761.94/800

The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State

No. 1030

Sir: For some years after the emergence of the Soviet régime Japanese policy towards Russia was limited, in its imperialistic tendencies, more by the restraining influence of third parties than by Soviet resistance. As recently even as the winter of 1931–1932 the Japanese discovered that the USSR was unwilling to risk the defense of the traditional Russian sphere of influence in North Manchuria. It was only in December 1932 that, in refusing to extradite the rebel General Su Ping-wen, the Soviets served notice that there were limits to their subservience to Japanese encroachment.

In the last two years Japanese policy has been confronted with progressively stronger, self-reliant opposition on the part of the USSR. The situation has altered profoundly. The USSR has secured her European frontiers through non-aggression pacts, she has improved her line of communication to the Far East, she has developed a military machine of undoubted strength in this region, she has in some measure resolved an economic crisis, she has been recognized by the United States, and she has secured admittance to the League of Nations.

There has as yet been no general realization in this country of the full significance to Japan of the altered situation. The army at first was inclined to underestimate the Soviet regeneration, Japanese army officers today still adopt an attitude of professional scorn when Russia’s military strength is mentioned. In General Araki’s time the Soviet “menace” was capitalized for political purposes to secure funds for the army. Certain elements in the army then advocated and possibly still advocate seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the liquidation of Soviet interests in North Manchuria by condemnation and seizure. There has been, however, some disinclination to arouse a war psychology directed against the Soviets. On the other hand, since the advent of Mr. Hirota the Foreign Office has fully recognized that Japanese policy must be modified, that it is now necessary to compromise with Soviet Russia rather than mete out to her the treatment accorded to Japan’s inferiors in power.

In addition to frequent lack of harmony between the civil and military branches of the Government Japanese policy has suffered from a failure to appeal to world opinion. The Soviets have outmanoeuvered the Japanese in the Chinese Eastern Railway negotiations. They have not only gained the time which they needed to achieve a greater degree of security but they have also continually forced the Japanese [Page 298] on the defensive before the court of world opinion. Russia probably averted confiscation of her interests by her timely offer to sell the railway, she also focused public attention on the question by publishing the “Hishikari Documents” a year ago, and only lately she called into question Japan’s intentions by revealing that negotiations had been broken off by Japan with only a difference of Yen 40,000,000 remaining between the bid and asked price. Moreover, in securing Mr. Hirota’s active participation as “mediator”, the USSR has successfully flouted the Japanese contention that “Manchukuo” is an independent nation. The failure of Japanese diplomacy to secure foreign approbation in the controversy with the USSR has been one of the principal factors which have deterred Japan from a war with Soviet Russia. Not many months ago Major General Doihara, chief military intelligence officer in Manchuria, admitted this fact to an American correspondent*. More recently Major General Isogai of the General Staff wrote in the Gaiko Jiho of October 11 that “The existing international situation is such that it will hardly be possible for Japan in case of war to hope for as favorable diplomatic circumstances as those she enjoyed in the past wars in which she was involved”.

Were the Chinese Eastern Railway question the only important issue at stake Japan could afford to leave the definition of policy towards Soviet Russia in abeyance. However, as the Foreign Minister well realizes, there are many questions awaiting solution, the fisheries of Kamchatka, the oil fields of North Saghalien, the yen-ruble exchange rate, the delimitation of the “Manchukuo”-Soviet border, as well as certain minor problems which are likely to follow in the wake of the Chinese Eastern Railway Settlement. Still more important to Soviet-Japanese relations in the long run is the question of Japan’s continental policy in regions such as Mongolia where her political interests have not yet been defined.

There have been rumors recently that all is not well with the autonomous government of Prince Teh Wang in Inner Mongolia. It is known that the Nanking Government has not paid the monthly subsidy promised to this government at its inception last April and that there has resulted much unrest among the Mongols. These people naturally prefer the Chinese as less powerful overlords than the Japanese but the steady encroachment of Chinese settlers on Mongol land is of course, bitterly resented, especially as the frontier to Outer Mongolia remains closed with the result that the Inner Mongolians find themselves reduced to a slowly narrowing east and west corridor in Chahar and Suiyuan. Recently Teh Wang’s chief of staff, Han Fenglin, [Page 299] disappeared in Peiping, and a significant report has appeared that he was executed for selling information to the Japanese. The Japanese, it seems, are losing no opportunity to extend their influence west and south from the “Manchukuo” Mongol province of Hsingan where frequent reforms and privileges are calculated to appeal to the Mongols both within and without the border. Recently a delegation of Hsingan Mongols has been feted in Tokyo. Last month in Peiping my secretary was told by a recent visitor to Kalgan that foreign residents there had been approached by Japanese agents who were apparently making an extensive survey of facilities for transporting gasolene and supplies in large quantities into the interior. It is also to be noted that General Isogai in the article quoted above, writes that “The Japanese Empire relies much on the resources of Manchuria and Mongolia, both in peace and war” and, in developing this theme, he quite ignores any political difficulties which might arise with respect to the exploitation of Mongolia.

In closing the Outer Mongolian border to the south it is quite possible that the Soviets believe that Inner Mongolia is soon destined to become a Japanese sphere of influence and that they wish to have their own interests clearly delimited in advance. Should the strained situation now existing in Inner Mongolia result in an insurrection, the stage is set for the Mongolian question to become acute. At that time it is likely that Soviet Russia and Japan will find each other face to face along a Mongolian frontier of great strategic importance.

The question then arises in what manner Japan can deal with Soviet Russia in the light of the latter’s greatly improved position and reach a settlement of the foregoing problems. At present the danger of a military solution appears slight. The army to be sure remains impatient and out of sympathy with the Foreign Office whose methods seem to it indirect and dilatory. Yet the “strong policy” which the army as a whole wishes the Foreign Office to adopt is now clearly ineffective in dealing with the Soviets who seem thoroughly conscious of the altered situation and of their own enhanced power. In a recent conversation with me the Soviet Ambassador seemed genuinely to believe that Japan’s internal and external affairs are in a critical position and that the difficulties which the country faces may at any time cause a crisis. He is doubtless reporting in this vein to his Government. Accordingly such diplomatic pressure as Japan may from time to time attempt to exert would in all likelihood prove ineffective. There probably remains only one productive way of dealing with the Soviets, namely bargaining pure and simple. For Japan this involves [Page 300] two difficulties, first the question of “face”, prestige, and second the difficulty of maintaining stable political conditions within the country when necessary concessions to foreign powers are revealed. These factors minimize the likelihood of any open rapprochement.

The situation in Japan at the present appears not so much favorable to a rapprochement as it does adverse to a war at the present time. Therefore, dictated by purely temporary expediency, further compromises and bargains may follow the example of the Chinese Eastern Railway settlement. Mr. Hirota has long been in favor of such a course, business leaders heartily endorse his point of view in the hopes of enjoying the present industrial boom to the utmost, and the army is preoccupied with the reform of Japanese administrative organs in “Manchukuo” as well as with its own modernization program and with securing budgetary appropriations for the next fiscal year. Furthermore the attention of the nation as a whole has been focused on the naval question, the difficulties of the agricultural classes appear likely to become an important political issue, and the question of national finances is causing considerable anxiety.

It is possible that the first problem with Soviet Russia to be tackled will be the “Manchukuo”-Soviet border. At present there is much talk about a permanent Border Commission and the establishment of a demilitarized zone similar to that set up by the Treaty of Portsmouth20 for the Korean frontier. The Soviet side, which has constructed expensive fortifications along the Amur border, is believed to prefer a non-aggression pact and the retention of the fortifications. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese army will in all likelihood oppose a non-aggression pact as long as any excuse may be found to justify its position. A settlement more in line with the ambitions of each country and in accordance with the general trend of events would be a secret partition of Mongolia, Japan to be paramount in Inner Mongolia while guaranteeing the USSR’s position in Outer Mongolia.

Nevertheless, should some sort of negotiated improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations take place it will involve artificial expedients and could scarcely preserve a static condition for many years. Both powers are expanding rapidly in East Asia, one motivated by 19th century imperialism vitalized with the patriotic fanaticism of the Japanese race, the other motivated by a cult which produces an equal degree of fanaticism. The two ideologies cannot compromise nor can a position of mutual trust be reached between these two peoples. Each is perfecting powerful trained military machines, and many leaders of each, it is believed, are convinced that an eventual struggle is necessary. As earnest of future difficulties the unification of Japanese [Page 301] administrative organs in Manchuria under a Kwantung Army officer and the recent pamphlet issued by the War Office exhorting the people of Japan to greater self-sacrifice and to a sterner patriotism are not calculated to allay Soviet suspicions. Nor is it possible to lose sight of the fact that periodically in Japanese history the Army has dictated the direction of foreign affairs.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
  1. Embassy’s despatch No. 714, March 23, 1934. [Footnote in the original.]
  2. Embassy’s despatch No. 894, July 18, 1934 and No. 761, May 3, 1934. [Footnote in the original.]
  3. See Memorandum of conversation attached. [Footnote in the original; memorandum not printed.]
  4. Foreign Relations, 1905, p. 824.