Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

761.94/714

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 700

Tokyo, March 8, 1934.
[Received March 24.]

Sir: A renewed^* source of friction between Japan and the Soviet Union has recently come to light with the publication of reports that Japanese planes have illegally flown over Siberian territory and that Soviet planes have similarly crossed the Korean and “Manchukuo” border on several occasions. A brief account of this development was included in the Embassy’s Monthly Political Report for February.⁷⁸ There is nothing further to report on the matter to date save that the Assistant Military Attaché of the Embassy conversed with one of the secretaries of the Minister of War and with the Soviet Military Attaché in an effort to ascertain the facts behind the newspaper reports. While both officials confirmed that Japanese aeroplanes had been fired at along the Kirin-Siberian border, the Soviet Military Attaché implied that reports of trespassing on the part of Soviet planes were merely propaganda in reply to Soviet chargés of trespassing against Japan. It may be noted that the Secretary to the Minister of War ventured the opinion that these recent incidents would not be likely to increase the tension between the two countries and that the Soviet Military Attaché seemed inclined to believe that war between Japan and Soviet Russia would not break out in the coming spring or summer. There seems no reason to regard these statements as other than sincere expressions of opinion on the part of officials who should be well-informed by virtue of their positions.

Another minor irritant in the making is seen in the filing of a suit by the Nippon Can Manufacturing Company against the Soviet Trade Representation in the Tokyo Local Court. The suit is filed, according to the Japan Advertiser, because the Soviet body refused to take delivery of 25,000 cases of cans shipped about the end of last year. It is said that the Company has prevailed on its two chief competitors, Hokkai Can and Toyo Can, to join a boycott against the Soviet Union which customarily imports over 100,000 cases of cans each year for canneries which are in competition apparently with the Japanese fishing and canning interests.

The controversy over the auction^† of fishing lots has apparently entered a phase of somewhat dilatory negotiations. After several delays another auction was held on March 5 for additional lots but since there has as yet been no agreement as to the exchange rate for Japanese bidders, there were no Japanese bids and the auction was a farce. If a report from Vladivostok may be credited, the Soviets are not eager to dispense with Japanese rental payments for it was announced that the bids obtained from Soviet sources would be sealed and retained until still another auction has been arranged. The Japanese insistence on the exchange rate of the Shidehara-Troyanowsky agreement (32.5 sen per ruble) remains unmodified while the Soviets still hold out for an upward revision of the rate.

The question of the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway is the subject of considerable speculation at the present time since the release on February 24 of the detained Soviet officials has made possible the resumption of negotiations. It is probable that negotiations are already under way between the Soviet Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, but the Embassy is not yet in a position to report the facts of the matter. On March 7 the Foreign Office spokesman stated that strict secrecy would be maintained during the negotiations and intimated that progress had already been made. On the preceding day at a reception at the Soviet Embassy the Soviet Ambassador volunteered that he would soon get in touch with me to apprise me of the latest developments. It may be remarked that the Foreign Minister has, in practice, apparently dispensed entirely with the fiction that the railway question was purely a matter for negotiation between Soviet Russia and “Manchukuo”.

It may perhaps be of interest to the Department to hear an hypothesis advanced to me by the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires on February 26 during the course of a conversation on the general situation. Nebil Bey asserted that he knows the Minister of War, General Hayashi, well, that the latter told him that Japan could never feel at ease so long as there were Russian troops and aeroplanes in Eastern Siberia and that this threat would have to be definitely eliminated. Nebil Bey thinks that the danger of a war with Soviet Russia was much less under Araki who is more a theorist and a dreamer than a man of action, but that Hayashi is distinctly a man of action and that only the restraining influence of Hirota and other pacifist influences prevent an early attack. The American recognition of Soviet Russia he considers a restraining factor because the Japanese do not know what America would do in case of war and a neutrality benevolent to the Soviets might be serious to Japan.

It is apparent that only close personal association could substantiate or invalidate the above estimate of General Hayashi together with its implications, and the Embassy is thus far unable to evaluate authoritatively Nebil Bey’s opinion although the Military Attaché is making every effort to obtain information on this precise matter. It will be remembered, however, that at the time of the Mukden Incident of September 18, 1931, General Hayashi, then commander of the Korean Garrison, did not await orders from headquarters but immediately and on his own initiative despatched troops across the border. To comment further on the hypothesis that an attack on Soviet Russia might be possible during General Hayashi’s tenure of office, I have reported several times that the Japanese are genuinely alarmed at the strength of the Soviet air base at Vladivostok and I have also noted on several occasions the Japanese tendency to adopt the method of attack as the best defence. It would not be at variance with the present day Japanese concept of “self-defence” for a Japanese force to attempt the removal of this menace.

In comment on the above statements I feel obliged to point out that the hypothesis advanced by the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires stands or falls on his understanding of General Hayashi and that the ordinary fallibility of personal judgments is in this case heightened by differences of race and psychology. I am more inclined, in fact, to concur with the view recently expressed by the Counselor of the German Embassy to a member of my staff to the effect that there would be no clash this spring, although the Japanese and the Soviets would ultimately, of course, have to come to terms and agree definitely on the basis on which they would live as neighbors. It is, moreover, interesting to note that this official, who has a background of many years experience in Japan, views the future of “Manchukuo” largely as a function of Soviet-Japanese relations. In other words, while he recognizes that China has been eliminated from the Manchurian problem, he seems to feel that no such settlement has been reached with regard to Soviet Russia over Manchuria and that the determining factor for the future of the new “Manchukuo” Empire is the relationship between Japan and Soviet Russia. Proceeding further, he stated that the Soviets always had the idea of world revolution in mind, that they were constantly getting stronger from a technical viewpoint at least, and, propaganda having failed, they would try to foment difficulties for capitalistic nations through economic, political, and even military action. For this reason it seemed almost impossible to him for the Communists to come to any honest working agreement of a permanent nature with Japan as to policies in the Far East.

In summing up the situation as it now appears, I believe that certain pacific influences which I outlined in my despatch No. 670 of February 8 are still operative, that they have enhanced the possibility of avoiding war with the Soviets, and that tension has decreased perceptibly in the last several weeks. I nevertheless feel that the concrete achievements to date in adjusting Soviet-Japanese controversies have been largely the work of one man, the Foreign Minister, and that further successful steps may possibly depend on his continuance in office. At the same time I do not believe that his efforts have thus far affected the underlying and deep-rooted difficulties and that consequently, with regard to the long term outlook, I am not yet inclined to modify my view that the possibility of an eventual war between the two countries still exists.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Postscript

March 9, 1934.

Late this morning, after the foregoing despatch had been typed for forwarding to the Department in the pouch which leaves tomorrow morning, the Soviet Ambassador came to call on me. We talked for over an hour and since I believe that the substance of his remarks should be submitted to the Department at the earliest moment, I have the honor to transmit a necessarily hurried memorandum of the conversation as an enclosure to this despatch.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

[Tokyo,] March 9, 1934.

During a long conversation today with the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Youreneff, he first told me the present status of the negotiations for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway: these negotiations are still confined to pourparlers between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and himself, the general conference not having yet reconvened. These pourparlers have taken the form of bargaining pure and simple, each side naturally wishing to win a success—especially Mr. Hirota, who will have difficulty in satisfying Japanese public opinion. In brief the situation is as follows:

The Soviet Government places the negotiations in two categories, the first comprising (1) liquidation of the Russian personnel of the railway and (2) “Manchukuo” assumption of the railway’s debt, and the second category comprising the actual sale of the railway itself. For the liquidation of the personnel the Soviet Government will expect an amount of between nine and ten million yen. The approximate amount of the debt he did not tell me. With regard to the price for the railway, the “Manchukuo” authorities have not moved from their original offer of fifty million yen. The Soviet demand which was originally placed at two hundred and fifty million rubles was later reduced to two hundred million rubles. In order to convenience the Japanese, the Soviet Government had subsequently agreed to receive 50% of the total amount in merchandise and of the other 50%, 15% would be paid immediately on signature in yen and the remaining 35% would be paid within three years by the “Manchukuo” Government. The final figure to be agreed upon would be a global amount. Bargaining with regard to the type of merchandise to be received is now going on, the Japanese desiring to make as favorable a deal in this respect as possible.

I asked the Ambassador whether he was optimistic as to an eventual favorable outcome of the negotiations. In reply he made the significant remark: “An agreement will be reached if the Japanese wish to avoid war with Soviet Russia”. I said to him: “That remark could be interpreted as meaning that if the Japanese do not come to terms the Soviet Union will declare war”. He replied that this was not his meaning and that what he wished to convey was that if an agreement for the sale of the railway should not be reached, this fact would be a significant indication that the Japanese intended to bring about a war and would use the failure of the negotiations as an excuse to satisfy public opinion in Japan as to the reasons for such a war. They had already given their hand away in the documents published, to the effect that they would take the railway anyway, whether the negotiations succeeded or not.

I then asked Mr. Youreneff whether he was optimistic that war would be avoided. He said that it was important to be optimistic and implied that he had to be very careful to take such a position because at a given moment the Japanese Government might publish his pourparlers with Hirota over the railroad and that his attitude as then revealed might be an important element in the situation. In spite of this statement he gave me the distinct impression that he was far from optimistic with regard to the future. He said that a meeting of the principal generals of division will take place in Tokyo some time this month^* and that the pros and cons of an attack on Soviet Russia will be thoroughly discussed at that time. He alluded to the significant fact that a similar meeting of generals had taken place shortly before the outbreak of the Manchurian adventure in September 1931. He said that Hayashi has constantly worked against Soviet Russia, particularly in Sinkiang, and that while it is very difficult to get a precise line on his present attitude, there seems to be no good reason to credit him with peaceful intentions.

Mr. Youreneff repeated what he has frequently said to me before that the Soviet Union is fully prepared for all eventualities and is strongly fortified both in Vladivostok and along the Siberian border. The double tracking of the trans-Siberian railway has been carried on steadily throughout the winter in spite of the intense cold. If the Japanese should attack, they could of course pour immense forces into Manchuria and might be able to take Vladivostok and the adjacent portion of Eastern Siberia, but further operations would entail extending and weakening their lines of communication, and little by little the Soviets could pour more and more troops into that region. If war should commence, it would not stop until one side or the other was completely exhausted, and it would take a long time to exhaust the almost unlimited power of the Soviets. Japan’s navy, he said, is of course incomparably stronger than the Russian navy but the Russian fleet of submarines at Vladivostok is very strong and the sinking of a Japanese battleship or two would have immense significance and would alter the whole situation in the Far East. He said furthermore that while the Soviet measures were now purely defensive in character, if war should break out these measures would immediately become offensive, and unless Japan should quickly win an outstanding victory the Soviets would be able to occupy part or all of Manchuria, especially, he said as at least 100,000 of the present troops of “Manchukuo” would support the Soviet arms and might turn the whole tide of the operations.

I said to the Ambassador that most of the foreign military experts in Tokyo believe that the Japanese army will reach the zenith of its combat efficiency in 1935 and that, if war is intended, the spring of 1935 will be the most likely moment for attack. The Ambassador replied that while nobody could foresee a precise date, he thought it more likely that such an attack would occur this spring, at any time after the coming meeting of Japanese generals, because they realize that time is constantly telling in favor of the Russian forces. He seems firmly convinced that the final decision will be taken at this coming meeting of high Japanese military officers. He agreed with me that important pacific influences are at work in Japan, including the Emperor, Prince Saionji, Count Makino, a considerable body of liberal opinion, and especially Hirota, but he added that in the last analysis the decision would lie with the military.

In further conversation Mr. Youreneff spoke of the situation in Sinkiang where the Chinese troops which had been repatriated by Soviet Russia had been victorious over troops backed by the British. He believes that the Japanese are steadily working in China to foment further disruption. He thinks that the Japanese are convinced that the United States is backing China, especially in its aircraft development, and he smiled rather cynically when I stated my belief that war between Japan and the United States is unthinkable. He asked me many questions with regard to our intentions concerning the further fortification of the Philippines, Guam, etc. He also said that according to his information England is showing a distinct pro-Japanese tendency, and he gave me the impression without stating it openly that he believes that England is trying to foment war between Soviet Russia and Japan. On the other hand he said that England is in a very difficult position because she has good reason to be afraid of Japan becoming too strong. On the whole he agreed that the political situation is rather nebulous, although he finds that international intrigue is constantly working throughout the Far East.

J[oseph] C. G[rew]

1. Embassy’s despatch No. 593, November 18, 1933 and telegram No. 175 of November 12, 6 p.m., 1933. [Footnote in the original. For despatch No. 593, see Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. iii, p. 458; telegram No. 175 not printed.]
78. Not printed.
79. Embassy’s despatch No. 691 of February 23, 1934. [Footnote in the original.]
80. This meeting of division commanders is scheduled to meet in Tokyo on March 26 and to last for five days. It is not an annual meeting but is said to be customarily held after the appointment of a new Minister of War. [Footnote in the original.]