861.77 Chinese Eastern/1346
The Consul General at Harbin (Adams) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22.]
Sir: I have the honor to report information and impressions which I have received on the subject of the Chinese Eastern Railway since my arrival in Harbin on August 18, 1934.
Informed people in Harbin, regardless of nationality, appear to be uniformly of the opinion that Japan is determined to erase Russian interest and influence in the Chinese Eastern Railway in the near future. The only question connected with the taking over of the Chinese Eastern Railway by Japanese interests appears to be the one of method.
The vicious campaign of vilification which the Japanese controlled press in Manchuria is aiming at Russia, the utter indifference of the Japanese garrisons toward bandit attacks upon the eastern section of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the wholesale arrests by Japanese gendarmes of Russian railway employees, the construction contemplated and already undertaken in Harbin by the South Manchuria Railway, and many other things, all point to the correctness of the local opinion, and indicate that Japanese patience is wearing thin over the protracted negotiations for the sale of the railway. Recent American visitors and local businessmen who have talked with high Japanese and “Manchukuo” officials in Hsinking report that the question [Page 279] of seizing the railway under the theory of the State’s right of eminent domain is seriously occupying the minds of those controlling “Manchukuo.”
Leaving aside the political aspects of the matter and considering it purely from the standpoint of efficient transportation, there seems to be no doubt that the taking over of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Japanese would be beneficial to Manchuria. The South Manchuria Railway will of course operate the Chinese Eastern Railway in the event of its acquisition by the Japanese, and the gauge will no doubt be changed to conform to the gauge of the South Manchuria Railway.
Locally, however, the transfer of the railway from Russian to Japanese control would cause much suffering and probably some lawlessness. There are about eight thousand Russian employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. A large Russian community is dependent directly or indirectly upon these eight thousand employees and upon the railway. It is a foregone conclusion that one of the first steps which the Japanese would take would be to discharge practically all Russian employees and replace them with Japanese. That is foreshadowed by the agreed upon provision for the indemnification of discharged Russian employees in the interrupted negotiations covering the sale of the railway. Many of these Russians are not in a position to return to Soviet Russia, and their absorption into other occupations in “Manchukuo” is, under prevailing conditions, utterly out of the question. In no occupation connected with the extensive development that is occurring in Manchuria are Russians given an opportunity. They are segregated from the main stream of development and activity with a definiteness that is startling.
With respect to the absorbing question of whether or not Russia would undertake a military defence of her rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway in the event of the seizure of that property by “Manchukuo”, the general consensus of local opinion seems to be that Russia would not at this time risk a war with Japan for the sake of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
As the Department is aware, railways owned by and under the control of the South Manchuria Railway Company completely circle and blanket the Chinese Eastern Railway, excepting the western section extending from Anganghsi to Manchuli and the eastern section extending from Harbin to Suifenho (Pogranichnaya). For some time past the servicing of Vladivostok by traffic on the eastern section of the line has been vitally interfered with by almost incredibly frequent bandit attacks upon trains. These attacks have made exporters and importers afraid to risk shipment over the eastern section. The diverted traffic goes out through the Japanese ports of the Liaotung Peninsula and Korea. As an indication of the existing conditions, the following statistics of disturbances on the eastern section are given. [Page 280] These statistics were published in the Harbin Nichi-Nichi (Japanese), issue of August 22, 1934, and have been verified by consultation with Chinese Eastern Railway officials. The period covered by these statistics is from January 1, 1934, to August 8, 1934:
- 16 trains overturned,
- 41 cases of destruction of rails, 91 attacks upon railway stations,
- 116 persons carried away as captives,
- 42 trains looted,
- railway telephones cut 18 times,
- 46 persons killed,
- 102 persons wounded,
- 31 incendiary fires on railway bridges.
The rolling stock loss of the Chinese Eastern Railway in the above mentioned disturbances was 21 locomotives and 207 wagons.
The western line, extending in the direction of European Russia, is comparatively quiet, but the smooth operation of this section does not interfere with the Japanese plan for the development of Dairen and the Korean ports of Seishin, Rashin and Yuki, partially at the expense of Vladivostok.
It will thus be seen that the Chinese Eastern Railway is of very little economic importance under the existing conditions, its value having been largely destroyed by Japanese railway construction and by other Japanese activities. Russia would suffer principally in loss of pride and prestige in the event of the seizure by “Manchukuo” of the railway. The general opinion here is that the men in charge of Russian affairs are too practical to go to war with Japan at the present time with so little of material value at stake. It is said that particularly is this so in view of Russia’s present need for the concentration of her energies upon the execution of plans for internal industrial development.
Respectfully yours,