500.A15A5/526: Telegram
President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)
325. The question of our representation in the forthcoming naval conference must be determined largely by how seriously the conference [Page 137] is to be taken by the British and ourselves, as well as the other governments concerned, and by what the aims and scope of the negotiations are to be and also the desire and prospects for ultimate agreement.
If the conference is being called by the British at this time mainly as a matter of strategy and in order to comply formally with provisions in the present treaties, but without much expectation of success or a determined effort to reach agreement on a new naval treaty to replace existing treaties, I agree that it would be unnecessary and perhaps inadvisable to send a special mission to London for this purpose. I also question the advisability in such a case of sending our highest ranking naval officers as advisers. On the other hand, if there is to be a serious effort on the part of the British as well as ourselves to negotiate and enter into a new naval treaty with Japan, and if possible other naval powers, which is most important in order to avoid a disastrous naval race, there are controlling reasons for designating a special national delegation to negotiate and execute a multilateral treaty of such a nature.
I realize, of course, that there are certain disadvantages and embarrassments inherent in a formal Conference. I do not feel, however, that these difficulties can be avoided by calling a conference and then trying to make it appear as something else, and particularly if it is to result in a new multilateral treaty.
We have understood from your previous despatches that, while the British think there is little chance of agreement on quantitative limitation, they do state they intend at least to make an attempt in that direction and they do think there is a good chance of reaching agreements such as qualitative limitation and possibly building programs and various other problems involved. If they do not think this is possible and do not intend to make every effort to that end, it is difficult to understand why they would have assumed the responsibility of calling such a conference and why they would have indicated the possibility of extending the conference to include other naval powers. Moreover, I understand the Japanese are sending a special delegation.
I feel that we must not only make the greatest possible effort to negotiate a new naval treaty, but that we should in every way make our desire to do so manifest. While it is important that our public must not be led to expect too much from such a conference, it is equally important for us to do nothing that would make it appear that we are taking this naval conference casually and less seriously than we have taken previous naval conferences and thus run the risk of being blamed for failure.
In view of all the circumstances my judgment is that as a matter of principle and policy it is advisable to follow the well established precedent of appointing a special delegation to attend the conference and negotiate a treaty. From your own standpoint I frankly feel [Page 138] that it would be inadvisable for you to assume, in addition to your many exacting duties and responsibilities as our accredited representative to Great Britain, the sole responsibility and burden of conducting the naval negotiations with all of the naval powers.