Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1935, General, The Near East and Africa, Volume I

500.A15A5/490: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton)

Washington, September 19, 1935—6 p.m.

261. Your 435, and 439, September 12. You are authorized at any time convenient to the British to enter into informal discussions with them. The following message from the Navy Department to Anderson⁷³ is intended for his guidance:

“Reference 435 and 439 of September 12, 1935 from Atherton.

The Naval Attaché is authorized to represent the Navy Department in an informal exchange of views with representatives of the British Admiralty as arranged by the United States Embassy in accordance with the above references. He will be guided by the following considerations:

(a) Views exchanged will be general and tentative in nature, but designed to indicate limits beyond which the Department will not go.

(b) Our representations will be made with a view to assisting the Admiralty in arriving at a basis for negotiation looking to an ultimate agreement.

The following views of the Department may be discussed bearing in mind the considered opinion of the Department that ‘qualitative limitation, without quantitative limitation, or an arranged program that will continue the naval balance established by the Washington and London treaties,’ is not consistent with the desire of the United States for naval stabilization and accord:

(a) The Department will accept a reduction in calibre of guns of capital ships to 14 inches.

(b) The British have expressed the hope that we could accept a reduction of two or three thousand tons in battleship displacement as being very helpful in future negotiations. We would be very glad to accept this, or a greater reduction, provided it could be done consistent with essential characteristics. Recent studies, however, indicate that to meet modern conditions including the need for increased speed and protection, very little, if any, reduction below 35,000 tons can be effected. The Department therefore suggests for discussion: (1) restriction in number of capital ships by a building agreement similar to the six year program referred to; (2) limitation to a battery of nine 14-inch guns: (3) deferment of the question of displacement limitation below 35,000 tons to a future consideration after a period which will give opportunity to determine definitely after trial and experience the amount of reduction obtainable.

(c) As to any proposal by the British for an increase in cruiser tonnage, the Department considers that agreement is possible only on condition that we obtain types in return suitable to our needs. If in this connection the British should raise the point of retaining over-age tonnage that should be scrapped under the existing treaties, the Department suggests that you indicate that the United States has been proceeding on the assumption that the scrapping provisions of the Washington and London treaties would be carried out, but that if they have any definite suggestions to make, you will be glad to transmit them for consideration. You may bear in mind that unless something is done to disturb the existing equilibrium or ratio, the question of the replacement of eight-inch gun cruisers will not come up for fifteen or twenty years.

(d) The Department will strongly support the stand of Great Britain on reduction or elimination of submarines and to that end proposes for consideration that nations which reduce or abolish submarines may build, within limits to be determined, additional destroyers adequate to protect against submarine aggression.

Subject to your report of any discussion that may take place, the Department will be prepared to furnish further details or consider definite suggestions which may be advanced.”

With respect to the British inquiry as to whether we would be prepared to enter a naval agreement even without the Japanese, we agree that it would be desirable for the British and ourselves to reach a naval agreement which, if possible, would also include France and Italy, but with a necessary clause of elasticity. It would be advisable under these circumstances that such an agreement be in effect a continuation of existing naval treaties with such modifications as the circumstances may require and that it be left open for Japanese adherence at any time.

For the reasons suggested by the British in view of the fact that both the Washington and London treaties call for a conference to be held before the end of this year, we believe it desirable that the British arrange for such a meeting to satisfy this requirement if in any way possible, consulting us in advance. Inasmuch as the British have taken the initiative and since it is not desirable to hold two meetings, it would be preferable for the British to go ahead and call such a meeting to cover the provisions of both treaties.

We see no objection to the British Government’s informing the Japanese Government that we are discussing the pros and cons of a conference as suggested by Craigie, but we are anxious to avoid any publicity at this time.

Hull

73. Capt. Walter S. Anderson, Naval Attaché.