793.94/6812
The Chargé in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 1.]
Sir: With reference to recent despatches* from the Consulate General at Mukden containing information with regard to railway construction and other Japanese activities in Jehol Province suggestive of possible future forward movements of the Japanese military into Chahar or Hopei Provinces, I have the honor to submit, with comment, information available at Peiping in this regard.
[Page 303]According to the above-mentioned despatches, reports have been received to the following effect: (1) The Railway approaching Chengteh (Jehol City) from the northeast will soon be completed as far as Hsiapancheng, which is 20 kilometres southeast of Chengteh. (2) A line is shortly to be constructed southwest from Hsiapancheng to Hsinlung, which is only 30 or 40 kilometres north of Malanyu (a pass in the Great Wall), which in turn is only slightly more than 100 kilometres from Peiping. (3) This line to Hsinlung is now referred to in Chengteh as “the main line”, although Hsinlung is of no intrinsic importance unless the line be extended south of the Great Wall, while the line to be constructed from Hsiapancheng to Chengteh is now referred to in Chengteh as “a branch line” which is not to be completed for some time. (4) A railway is to be built from Chengteh to Dolonor, in eastern Chahar Province and a road, ostensibly a motor road but perhaps the road bed of a railway, is under rapid construction along the first quarter of the distance between the two cities. (5) Motor roads, which may also be the road beds of railways, are under construction north of Chengteh. These roads (or railways) will approach the Jehol-Chahar border considerably north of Dolonor. (6) Maps are on sale at Chengteh showing Dolonor and the immediate vicinity as part of “Manchukuo”. (7) The Chief of the Japanese Military Mission at Chengteh has been transferred to Kalgan, the capital of Chahar Province. (8) The press in Manchuria publishes reports indicating, or intended to indicate, close relations between some of the Mongols of Chahar and “Manchukuo”. (9) Gasoline has been ordered by Japanese for transportation to Dolonor and Kalgan. (10) General Doihara has recently visited Peiping and Tientsin.
The Legation concurs in the view that these developments indicate that a forward movement may be intended by the Japanese military. All of these developments, on the other hand, may have a quite different significance. The road work, for example, may be for the purpose of consolidating Japan’s position within “Manchukuo” or may be preparation for a possible future conflict with Soviet Russia; the new military mission at Kalgan may be no more than a routine matter, as such missions are to be found in a number of Chinese cities; General Doihara is said by a liberal Japanese opposed to the Japanese military to have no longer the importance which he once had; the maps may be the work of patriots without influence; and some of these reports may be without foundation.
Nevertheless, the Legation feels that, whatever the significance of the foregoing developments, the Japanese military may make a move which will imperil Chinese sovereignty in one or both provinces in question. It is impossible to state whether such action may occur in the near or more distant future. It is doubtful whether the Japanese [Page 304] military itself could make an accurate forecast in this regard. If and when the Japanese do make such a move, at least some of the developments described in the despatches of the Consulate General at Mukden will naturally play a part.
Local Chinese and Japanese opinion does not foresee any forward action on the part of the Japanese military in the immediate future. Even they, however, cannot be certain of the intentions of the ultrareactionary junior officers of the Japanese military stationed in Jehol Province and at Tientsin. There are, for example, factors in the situation which are known to be highly irritating to the Japanese military. Such irritation might easily develop into some sort of an outburst which would alter considerably the present superficial tranquility.
There continue to be incidents between Chinese and Japanese which arouse the anger of the Japanese military. The most recent is that of the Japanese chancellor, Ikeda, of the Japanese Consulate General at Tientsin, attached to the Japanese Consulate at Kalgan for duty. Ikeda started out on October 26 northward from Kalgan in the company of Lt. Col. Matsui, Chief of the Special Military Mission at Kalgan, and Major Yamaguchi of the Tokyo General Staff. They were stopped at Changpei (10 miles north of Kalgan) by 19 Chinese soldiers. Ikeda, who speaks Chinese very well, approached the Chinese soldiers and asked what they wanted. According to the Legation’s informant, who obtained his information from a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate at Kalgan, Ikeda very probably used some impolite Chinese language. At any rate, one of the Chinese soldiers clouted him on the side of the head with a rifle, knocking him down and rupturing one of his eardrums. A Chinese officer appeared on the scene, the matter was temporarily adjusted, and the three Japanese proceeded on their trip. The Japanese military, however, have demanded a settlement, and the case is now under negotiation.
Another recent incident was the refusal of Chinese authorities to permit a body of Japanese-“Manchukuo” troops to pass through Malanyu, a pass in the Great Wall, in pursuit of some bandits who had fled southward through it. Although the Japanese concerned permitted themselves to be dissuaded from pursuit, this incident is said still to rankle in the minds of the Japanese military.
It is also understood that the settlements of the affair of the killing in August of this year by Chinese of six Koreans at Fushanssu and of the affair of the killing by a Chinese of Miyagoshi, a Japanese sutler to some of the Japanese troops in the demilitarized area (Legation’s monthly report for September, 193425), were not so severe as some of the military desired. The terms appear severe enough to an observer. [Page 305] In the case of the Koreans, an indemnity of $2,000 for each of the deceased was paid, although these Koreans, according to an official of the Japanese Legation, were probably undesirables, peddling narcotics. The terms of the settlement of the Miyagoshi incident were so severe that, according to reliable Japanese information, publication was withheld for three or four weeks at the request of the Chinese authorities. They have now been published with the exception, it is understood, of one of the clauses. They include an indemnity of $10,000, the dismissal of two local magistrates, and provision for the punishment of the Chinese offender. (In this connection, information has been received from a Japanese source to the effect that the offender has been turned over to the Japanese for punishment. It is difficult to believe this report, but it cannot be entirely ruled out as impossible in view of the general temper of the Japanese military authorities in this area.) The unpublished condition will never, according to a statement made by the Japanese Assistant Military Attaché to a Japanese known to the Legation, be divulged as it would arouse too much indignation on the part of the Chinese people. The Legation has not yet learned what this condition is.
The flight of Japanese planes over Chahar on October 25 and the scattering over the town of Chihfeng of handbills which complained of “illegal acts” on the part of certain Chinese and which threatened retaliation is believed to have been caused by anger on the part of the military resulting from the accumulation of such incidents, as well as from their probable desire to remind General Chiang Kai-shek, who was at that time visiting Peiping, that the Japanese military is still a force to be reckoned with both north and south of the Great Wall.
The Legation has been informed by an unusually frank critic of the Japanese military, the representative of a Japanese news agency, that the Japanese military are very dissatisfied with the “conciliatory” attitude toward the Chinese authorities of Lt. Col. Shibayama, Japanese Assistant Military Attaché at Peiping and principal Japanese figure in negotiations over problems in North China affecting both countries. They feel that he gives in to the Chinese to such a degree that “he is rather an adviser to General Huang Fu than a Japanese military attaché”. The civilian Japanese of Peiping regard Lt. Col. Shibayama as an exceptionally able and liberal Japanese military officer and believe that he is in frequent conflict with the Japanese military in Manchuria and at Tientsin. According to the press correspondent mentioned above, it is probable that the Japanese military will effect the transfer of Shibayama by the end of this year, having him replaced by a reactionary, ultra-patriotic officer.
The Japanese military are also dissatisfied with General Yu Hsuehchung, the Hopei Provincial Chairman, and with some of his subordinates. [Page 306] I am now informed that the Japanese military have come to an agreement with the Chinese authorities by which General Yu will retain his position while some of his subordinates distasteful to the Japanese military will be removed. According to my informant, the Japanese agreed to the non-transfer of General Yu because none of the possible successors suggested by the Chinese authorities were as satisfactory in the Japanese viewpoint as General Yu, unsatisfactory though he is. Although the Japanese military may have agreed to the retention of General Yu, it is doubtful if they are pleased with the arrangement.
The desire of the Japanese military to see Japanese interests develop North China economically in order that Japan may be helped financially is not being realized with any rapidity. As far as the Legation knows, the only important solutions reached in Sino-Japanese relations affecting North China have been the establishment of through passenger traffic on the Peiping-Liaoning Railway and the establishment of five Chinese customs houses and one sub-office at passes, other than Shanhaikuan, along the Great Wall. It is now understood that an agreement for the reestablishment of postal communications between Manchuria and North China will be made public in the near future. Japanese efforts to persuade the Chinese authorities concerned to use Japanese money for the construction of certain railways in North China (Legation’s despatch No. 2906 of August 16, 1934) are said to have been unavailing so far. According to a usually reliable Japanese source, conversations in this regard are not now in progress as the Japanese have come to realize that the Chinese authorities cannot at present do anything definite in this regard without arousing such a clamor on the part of the Chinese people as to endanger the position of the Chinese authorities. The progress of Japanese economic penetration into North China does not appear, therefore, to be as yet very extensive.
Another indication of dissatisfaction with the situation is to be found in a Japanese daily newspaper published in Tientsin (Tenshin Nippo), an organ of the Japanese military. Complaints appear frequently in this paper of alleged anti-Japanese activities existing in North China.
From the foregoing it may be seen that, although there is no conclusive evidence that any action affecting Chahar and Hopei Provinces in the near future is contemplated by the Japanese military, there is evidence to show that the Japanese military is discontented with the present situation and is in an irritable mood. When the Japanese military is discontented, it is capable of taking matters into its own hands. One can only surmise what the purpose of possible future [Page 307] actions might be. For example, the military might wish to define the western boundary of Jehol Province to its satisfaction, as that boundary is at present in dispute and ill-defined; the military might wish to force the Chinese into agreements which would accelerate Japanese economic penetration into North China, possibly including the connecting of railways in Jehol with railways inside of the Great Wall; or the military might intend to bring within the boundaries of “Manchukuo” a part of Inner Mongolia, say, Dolonor and that part of Chahar Province which juts eastward into “Manchukuo”, with Jehol on its south and Outer Mongolia on its north.
It is also possible that the Japanese military in Jehol and Tientsin, whatever the local factors were, might be influenced in future action by the situation in Japan and Manchuria; that is, they might conceivably be inspired to action in order to arouse a patriotism at home which would defeat the activities of Japanese civilians desirous of limiting the powers of the military.
Respectfully yours,