500.A15A5/530: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
553. Personal for the President. In your telegram 317, October 25, 7 p.m., you remind me that you have not been able to be in full touch with the naval situation here during your absence from Washington, or in other words, since the approximate time I discussed these naval matters with you on the White House veranda last September. During this interval exchanges on naval matters have taken place between the British Foreign Office and this Embassy, and have terminated for all practical purposes in a successful accord so that the British and American Governments are now in substantial agreement on naval matters, both as regards principle and relevant details. Later, I personally sought here authoritative information on the purposes and possibilities for the scheduled Naval Conference, and outlined them to you at some length in my telegram 542, October 28, 8 p.m., as requested in your personal message to me.
In view of the many conflicting considerations enumerated in your latest telegram, No. 325, November 1, 3 p.m., I feel in duty bound to set forth anew certain aspects of the question as of possible value to you in reaching a final decision.
With the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, under whose auspices the recent satisfactory naval conversations with this Embassy have taken place, and in the given circumstances, I see no adequate grounds for doubting the British statement to me that the projected Naval Conference, the initiative for calling which was expressly left with the British with American consent at the termination of last December’s conversations, is convened (1) because the British Government considers it mandatory under the existing treaties, and (2) in order to salvage as much as possible from those treaties. At the same time, it is recognized that the inexorable facts of the situation are that the possibilities of salvage are small; that there is a conflict of policy between Japan on the one hand, and the United States and [Page 140] Great Britain on the other, so wide as to nullify any “serious effort on the part of the British as well as ourselves to negotiate and enter into a new treaty with Japan”, unless we are prepared to make concessions which in fact would constitute a reversal of our national policies.
The Japanese Government has already made it clear that they are not prepared to consider quantitative limitation except under terms which would be unacceptable to the British and which we have consistently reiterated are unacceptable to us. Furthermore, the Japanese Government has stated in writing to the British Government, as already reported by me89 (1) that they are unable to agree to consider only qualitative limitation apart from quantitative; and (2) that they are not disposed to consider the policy of announcing building programs as proposed by the British. Thus, although the Japanese have consented to come to the Conference, upon their own clearly declared platform, prospects of substantial accomplishments with them are practically hopeless. I can but assume that your public statement of September 29th stands,90 and that we are not prepared to recede from our position regarding ratios with Japan. Consequently, with the elimination of the practical Anglo-American difficulties already achieved, there is in reality little that can be done as regards the three major naval powers at the forthcoming Conference except insofar as the Japanese will agree to maintain, voluntarily or otherwise, for a limited period, certain relatively minor aspects of those treaties.
Therefore, the negotiations at the forthcoming Conference will in practice develop mainly into a series of negotiations and exchanges of views between the European nations primarily with a view to preventing a naval race in Europe, and it is in this connection that Germany and Soviet Russia might at some point be consulted. While it is in my view important that the United States should be kept abreast of and fully informed of these negotiations, in practice I question whether it would be advantageous for us to be drawn into the detailed exchanges of views.
It is obviously in the British highest interest to exert all possible pressure to secure limitation of naval armaments among the European powers.
Therefore, with the above considerations in mind, I am in full accord with the first paragraph of your telegram No. 325, November 1, 3 p.m., that “the question of our representation in the forthcoming Naval Conference must be determined largely by how seriously the [Page 141] Conference is to be taken by the British and ourselves, as well as the other Governments concerned, and by what the aims and scope of the negotiations are to be, and also the desire and prospects for ultimate agreement”. And with this as a promise, I am driven to the conclusion, which is in accord with that portion of your message, “that it would be unnecessary and perhaps inadvisable to send a special mission to London for this purpose”. I do, however, feel that Admiral Standley’s appointment is highly desirable, not merely as an adviser but as a delegate with such authority as he was given in the preliminary discussions of last autumn.
Since Ambassador Matsudaira cannot be in England for the early weeks of the Conference, and the Japanese Ambassador in Paris has asked to be excused from heading the Japanese delegation because he only speaks French, the Foreign Office informs me that the Japanese Government will send Admiral Nagano supported by former Ambassador Nakai to represent Japan. Since, however, the Japanese Government has pointed out, it will prove impossible for this Japanese representation to reach London by December 2d, I understand from the Foreign Office that the opening of the Naval Conference is to be postponed to a later date in December.
Since I am on the ground and have been responsible for the most recent negotiations with the British, it would seem that my knowledge of the subject and of the circumstances should be frankly and fully stated for your serious consideration. While my duties are exacting, they are not so confining or so exacting as to prevent me from giving the time, the thought and the effort required by such an important matter as our naval arrangements, especially since it constitutes at the present time the principal point of cooperative contact between my Government and the Governments to which I am accredited. I quite agree that our efforts at the Conference should be unrelenting and that any appearance of casualness on our part should be as assiduously avoided as the evoking of false expectations; but the fact remains that as regards the three major powers the prospects of repeating the substantial gains achieved by the Washington and London Treatties are little more than negligible.
For the first time in my life I find myself debating a course of action—in this case proposed not by me but by the British Government—which nevertheless may be open to a mistaken interpretation that I have some personal motive. The fact that I have in these circumstances defended such a course of action is an indication of the strength of my conviction that it is in the best interests of the United States. So important do I deem it that I am quite prepared to take the first available boat to the United States and discuss this situation with you personally, should you desire it.
- Telegram in four sections.↩
- For text of the Japanese aide-mémoire, see p. 128.↩
- Presumably the President’s statement made September 27, 1935, concerning the naval construction policy of the United States, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, Random House, 1938), vol. 4, p. 379.↩