were so strong that the Chinese found themselves in a difficult position to present proposals to foreign countries, and he said he had not really had a moment to consider this phase of the question.