500.A15a5/154
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that the progress of the preliminary naval conversations in London between the United States and Great Britain has been followed with the greatest interest in this country and there is a perceptible hardening of public opinion on the question of abolishing the ratio principle and demanding parity in defense. [Page 668] The reported divergence of views between the Foreign Office and the Navy Department over the question of abrogating the Washington Naval Treaty* has apparently been adjusted following a conference between Mr. Hirota and Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy, on June 26 according to the Asahi. A statement was given out afterward in which Admiral Osumi is reported to have said: “The Foreign Office and the Navy Department are in perfect agreement regarding the naval disarmament situation; there is not the slightest lack of Harmony. Any rumor to the contrary has absolutely no basis.”
On the other hand, at the end of June an incident of considerable significance occurred when some sixty high ranking officers of the Japanese Combined Fleet which was at the time engaged in naval maneuvers off Kyushu addressed a joint communication through the Commander in Chief of the Fleet to Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy, to Admiral Kanji Kato, member of the Supreme Military Council, and to Fleet Admiral Prince Hiroyasu Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff, expressing the will of the fleet with regard to the forthcoming naval conference next year. The two main points, as quoted in the press were as follows:
- 1.
- It is most desirable that in facing the 1935 naval disarmament conference Japan, in order to liberate herself from the existing treaties, should serve notice of the abrogation of the Washington Naval Treaty at the earliest opportunity which presents itself and that strong unified measures should be taken immediately for securing independent rights in national defence and establish the principle of equality for armament rights.
- 2.
- In order effectively to cope with the present important situation it is most desired that a Cabinet should be organized which is capable of removing internal political unrest immediately and administering fair and strong policies with the whole-hearted confidence of the entire nation.
The significance of this unprecedented action is great in that it reveals the difficulties with which the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs by the Foreign Office is faced. While the control is being wrested painfully and by slow degrees from the military in Japan it is evident that the military die hard and that the spirit is as unyielding and adamant as ever. It is believed that this joint communication was signed and transmitted by the superior officers of the fleet—it was signed by those having the rank of Captain or higher—in the fear that the younger officers might take more hasty and less considered action. It must also be realized that this action was taken in the face of the recent resignation of the Navy Department’s spokesman who was forced out because of his contravention [Page 669] of the regulations in making a statement relating to the internal political situation.† It is not known what attitude the naval authorities will adopt toward this communication.
The press continues to issue warnings that Japan will refuse to participate in the 1935 Conference unless the present ratios are abolished. The Nichi Nichi Shimbun says that Japan’s opposition to maintenance of the present naval ratios will be made even at the cost of non-participation in the Conference. “Should Britain and the United States insist on extension of the Washington and London Pacts44 with maintenance of the present ratios as a prerequisite, Japan would withdraw not only from the main conference but even from the preliminary parley immediately and wait for the reconsideration of the United States and Great Britain. Such is the Japanese policy.”
There was immediate and vigorous reaction here to Admiral Pratt’s45 recent article which appeared in Foreign Affairs, in which he denounces as logically untenable Japan’s claims for revision of the existing naval ratios, and the article is accepted as accurately reflecting American naval opinion on the subject and as revealing the attitude of the American Government toward the 1935 Conference. A typical reply is that of the Jiji in an editorial published on June 21, a summary translation of which as it appeared in the Osaka Mainichi of June 24 is enclosed.46 This editorial undertakes with unvarnished directness to refute Admiral Pratt’s five points which are summarized as follows:
- 1.
- Japan does not possess scattered domains all over the world requiring huge naval defense like Great Britain.
- 2.
- Japan is not required to defend the shores of two oceans, like the Atlantic and Pacific, as the United States is required to do.
- 3.
- Japan’s responsibility as a neutral power in an event of hostility among third powers is not so great as that of either the United States or Great Britain who must shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding the rights of neutral nations.
- 4.
- There is no danger of Japan being blockaded by the joint action of other Powers as the domestic conditions of the various Powers make such a move impossible.
- 5.
- The financial conditions in Japan make it difficult for Japan to maintain a larger Navy.
The first two points are countered with the argument that Japan needs a fleet sufficiently strong to protect herself against any potential [Page 670] enemy. The article then goes on to point out that the type of navy demanded by the United States, with its large units and high cruising radius, together with its ability to concentrate both its Atlantic and Pacific fleets in the Pacific, as shown by the recent maneuvers, makes the United States fleet a real, tangible threat against’ which Japan must protect herself.
As to her responsibilities as a neutral, Japan points out that her shipping is active on sea lanes all over the world and therefore requires adequate protection. The editorial is not convinced by Admiral Pratt’s assurance that there is no danger of Japan being blockaded by the other Powers.
And, finally, the Jiji remarks that Japan is the best judge of whether her financial conditions warrant a larger navy and says bluntly: “It is none of Admiral Pratt’s business.”
In short, the position taken by the press is that what Japan wants is revision of the present ratio for no purpose other than to remove the menace she now feels.
Similar views were expressed by a naval authority in an interview with the Japan Advertiser of June 28; he said that whether or not Great Britain had her fleet scattered over the seven seas or the United States has her fleet split on two ocean fronts, so long as either is able to concentrate her navy at any given point for an effective naval operation in time of war, this constitutes a condition which must be taken into account by a third Power. Therefore, “Admiral Pratt’s attack on Japan’s demand for naval parity on the ground that she does not need to cover the world seas like Great Britain or does not have two ocean fronts like the United States is hardly to the point.” The most enlightening statement in this interview, however, and one which perhaps lays bare the very essence of Japan’s motives in demanding freedom to build as she pleases may be found in the following:
“Japan’s international relations have been particularly adverse to her since the Manchurian incident. All Japanese thought and still think that Japan was right and just in the Manchurian incident. With this conviction, Japan sought to settle the matter in cooperation with other members of the League of Nations. It was Japan who proposed the Lytton Commission for that purpose. But Japan was defeated to the tune of 1 to 42 at Geneva. Japan is absolutely sure that she was right in the Manchurian incident and is convinced that what she believes as just is not just to the Western nations when such justice is found to be prejudicial to their national interests. Japan assumes her responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and has decided to carry on her work in her own way according to what she conceives as just and right. In other words, Japan must be prepared for a possible contingency to face the worst under the present circumstances.”
Here is a statement right from the heart; it is an unvarnished announcement of Japan’s intention to proceed along her chosen path in international affairs irrespective of any other considerations whatever. Under such conditions a nation must be prepared to fight and Japan, aware of this, is working to close the gap of disparity between her Navy and those of those nations which would be most likely, in her opinion, to interfere with her purposes.
Still another argument advanced by the Japanese to support the necessity of an adequate navy is that made by Admiral R. Nakamura, head of the Naval Technical Department, who pointed out that larger nations, with their greater resources, can frequently gain their ends by diplomatic, technical and financial means but that for the smaller nations armaments alone could be effective.
In conclusion, reference must be made to the possible effect upon the Japanese attitude at the forthcoming preliminary naval conversations of the change of Cabinet which is now in progress. As reported by telegram yesterday‡, Admiral Okada has been charged with the formation of a cabinet to succeed that of Admiral Saito who has held the reins since May, 1932. While no members of the new cabinet have yet been definitely announced the name of Admiral Suetsugu is frequently mentioned. As the Department is aware, he represents the most chauvinistic elements in the country and if he were to succeed Admiral Osumi this fact could not fail to have great bearing on Japan’s attitude at London and afterward.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s despatch No. 838 of June 14, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- Embassy’s despatch No. 814 of June 1, 1934. [Footnote in the original; despatch not printed.]↩
- For text of the Washington naval treaty signed February 6, 1922, see Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247; for text of the London naval treaty signed April 22, 1930, see ibid., 1930, vol. i, p. 107.↩
- Admiral William V. Pratt, U. S. Chief of Naval Operations, 1930–33.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 144, July 4, 1 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram not printed.]↩