711.94/1002
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 16, 1935.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Embassy’s despatch No. 1079, December 11, 1934, entitled Recent Political Tendencies in Japan in which was discussed the contemporary wave of virulent nationalism. In that despatch it was shown that from the historical point of view the present drive towards a state of isolated self-sufficiency is not a new phenomenon in this country. One of the inevitable concomitants of this periodic drive is the decline of foreign prestige. Moreover, in Oriental nations prestige has a special importance quite alien to Occidental understanding.
[Page 688]This importance arises from considerations which are rooted deeply in the fabric of Oriental society. The tradition of “face” (i. e. Prestige), which is as little understood in the West as are the ideas of contractual obligation and abstract justice in the East, may be compared in importance to the heritage of Roman Law in European civilization. The Oriental spirit seeks above all to accept and to allot responsibility for that which has already happened, and it instinctively avoids decisions which involve a rigid future course of action. A spirit of compromise and personal sympathy facilitates the adjustment of contracts in a manner quite unacceptable to the ethical and legal standards of Occidental peoples. Therefore, although legal commitments do not necessarily bind the future, prestige is a compelling factor when future relationships are considered. In Japan, a militaristic country, the principal basis of prestige is force. It was the power of Commodore Perry’s fleet which provided the mainspring of western prestige in Japan in modern times.
It is of course platitudinous to remark that the decline of American prestige in Japan impairs the effectiveness of American policies in the Orient. It is not, however, so simple to grasp the full extent of the handicap which such a decline imposes or to isolate its individual effect from the various factors which contribute to the sum total of Japanese intransigeance. At every step one is confronted by considerations of the broadest importance to our future political and commercial relations with the Far East. If it is true that the distrust of Japan’s word which has been built up in the United States by the events of the last few years will take years of constant good faith to eradicate, it is also true that it will take some years and no small expense before the Japanese will take at face value the representations of the United States Government. This misfortune is due in part at least to the decline of American prestige.
From the Japanese standpoint nothing is more disastrous to prestige than failure to act on a statement of intention. In the recent extraordinary session of the Diet the Seiyukai party introduced an additional relief measure calling for an appropriation of ¥180,000,000 and then lamely withdrew it when the Government evinced its willingness to dissolve the Diet. The following day every paper in Tokyo commented editorially on the Seiyukai’s humiliation making such statements as “The mess made by the Seiyukai has jeopardized the future of all parties” (Yomiuri), “The prestige of the Seiyukai as a public organization has been thrown to the winds” (Asahi), and “Sooner or later the party may go to pieces” (Miyako).
Although western prestige in general was undermined by the defeat of Russia in 1904–1905, by the futility of the world war, and by the seeming inability to overcome the long depression which Japan feels [Page 689] that she herself has conquered, American prestige in addition suffered through our ineffective representations in regard to Manchuria. Certain policies were enunciated under the leadership of the United States and they failed to modify Japan’s course of action. No distinction is made in the practical Oriental mind between inability to carry out a professed policy and unwillingness to do so by the forcible methods which are alone valid against a virtual military dictatorship. In either case failure is the essential fact, it is well remembered, and the next pronouncement of the nation—or the party—which has failed receives only the attention which the previous weakness, real or supposed, merits. The Japanese remember that the so-called “Stimson Doctrine” which had the support of the American public was not implemented by any positive action.
At this point it may be remarked that history has shown that time and again the Japanese are in the last analysis willing to accord just consideration to the rights of foreigners only when they are confronted with superior force or the certitude of retaliation. As outlined above these are the elements of prestige in Japan. However, the Japanese have seized upon the experience of 1931–32, on the statements of the pacific elements in America, and on the effects of a prolonged industrial depression there. These elements were destructive of prestige and they induced the Japanese belief that it was possible to secure naval parity with the United States. They also explain in part the ineffectiveness of certain representations made by the Embassy within the past year. No serious attempt was made to answer the arguments presented in the Embassy’s two notes requesting extradition of the Japanese involved in the Kaiun Maru case. No serious attempt has been made to answer the representations made on behalf of the American oil companies.
But despite the independent policy of present-day Japan she has already modified her policy towards the one nation which has assiduously devoted itself to building up its defences in the Orient and to making clear its readiness to employ them if need arises. Soviet Russia has forced the Japanese army to relegate all ideas of seizing Vladivostok and the Maritime Province to the uncertain future although at one time such action seemed imminent. Soviet Russia has avoided the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway and is receiving a fair price for it. Propaganda against Soviet Russia has markedly decreased during the past year although the army’s appetite for the funds of the nation is as rapacious as ever. As I have already reported, my Soviet colleague not long ago repeated to me the remark of a prominent Japanese that the greatest single factor in obviating war between the U. S. S. R. and Japan was the marked increase of Soviet military strength in the Far East.
[Page 690]On the other hand anti-Americanism is rampant in the press and the cinema. When our naval supply ship Gold Star came to Kobe lately, there were sneering references to the fighting qualities of a navy which permitted the presence of women on one of its vessels. The cumulative force of a campaign of this character induces false beliefs full of tragic potentialities. Even so staid an organization as Rengo which seldom speaks editorially recently circulated a statement which attempted to prove that the Japanese navy had nothing to fear from that of the United States largely because of the invincible morale and superior bravery of Japanese seamen. The Nichi Nichi has been harping on this theme for weeks. The mass of the people gladly accept these arguments and they are part and parcel of the decline of American prestige.
When the Japanese learn that it is no longer possible substantially to ignore American rights, when self-interest forces them to realize that it is more advantageous to cooperate, when the present trend destructive of American prestige is reversed, we may rest assured that many of the problems which present irritating and potentially dangerous aspects will be more reasonably considered by the Japanese. These things can not be brought about by half-way measures, however. The root of American prestige as applied to Oriental peoples is the power of the United States navy. We cannot assure a square deal for our own interests by pacific means without adequate naval strength. We are given no credit by reason of American ethical standards of which we are justly proud. American motives are deeply mistrusted in Japan and are judged by Japanese standards. A recent editorial (Fukuoka Nichi Nichi) stated: “Intimidatory diplomacy can only be applied to negotiations with a weaker power. America may apply such a policy to the Central or South American countries but she cannot do so to Japan”. Would such statements appear if American naval preparedness was a recognized fact in Japan? They have not recently been applied to Soviet Russia despite the polemics of the Chinese Eastern Railway negotiations.
Respectfully yours,