724.3415/4142: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell)
111. Your 161, September 17, 6 p.m. Please state to Dr. Saavedra Lamas that this Government has read with the greatest interest his memorandum as transmitted by you. It is felt certain that Dr. Saavedra Lamas recognizes fully the spirit of cooperation and moral support shown by this Government during the past year towards the efforts of the League Chaco Committee. The desire of this Government to support and further efforts for peace in the Chaco, whether emanating from Geneva or from the American Republics, has been repeatedly demonstrated and notably so at the time of the Montevideo Conference. It is believed therefore that he will readily appreciate the fact that this Government is not animated by any spirit of prejudice nor by any desire to minimize or disparage the activities of the League when it expresses the belief that under present conditions, a peaceful solution of the Chaco problem is more likely to be obtained through the cooperation of some or all of the American Republics rather than by a renewal of League activity. You may remind the Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was only after the League had apparently suspended all active participation in promoting a peaceful solution of the Chaco war that this Government accepted the invitation [Page 215] of Argentina to join with, her and Brazil in support of the Argentine conciliation formula. Since the United States joined with those two nations in the efforts at mediation, she has consistently and untiringly devoted herself to bringing about a common ground between the two belligerents in the belief that the conciliation formula presented by Dr. Saavedra Lamas offered an effective manner of terminating the dispute.
The obligations and responsibilities of Argentina, owing to her membership in the League of Nations, are, of course, readily understood by this Government. The United States necessarily believes that the determination of these obligations and responsibilities is solely a matter for Argentina to decide for herself, and should Argentina, in view of her situation, believe it preferable to “link the negotiations which have been carried out to those which now pertain to the League”, this Government would not, of course, question the high motives which might prompt Argentina so to do.
This Government, however, is not a member of the League of Nations. As you have been previously informed, the Government of the United States will not accept membership on any committee appointed by the League to deal with the Chaco problem. It would therefore be unable to continue in the present negotiations should these negotiations be amalgamated with negotiations under the jurisdiction of the League.
On the other hand, the United States, for the reasons above set forth, participated in the present negotiations in the belief that its influence and moral support and active participation might be beneficial and conducive to an agreement between Bolivia and Paraguay for a lasting peace. Until recently, these negotiations appeared to offer a favorable prospect for success. In view of these circumstances, the Government of the United States will continue in the present negotiations provided that Bolivia and Paraguay desire such continuation.
The Government of Brazil has stated that its policy in this regard was identical with that of the United States. In conclusion, you may state that in the considered judgment of this Government, the bases of settlement offered in the Argentine conciliation formula, with such modifications thereto as the two belligerent nations might by common accord adopt, offer an effective and practical means of obtaining peace. It would, of course, be the purpose of this Government to continue to support that formula, as it has in the past.
It is very clear that any conflict of jurisdiction over the Chaco controversy would have highly prejudicial effects. It would seem reasonable to suppose that the League, while technically continuing its own jurisdiction, might refrain from any renewal of activity until [Page 216] such time as the present negotiations reach a point where it may be ascertained definitely that they will meet with success or be doomed to failure. In the latter event, the League could promptly determine what action it desired to take.