500.A15A5/497: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 27—2:45 p.m.]
478. My 475, September 27, 1 p.m. By my direction, Atherton and Anderson discussed naval questions informally this morning at the Foreign Office with Craigie and Danckwerts of the Admiralty. Craigie opened the discussion by referring to the British memorandum of August 2nd, amplifying the explanation previously given that it was not intended as an endeavor to create a European front.
It was agreed that the views to be exchanged were tentative and for the purpose of assuring mutual understanding “in arriving at a basis for negotiations looking to an ultimate agreement”. The British were reminded that the American Government stood for a continuation of the principles of existing naval treaties and was prepared to accept a reduction as much as 20% in tonnage by categories, but that qualitative limitation without the continuation of ratios or satisfactory quantitative limitations did not meet the American desire.74 However, America desired to salvage as much as possible of the naval treaties.
As a preliminary and basic consideration our representatives stated it to be the American understanding that without prejudice to further discussion Britain and America would like to continue the existing naval treaty qualitative limitations provided no reduction could be mutually agreed upon and asked for British confirmation, which was definitely received.
The American willingness to accept a reduction in calibre of guns to 14-inch was affirmed, subject to general agreement by all naval powers. In response to British questions it was stated that America retained liberty of action in this respect until such an agreement had been accomplished.
Subsequently the capital ship was the main theme of discussion. Regarding a reduction in battleship displacement, the British were informed of the American desire to accept such reduction as was [Page 117] feasible but that, even if the reduction were eventually found practicable, our studies indicated that it must be very limited. The British then referred to the view allegedly presented by Admiral Standley that it was desirable to build at least one capital ship with existing allowed maximum characteristics and from trial of that to see whether any tonnage reduction could be expected. They were informed this was still the general American viewpoint and, after discussion British acquiesced in this proposition, evidently strongly influenced by current European capital ship construction programs. The fact that Italy is building two capital ships of maximum characteristics, as stated by the British, with 15-inch guns, and that the French and presumably the Germans propose to match them, resulting in six modern Continental capital ships, has, in the British view, produced a new situation and evidently weakened their insistence upon immediate reduction in capital ship displacement.
The proposition finally reached was that each power be permitted to build, after December 31, 1936, two capital ships with existing treaty maximum gun calibre and tonnage limitations, but that ensuing capital ships should by agreement be limited to guns of 14-inch calibre. This proposition envisaged a possible reduction in displacement of the 14-inch gun ships, perhaps resulting from economy of weights, due to reduction in size of guns. In this discussion, however, a tentative American suggestion that the British desire for smaller capital ships might be met by limiting the number of allowed 14-inch guns per capital ship to, say, 12, did not meet ready British concurrence in view of their expressed preference for a tonnage limitation. I venture to point out, however, the British took this suggestion under advisement and appeared interested. The British evidently desired to find a way definitely to reduce the allowed tonnage of these above mentioned 14-inch gun ships but could suggest no practical method as service experience would not be available until completion of trial of the unfinished new capital ships of maximum characteristics.
No American commitment was made as to this reduction in maximum displacement but the question of a future and very minor reduction in displacement was left open. In the course of this discussion the British tentatively mentioned 30,000 tons as a future maximum displacement, and then increased their proposal to 32,000- or 33,000 ton maximum.
The British raised the question as to the desirability of a minimum displacement limit for capital ships in view of probable inadequate quantitative limitation by categories in order to provide a blank displacement zone and prevent unusual or surprise types to be developed. In this connection they were apprehensive over possible Japanese competition in new types without such a blank zone. British mentioned [Page 118] a tentative 20,000-ton lower limitation. They were told this proposition seemed to afford a basis for discussion. Accordingly, instructions are requested on this point.
At the conclusion of the talk the British asked whether we tentatively were prepared to accept British proposed maximum of 22,000 tons with 6.1 guns for aircraft carriers, and were told an answer on this point would be forthcoming. Instructions are requested.
Unless otherwise instructed it is proposed to hold a further meeting Tuesday or Wednesday of next week to discuss those other points in the Department’s 261, September 19, 6 p.m., not covered today.
- See telegram No. 336, June 19, 1934, 6 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, and telegram No. 270, June 26, 1934, 9 p.m., to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. i, pp. 262 and 277.↩