793.94/6648

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 751

Sir: [For first two paragraphs of this despatch, see extract printed in Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, volume I, pages 223224; [Page 118] for the enclosed “Unofficial statement” by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, see ibid., page 224.]

The Embassy’s impression is that the statement as issued conveys the true policy of the Japanese Government toward activities by other countries in China, but that the Foreign Office is somewhat fearful of the effect of the statement abroad and therefore is carefully maintaining a position where it can deny that such a statement was ever officially issued. This view is borne out by a conversation which a member of the staff of the Embassy had with an under official of the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs of the Foreign Office on the 19th. According to this official, the essential basis of the announcement, namely, that the Japanese Government feels that it should be consulted by other governments before they take any action in China, is the actual opinion of those in chargé of Japan’s relations with China. The official stated that the statement of policy should be interpreted in a negative rather than a positive way; that Japan did not contemplate any single-handed action in China but only wanted the other powers to recognize Japan’s right to be consulted when they contemplated any activity in China. The official did not state how this policy could be reconciled with Japan’s recognition, in the Nine-Power Treaty, of the administrative integrity of China.

It has been apparent for some time that the Japanese Government has been developing such a policy as is outlined in the statement unofficially released by the Foreign Office on April 17th. There was considerable resentment, official and unofficial, of the American wheat and cotton loan to China, and for months past the Japanese have viewed with a suspicious and resentful eye the activities of American airplane companies in China. Even the activities of Dr. Rajchman, of the Health Bureau of the League Secretariat, in China have called forth considerable criticism in Japan. On April 9th, in commenting on rumored plans for international cooperation in giving economic assistance to China, the spokesman for the Foreign Office stated that such attempts have always ended in failure in the past; that the repercussion from failure in Japan was much greater than in other countries; and that for these reasons Japan would not only not join in such international cooperation but would definitely oppose any plans for international cooperation.34 The statement issued on April 17th is undoubtedly an elaboration and elucidation of the policy mentioned on the 9th, but the question which has been agitating foreign circles in Tokyo is not why the Government issued such a statement, but why the Government issued the statement at the present time, when everything possible is being done to conciliate foreign countries. [Page 119] The under-official of the Foreign Office with whom a member of my staff conversed stated that he knew of no reason for issuing the statement of policy at the present time, but seemed to be inclined to ascribe the move to a desire on the part of Mr. Amau to create a sensation, such as Mr. Shiratori, when in the same position in the Foreign Office, was inclined to create. This interpretation, however, seems somewhat strained. Baron Shidehara, when questioned by one of the newspaper correspondents, expressed surprise that the statement should be issued just at the moment when Japan’s relations with other nations appeared to be improving. An explanation which most observers agree seems to be the most reasonable is that the Japanese suspect that Dr. Rajchman, of the League Secretariat, now on his way to Geneva from China, where he has been conducting investigations for some months past, is carrying with him some plan for international technical and economic assistance supervised by the League of Nations, to China, and that the Japanese Government wishes to forestall any such move by the League.

There are various reports, some of which seem to be reliable, regarding the impelling force behind the issuing of the statement. One is that the action was taken at the instigation of the military, who have always advocated a strong attitude toward China and who induced Amau to issue the statement without the authorization of Mr. Hirota, thereby placing him in a most difficult position, as the policy enunciated in the statement is not in accord with his conciliatory policy, and as he cannot withdraw the statement without incurring the enmity of the military. On the other hand, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, according to most reliable information, thoroughly endorses the statement, asserting that it forms a part of Japan’s fixed policies, and that it will be carried out regardless of the opposition of other nations of the world. Mr. Amau himself, in a private conversation, asserted that the statement was issued as a sort of preliminary to the forthcoming naval conference, which would be a success if Japan’s thesis regarding assistance to China is accepted by the other powers and which would fail if the thesis is not accepted.

Amau, in the press conference of the morning of April 20, made an impromptu translation of a typewritten document. According to his translation of the document, Japan has no intention of interfering with the legitimate interests of other powers in China; Japan will object only when the action of a third power threatens Japan’s position; Japan has no intention of interfering with the independence of China or of infringing on the interests of China; and Japan has no intention of deviating from the established policies of the Open Door and equal opportunity, or of infringing existing treaties. This statement [Page 120] was apparently issued after it was seen that the original statement had excited much adverse comment abroad, and was intended to calm the fears of other nations. It will be observed, however, that while it modifies the tone of the original statement somewhat, it does not alter the basic policy.

According to the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi of April 19, 1934 (Japanese Edition), the Army authorities unqualifiedly support the stand envisaged in the statement issued by the Foreign Office in regard to international assistance to China. Since the outbreak of the Manchurian incident in 1931, the military authorities have viewed all attempts at or consideration of political and economic assistance to China as being injurious to the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. This was demonstrated by Japan’s refusal to accept the conclusions of the Lytton Report,35 which contemplated assistance to China. The Japanese military authorities believe that European and American nations should not endeavor to interfere in Oriental affairs, because of their lack of adequate knowledge of conditions and factors making for the maintenance of peace in the Orient. The maintenance of peace devolves only upon Japan and China, and there can be no argument on this point. They hold that it is shown by actual developments that the Nine-Power Treaty aiming to bring about peace and order in China has no practical value in its application to actualities, and that it is reasonable to conclude that it has practically been invalidated. Under these circumstances, they say, Japan should refrain from participating in the next naval conference if it is proposed that the conference touch upon Oriental problems in addition to matters directly concerned with naval limitation, and if the conference should proceed to consider the political problems of the Orient, Japan should immediately withdraw from the conference, as Japan’s policy in this regard is settled and unshakable and no discussion can be permitted. Therefore Japan should object to any agreement which will hamper cooperation between Japan and China, if any such agreement is proposed at the next naval conference, according to the military authorities.

In regard to the statement issued by the spokesman of the Foreign Office, the Embassy desires to invite the attention of the Department to the fact that the term “Toa” (Eastern Asia) is used in the statement. As a rule, the Japanese formerly used the term “Toyo” (Eastern Seas, or the Orient, as distinguished from “Seiyo”, Western Seas or the Occident) or “Kyokuto” (Extreme or Far East) in designating the Far East generally. The term “Eastern Asia” has a somewhat [Page 121] different and more precise connotation and is probably meant to include parts of China.

So far four vernacular newspapers, the Tokyo Asahi, the Jiji, the Chugai Shogyo and the Hochi, have published editorials on the subject of the statement issued by the Foreign Office. They all endorse the principles contained in the statement, although the Asahi doubts that cooperation between Japan and China will be possible for some time to come, because of opposition among some elements in China. The Hochi, while not disapproving of the statement, believes that the phraseology was too abstract, resulting in misunderstandings abroad, and was issued at the wrong time, before an understanding had been reached through diplomatic channels with other nations. The Japan Advertiser of April 19th published an editorial on the subject, expressing doubt that other nations will be prepared to subscribe to the Japanese thesis regarding assistance to China. Newspaper clippings containing these five editorials are enclosed herewith.36

In my opinion, the implications contained in the Foreign Office statement are very serious. If the policy as therein outlined is adhered to and carried out strictly, it will constitute an element in international affairs as important as, if not more important than, the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. It goes much further than the Monroe Doctrine and places China in a state of tutelage under Japan. In view, however, of the declared policy of the present Minister for Foreign Affairs to use every means in his power to better Japan’s relations with other nations, I do not believe that any attempt will be made at the present time to enforce the policy outlined in the Foreign Office statement in a provocative manner.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
  1. For additional correspondence on this subject, see pp. 371 ff.
  2. League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Geneva, October 1, 1932).
  3. None reprinted.