500.A15A5/464: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 21—12:50 p.m.]
386. Having already left a memorandum with the Foreign Office based on the Department’s 211, August 14, 7 p.m., I went yesterday to see Craigie in the country and discuss the contents thereof. Craigie informed me that a British memorandum in reply would be prepared in due course, but I venture in the meantime to summarize his remarks briefly.
Craigie stated that the proposals with regard to tonnage and gun calibers of future constructions in the British memorandum had special reference to the European naval situation. He said that the British realize, as implied in that memorandum, that some of these qualitative limits might not be acceptable to the United States but did not wish to approach the European naval powers with greater proposed maxima than seemed necessary or greater than those with which for some years they have been content, the idea being that some conclusion along the lines indicated in the memoranda might be possible for purely European application. Craigie argued the view that a considerable reduction in maximum allowed battleship size did not produce a new type but merely a reduction in the size of the battleship type. He added that the United States had known for some time that the British favored any reduction in the size of future battleships on which the naval powers could agree.
In regard to paragraph 2 Craigie said it was clearly understood last autumn by both the Americans and Japanese that the British Government was to inaugurate and sound out in bilateral conversations both the French and Italians in the matter of naval limitation. He pointed out that up to date nothing had been effected and it was to make those two Governments realize the need for decisive action in this matter that a memorandum had been prepared for the French and Italian Governments, copies of which had been given to the American and Japanese Governments for their information. The material in this memorandum was intended to draw out the French and Italian points of view into declarations of policy by them.
As regards paragraph 4, Craigie said the British Government did not feel the position of the two major participants were still so far apart. He said, however, that the British Government welcomed an informal exchange of views with this Embassy, but added as had been suggested last autumn, that a representative of the Foreign Office [Page 98] and a representative of this Embassy sit in with the Admiralty and the United States Naval Attaché in their discussion.
As regards the French, Craigie went on to say that the end of last week they had replied to the British memorandum of August 2d and added the French had informed the British a copy of their reply had been given to you.56 Craigie admitted that the French had given no intimation as to when they were prepared to open bilateral conversations in London and he realized that it was more than possible the Italians in the present circumstances would refuse to consider Anglo-Italian discussions, but that at any rate in spite of having named October as a conference date in the Italian and French memorandum the British Government did not contemplate its actually assembling in London before November at the earliest.
As regards the Japanese, the Foreign Office spokesman, according to reports received here from Tokyo, has stated Japan will consider accepting an invitation when it is received. The press reports here quoting other Japanese officials, Craigie points out, are from Admiralty sources and therefore it is not at all conclusive that Japan will only accept an invitation to a conference in Europe if her principle of common upper limit is acceded to beforehand. Craigie had no indication that Japan had varied from the position outlined in your 216, August 17, 5 [4] p.m. but he was hopeful of Matsudaira’s influence in Tokyo naval conversations now going on. Apparently Matsudaira has led the British to believe that impending Admiralty changes in Tokyo may result in a less rigid Japanese attitude.
Craigie stated in the strictest confidence and as a personal explanation to me that he realized that there was some criticism, when Japan announced her intention to denounce the Washington Treaty, that Great Britain was unwilling at that time to establish an Anglo-American front overtly to maintain the 5–5–3 ratio. What the British had in mind, and still believe, is that every opportunity should be accorded to Japan to negotiate on a reasonable doubt. Hence the emphasis had been shifted to qualitative limitation and announced building programs. But if Japan refused to accept any such reasonable offer as a basis of negotiations she would on her own initiative at some time thus eliminate herself from the picture. At that time, and it was becoming apparent that the time was drawing nearer, Great Britain and the United States Government could reach an agreement on their established principle of parity and could, without the appearance of coercion, let it be known to Japan that they intended to maintain in substance the 5–5–3 ratio; that it was their hope that Japan would not force competitive building and would, when her internal situation permitted it, return to a naval accord.
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