761.94/734
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to thank you most gratefully for sending me a copy of Mr. Grew’s despatch on Soviet-Japanese relations, No. 670, dated Tokyo, February 8, 1934. This admirable despatch has been of great value to me, and I trust that the Department will continue to forward to me similar documents.
To Mr. Grew’s clear estimate of the situation I can add little. The decision as to war or peace in the Far East will be made in Tokyo, not Moscow. It is my belief that only a violation of Soviet territory will drive the Soviet Union to war. I must confine myself, therefore, to reporting the apprehensions of Moscow.
(1) The leaders of the Soviet Government, without exception, believe that Japan eventually will attack the Soviet Union. They believe, moreover, that Japan’s objective will be permanent occupation not only of the Maritime Provinces but also of all Soviet territory east of Lake Baikal and the Lena River.
Certain publicists, including Radek and Bukharin, and some minor officials in close touch with the Comintern, are less pessimistic than the Soviet officers and diplomatists. They cling to a tenuous faith in the growth of the communist movement in Japan. Both Radek [Page 110] and Bukharin have told me that, in addition to communist workers, at least one-half the professors in the Japanese universities and schools are now secret members of the communist party. I cannot, of course, estimate the value of these statements. They were, however, made to me in the course of intimate conversations with every appearance of frankness. Radek and Bukharin believe that if war can be delayed for a few years a social upheaval in Japan may not be out of the question. They pretend to believe that the ultimate solution of the Soviet-Japanese conflict will be a communist Japan and a communist Russia marching hand to hand to communize China.
(2) Although there is little or no divergence of opinion as to the eventual certainty of war, there is considerable divergence of opinion as to the date of Japan’s attack. Voroshilov and the Army consider the menace imminent and regard the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad as the most urgent task of the Soviet Union.
Litvinov, with whom I have discussed the question many times, believes that Japan will not attack this spring or summer. He hopes to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Chinese Eastern Railway question. Since he has said to me that the sale of the railroad to Manchukuo would constitute de facto recognition of the government of that territory, I should not be surprised if, in order to keep Japan quiet, he should accord full recognition to Manchukuo.
Sokolnikov, who is now in chargé of Far Eastern affairs in the Soviet Foreign Office, and Karakhan, the leading Soviet expert on that area, agree that Japan will not attack this spring or summer. They believe that Japan will employ the next six months to extend her influence in North China and Mongolia and to consolidate her position in Manchuria.
(3) Preparations for war in the Far East are being pushed with all possible speed. Work on the double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad has progressed all winter in spite of physical difficulties. Submarines are now being produced in the Soviet Union in such quantities that Voroshilov has assured me that he is now completely satisfied with his Far Eastern flotilla. The statement has been made to me by two Soviet officials that these submarines are shipped in completed form to the Far East, stretched over three large flat cars. I have been unable to check the truth of this statement.
(4) Everyone in Moscow believes that time is running in favor of the Soviet Union and that within a year and a half the Soviet Union will be impregnable. The Soviet Foreign Office is, therefore, making every effort to postpone the conflict with Japan and to make certain that the Soviet Union will not be attacked by other nations if engaged in war with Japan.
[Page 111]The signing of the non-aggression pacts with the Baltic States was designed not only to reinsure those frontiers but also to compel Poland to enter into a similar extension of her pact with the Soviet Union. Litvinov was triumphant when he told me that Poland would sign the next day and furious when Poland did not sign.
The Polish Ambassador, who conducted the negotiations with Litvinov, told me that Poland’s last minute refusal to sign was due to the Soviet Union’s unexpected reaffirmation of its position with regard to Vilna. He added that Poland would sign as soon as the Soviet Union would declare an absolute disinterestedness in the frontiers of Poland.
I have investigated with the utmost care the story that Poland and Germany, planning to divide White Russia and the Ukraine between them, had agreed to a joint attack on the Soviet Union in case the Soviet Union should become engaged in a war with Japan. I am convinced that there is no truth in this rumor. Litvinov himself has admitted to me that he no longer believes it.
(5) Litvinov, Voroshilov, and many other Soviet leaders have expressed the opinion to me that the largest single deterrent to an attack by Japan this spring was recognition of the Soviet Government by the United States. They believe that the Japanese Government was uncertain as to the extent to which our relations had become intimate and feared an eventual attack by the United States in case of war. They are aware that if the honeymoon of December and January between the United States and the Soviet Union should now culminate in a rapid divorce an attack by Japan would become more likely. For this reason, but for no other, I am inclined to believe that they will not allow their relations with the United States to become so unpleasant as their relations with Great Britain. But it is not to be forgotten that the leaders of the Soviet Government place all capitalist states in the same unpleasant category and that they feel “it is poor picking between rotten apples”.
(6) From Japanese sources I have little to report. The Japanese Ambassador here has gone out of his way to be most polite to me and I have the impression that he has received orders to cultivate the closest possible relations with the American Embassy in Moscow. He startled me, however, a few evenings ago at a party at his Embassy in my honor by saying suddenly, “Well, which war will begin first, Japan and the Soviet Union or Japan and the United States?” Taketomi, Japanese Minister to the Netherlands, when I was on my way to my post, exploded one evening with the following: “The whole trouble is our militarists. Some colonel at any minute may march his men across the Amur River. So long as Hirota remains in office [Page 112] the Japanese Government will not decide to go to war. But how long will he remain in office? And who can tell what our young officers will do?”
That question cannot be answered in Moscow.
Respectfully yours,