500.A15A5/500: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 1—4 p.m.]
485. This morning naval discussions were resumed.
The British proposed that no more 8-inch gun cruisers be built; that a limit be placed on number of 10,000-ton 6-inch gun cruisers, and that individual cruiser tonnage generally be limited to 7,600 tons; also reiterated their desire for 60 under-age cruisers with retention of 10 over-age in addition. British stated should there be agreement on no further building of 8-inch cruisers Hawkins class would be scrapped or if retained over-age would be altered to make them class “B”. In reply to our question British confirmed situation would then be British would have 15 and we would have 18 class A cruisers.
British were informed United States attitude desiring retention of present allowed maximum cruiser characteristics remained unchanged, but their proposal would be submitted. British proposition was contingent upon general agreement Washington Powers and British believed Germans would conform, but frankly stated British doubts as to Japanese agreement. As alternatives British would welcome general agreement for limited term or agreement that cruisers would be limited to 6-inch guns. We gave no encouragement as to American agreement on any deviation from present qualitative limitations for cruisers.
Regarding destroyers, which term herein includes leaders, British desire abolition of present treaty qualitative limitations unless there be general agreement for continuing existing qualitative limitations. If submarines are not abolished British want 50,000 tons of over-age destroyers additional to present allowed 150,000 tons under-age. In case submarines were abolished British would accept reduction of destroyer tonnage to 100,000.
In connection destroyers, as alternative British mentioned as less desirable possibility a short-term general agreement to continue present qualitative limitations, mentioning 2 years as against their original 6-year proposal. In general they appear to favor short-term agreements [Page 121] if nothing better can be agreed upon. We made no commitments as to destroyers but registered no objections to expressed British views.
Regarding submarines, concurring views were expressed by both as to the desirability of complete elimination of submarines by general agreement or, failing that, for some agreed reduction. The British expressed their desire in case abolition could not be agreed upon that submarines be reduced in tonnage to 250 tons to restrict them to defensive roles. The British recognize there is little hope of abolition of submarines due to probable French and Japanese objection but stated Germany would agree to abolition. British stated their view was that submarines should be totally abolished or there should be allowed a sufficient tonnage to make them capable of real usefulness, for example, failing abolition they could not accept too drastic a reduction but would probably never want more than the present allowed maximum tonnage. There was agreement that failing other limitation the present maximum individual submarine limitations, viz.: 2,000 tons and 5.1-inch guns should be continued.
British mentioned their desire that article 19 of Washington Treaty regarding limitation of Pacific fortifications be perpetuated but stated that subject probably was not appropriate for discussion now with which view we acquiesced.
Referring to British memorandum of August 2d, paragraph 8, there was tentative concurrence as to the items from existing naval treaties therein mentioned forming a proper basis for consideration at the conference with continuation probable.
In connection with reciprocal notification relating to laying down new ships, the British referred to the French desire expressed at Geneva for (préavis) earlier notification and elaborated the British view as to constitutional and technical difficulties for more than 6 months’ notification and said recent information was that the French more clearly now appreciated such difficulties.
Regarding scrapping, we stated the United States has been proceeding on the assumption that the scrapping provisions of the Treaty would be carried out in default of any contrary representations having been made. The British indicated their belief that this matter would be considered by the Conference later this year but that their tentative desire to retain 50,000 over-age destroyers tonnage in case submarines were not abolished should be kept in mind and also the possible retention of over-age 6-inch gun cruisers as already mentioned; this whole proposition was necessarily somewhat undefined since depending considerably upon the changing international situation which British stated for our confidential information had resulted in holding up putting on the sale list cruisers Castor, Constance and Brisbane, already in process of dismantlement. The British reiterated [Page 122] if the Hawkins class were retained they would be either demilitarized or otherwise altered to make them class “B”. Craigie mentioned United States would probably want to avoid precipitate scrapping of old destroyers but Danckwerts observed we had probably had them as long as we wished in view of their age.
Regarding the London Treaty part IV, subject “Submarine Warfare”, the British expressed the view that the next naval agreement was not the best place for rules for submarine warfare, but that they should be in a separate protocol to which the British hoped adherence of all nations might be obtained.
British reverted to capital ships and mentioned the age limit of 26 years allegedly tentatively fixed upon in Geneva Disarmament texts75 and expressed the British desire that this battleship age limit be accepted. The British consider agreed age limits particularly important as a definition usual to them in connection with their German naval agreement, and also in defining sizes of categories and Navies should it be possible to accomplish any measure of quantitative limitation. Instructions are requested.
Craigie stated he had talked to Japanese Chargé d’Affaires, after our first discussions and Fujii had stated that he had no instructions or representations to make. Craigie stated he pointed out that the British could not accept as the Japanese last word the uncompromising attitude that they could not talk qualitative limitations without a quantitative limitations and could not talk quantitative limitations without an agreed upper limit, and requested that Fujii communicate with his Government with a view to Japanese participation in the Conference which the British hope can be convened this year. Fujii promised to do so.
In today’s discussions British views, it should be pointed out, were at times clarified and elaborated as the result of our questions or observations.
- League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Geneva, 1932: Journal; Records of the Conference, Series D, Minutes of the Naval Commission, vol. ii, p. 85.↩