Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

894.8591/5

Report by the Vice Consul at Kobe (McClintock)⁶⁷

[Kobe, August 14, 1934.]

The Strategical Value of Japan’s New Merchant Fleet

Since October, 1932 there have been laid down in Japanese dockyards thirty-one of the fastest merchant vessels in the world. Twentyseven huge motor freighters have either been ordered or built for the trade to New York alone which are the fastest cargo ships on any ocean. These Japanese vessels operate to the Pacific Coast at a speed greater than that of any transpacific liners under the American flag save only four. Japan has fifty-four merchant vessels in the Pacific trade which are capable of speeds of eighteen knots or over. The United States has twenty-five such ships. There is no freighter in the American register which can even approximate the speed of these Japanese cargo vessels. There is no unit of fleet train in the United States Navy which they could not leave far astern. While American Navy tankers lumber along at from 12 to 14 knots and American naval supply ships have a maximum speed of 12 knots, the Japanese Navy has at its disposal potential tankers and supply vessels of 18 knots. In a Pacific conflict involving two large fleets, both remote from bases, the possession of fleet train capable of keeping up with the combatant units might mark the difference between victory and defeat.

While this paper is concerned with the military and naval implications of the new Japanese merchant fleet, it must be recognized at the beginning that the primary impetus for the subsidized construction program which resulted in these new ships was more commercial than strategical. Japanese shipyards were at a low ebb of activity in 1932 when the Ship Improvement Law was passed and the merchant marine was burdened with an incubus of obsolete tonnage. Furthermore, the Osaka Shosen Kaisha had just shown the way to a new and lucrative trade by laying down huge 18 knot freighters for the silk trade to New York, which formerly had gone by rail across the United States. The other Japanese lines in the New York trade were quick to follow suit. The Ship Improvement Law, therefore, was the outcome of combined pressure from the dockyards, the steamship operators and the Navy, which saw in the building of the new fleet the significant possibilities of such potential units of fleet train.

The Ship Improvement Law which went into effect in October of 1932 provided for the subsidized construction of 200,000 gross tons of freighters in return for the scrapping by owners of 400,000 gross tons of vessels more than twenty-five years old. The subsidy paid by the Imperial Government was ¥54 per gross ton for vessels of 18 knots and over, ranging down to ¥48. Although not so provided in the law, the propelling units of all the ships laid down under its terms were diesel motors, with the exception of one vessel fitted with geared turbines.

Although the Ship Improvement Law of 1932 contemplated a two year program terminating in 1935, there was such a rush of applicants for subsidy that the project was brought to completion within eighteen months. The results of the law may be summarized as follows:

Line	No. of Ships	Unit Tonnage Gross	Global Tonnage Gross	Total Subsidy Yen	Speed Knots
Nippon Yusen  Kaisha	6	7,300	43,800	2,365,000	18
Mitsui Bussan  Kaisha	6	6,233	37,400	1,978,000	18½
Toyo Kisen  Kaisha	4	7,300	29,200	1,460,000	16
Osaka Shosen  Kaisha	3	4,400	13,200	660,000	16
Kokusai Kisen  Kaisha	3	6,966	20,900	1,128,600	18½
Iino Shoji  Kaisha	2	9,937	19,875	1,073,000	18
Kinkai Yusen  Kaisha	2	4,400	8,800	440,000	16
Takachiho Kisen  Kaisha (O. S. K.)	1	6,800	6,800	340,000	18
Shimatani Kisen  Kaisha	1	4,600	4,600	220,000	15
Azuma Kisen  Kaisha	1	4,185	4,185	209,250	16
Shinko Kisen  Kaisha	1	6,400	6,400	320,000	16
Yamamoto Kisen  Kaisha	1	4,150	4,150	207,500	16
Total:	31		199,310	¥10,401,350

All of the vessels built as indicated above were motor cargo ships with the solitary exception of the Takachiho Maru, constructed ostensibly for the “Takachiho Kisen Kaisha” which was in reality Osaka Shosen Kaisha. This vessel, although receiving a subsidy of ¥50 which called for 16 knots, is capable of 18 knots on geared turbines and is engaged in the express service to Formosa. Two tankers were included in the subsidized construction program—those built for the Iino Shoji Kaisha. This firm has relations of peculiar intimacy with the Japanese Navy and its home office is at Maizuru, the principal naval base on the Sea of Japan. The writer would regard these two phenomenally swift tank ships as having been built at the direct instance of the Imperial Navy.

The six express freighters for Nippon Yusen Kaisha and the Mitsui Bussan fleet of equal speed will be allocated to the Atlantic Coast trade, carrying silk out and cotton home. The three 18½ knot Kokusai ships will join the present fleet of four 18 knot freighters in the same run. The four Toyo Kisen boats will be operated by Yamashita Kisen Kaisha of Kobe in the transpacific trade. The vessels built for Osaka Shosen Kaisha and Kinkai Yusen Kaisha, a subsidiary of N. Y. K., will be devoted to the near-seas service. The other vessels listed are for general trading.

Mention must be made of the New York express fleet composed of eight large motor freighters which Osaka Shosen Kaisha brought out between 1930 and 1933. All are of approximately 8,500 gross tons, powered by M–A–N, Sulzer and Burmeister and Wain diesels and capable of a sea speed of 18½ knots. These vessels maintain a fortnightly service to New York of a 28 day passage, although they have made and can make the trip in 25 days. Kinai Maru of this remarkable fleet established a record in 1930 between Yokohama and Los Angeles of 11 days, 6½ hours, which is faster than the transpacific time of any American mail liner under subsidy from the United States Government. The eight O. S. K.’s would provide army transports or navy supply vessels unrivalled on any ocean.

One other fleet of swift diesel-driven ships which operates transpacific is that of the new Kobe shipping firm, Daido Kaiun Kaisha. Its five vessels were not built under subsidy, nor do they earn a service subsidy from the Ministry of Communications, but they are recently built and are capable of a sea speed of 16 knots.

It should be pointed out that the gross tonnages indicated above underestimate the actual carrying capacity of the ships. These vessels are powered by motors and many are of the shelter deck type, with the result that the gross tonnage is lower in proportion to the actual deadweight carrying capacity than might otherwise be imagined. For example, the newest Kokusai freighter, Kiyozumi Maru, has a gross tonnage of nearly 7,000, but her deadweight capacity is 10,000, as calculated by Lloyd’s Agent at Kobe. Like her sisters, Kiyozwni Maru is capable of 18.75 knots.

Such is the new fleet of Pacific merchantmen evoked by the construction bounty policy of the Japanese Government. The ships are astounding because of their combination of size and speed. One other astounding thing is that so little inducement resulted in such phenomenal results. The subsidy of ¥54 per gross ton for a vessel of 18 knots amounts to only 12.6% of the cost per gross ton. It is an actual fact that Kokusai Kisen Kaisha was quoted lower figures by British yards than Japanese yards could offer. It was only the policy of the Government to prohibit the importation of foreign-built ships, plus this very modest bounty of ¥54 per ton which made the differential favorable to Japanese yards. The American Jones-White Act⁶⁸ provided our own ship owners with 75% of the cost of construction in the form of loans at the lowest rate of interest ever offered by the Government. The Japanese law gave but 12.6% of the cost of these new ships.

It is the opinion of the writer that the primary reason for the construction of this great new fleet was the desire of the Japanese steamship companies to take over the trade between East Asia and the Atlantic Coast of the United States. Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Osaka Shosen Kaisha, Kokusai Kisen Kaisha, Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha and Mitsui Bussan Kaisha have divided the American silk trade between them. They have encroached vastly upon the trade between America and the Philippine Islands. Within a year there will be twenty-seven Japanese motor freighters in the trade through the Panama Canal, each carrying up to 10,000 deadweight tons at a speed never before approached by cargo ships. All are able to do between 18 and 19 knots. There are but two American vessels in service to the Orient which could even keep up with these ships. There are no other freighters in the world as fast.

The fact therefore emerges that, conceded the point that the principal reason for such a fleet was commercial, these ships have remarkable strategical value. It was perhaps only a coincidence that the subsidized construction program was to have been completed in 1935, when the so-called “Crisis of 1935” was to be expected. It is perhaps another coincidence that the continuation of this program, calling for the building of 500,000 gross tons of new ships over a five year period, is scheduled to start in 1936, when there will supposedly occur the “Crisis of 1936”. It is no coincidence at all that the Japanese Navy has been indefatigable in urging the adoption of these construction programs and that the Japanese Army has strongly seconded its demand.

The Japanese Navy has felt the need of faster units of fleet train. Most of the Japanese tankers of the Notoro^* and Shiretoko class can not do better than 12 knots. Only one Japanese Navy tanker can make 15 knots—the Kamoi of 19,550 displacement tons. The Navy’s two colliers have a speed of 12½ knots; its destroyer tenders can make between 13 and 16 knots. In other words, faced with the possibility of extensive fleet action remote from bases, the Japanese Navy found that its fuel and supply ships could not keep up with the fleet. An identical situation, incidently, faces the American Navy. The difference is that the Japanese Navy now has available cargo ships of large tank capacity which can keep up with the fleet. The American Navy has tankers of the Rapidan class that can not move more swiftly than 10½ knots and tankers of the Brazos class that can scarcely better 14 knots. Most of our supply ships make 11 knots. The American freighters in the transpacific trade, many of them receiving fat subsidies, could not do better than 15 knots on a flat sea with a following wind.

The naval and military value of the new Japanese motor freighters will be made more evident upon examining their specifications. The twenty-seven express ships in the New York service of Osaka Shosen Kaisha, Nippon Yusen Kaisha, Mitsui Bussan Kaisha and Kokusai Kisen Kaisha, some of which are still building, are so nearly alike in dimensions and power that it is possible to quote approximate statistics on a fleet type. It must be borne in mind, however, that the eight O. S. K. ships are from 1,000 to 2,000 gross tons larger than the other vessels under reference. The following figures describe, therefore, the general type to which all twenty-seven ships conform.

Average gross tonnage	7,300
Average deadweight tonnage	10,000	feet
Average length	450	feet
Average beam	60	feet
Average depth	39	feet
Average draft	28	feet
Average bale capacity	14,500	tons
Average deep tank capacity	1,000	tons
Propulsion units:	2-cycle, airless injection M–A–N’s; 4-cycle Burmeister and Wains; 2 and 4-cycle Sulzers, all of around 6,500 to 7,000 i. h. p.

Speed	18–19 knots
Cruising radius (est.)	15,000 nautical miles at 16 knots.

In profile these ships would for the most part appear as shelter deck vessels with raised forecastles and an unbroken sheer to the stern, except for a central house which consists of two decks surmounted by bridge and funnel. Cruiser and counter sterns appear to be about equal in number. There are a few three islander types in the fleet, notably the new M. B. K. boats.

It does not require a professional eye to discern from the above figures why such vessels are of value to the Japanese Army and Navy. The combination of great cargo capacity and large fuel and deep tanks with wide cruising radius and, above all, astounding speed, make these craft without peer for military and naval supply ships, transports or emergency tankers. Perhaps even more important would be the value of these ships in transporting food, fuel and munitions at express speed to a beleaguered country at war. These ships are as much a “life line” to an island Empire as certain of the continental “life lines” more generally associated with that term.

There is, however, one grave strategical defect which has been permanently built into these vessels. The greatest mineral resource of Japan is coal. The one fuel upon which Japan might rely during a period of extensive blockade is coal. Fast steamers can be transformed from oil burners to coal burners in a week, but a motor ship remains a motorship and can burn but one kind of fuel—oil.

There are beyond doubt immense supplies of oil in reserve for the account of the Japanese Navy. The recently passed Oil Control Act further increases the potential supply by its requirement that importers and refiners of petroleum must keep constantly in storage oil to the amount of half their annual importation. In other words, in the event of a blockade Japan would have a six months’ supply of petroleum on hand before even touching its emergency reserve. These facts mitigate but do not remove a weakness which, in the writer’s opinion, might easily be made fatal by the successful previous location and later destruction of oil reserves by aerial attack. Oil is stored in tanks or subterranean reservoirs and either is vulnerable to bombing.

The great defect of these extraordinarily swift ships is that they can not utilize the natural fuel of Japan. Proper strategy would indicate that the line for Japan to follow would be in the perfection of superheated steam giving impulse to geared turbines and motivated by pulverized or colloidal coal. Two fine Japanese liners are fitted for pulverized coal and utilize exhaust turbines, but no notice was evidently taken of Nagoya Maru and Johore Maru, for the Japanese yards have gone over practically entirely to the building of diesel motors. Irrespective of the question of efficiency of motor propulsion, the strategical weakness remains and should be remembered.

Another but far less important drawback to the strategical value of these new vessels is that most of them are to be placed in the trade to the Atlantic Coast of the United States. A sudden emergency in a certain quarter would cut off half these vessels on the eastern side of the Panama Canal. There is consequently provided a highly interesting barometer as to conditions leading to peace or war in Japan. Certainly the Japanese General Staffs will not wish to lose a dozen valuable units of train if it can be avoided. Therefore, should there become evident a diminution of sailings of these new ships to the Atlantic Coast and a concentration in the Pacific it might be possible to see beyond the effect to the cause.

Despite such objections, however, and despite the fact that the Japanese deep sea services are if anything over-tonnaged and the coastwise services greatly in need of new bottoms, the subsidized construction program of 1932 will not only be continued but greatly expanded.

Sponsored by the Saito Cabinet and vigorously, urged by the dockyards, the shipping companies and the Navy, a plan was evolved for the laying down of 500,000 gross tons of new ships over a period of five years in return for the scrapping of an equivalent amount of obsolete ships. The Okada Cabinet took over the project from the preceding government in its entirety, although as approved by the joint commission representing the Government, the ship builders, the steamship operators and the Navy the plan calls for a reduction in the bounty to ¥48 per gross ton. It appears at this date that the approval of the Diet to the draft bill is an almost foregone conclusion. One significant change in the proposed new program is that it will provide for the construction of passenger liners as well as cargo ships. It is understood that the Navy is particularly interested in the building of fast liners which might be converted into merchant cruisers in the same manner as the American liners built under the Jones-White Act can be converted. If the five year building program is made effective by the Diet it will cost the Government ¥4,800,000 a year from fiscal 1935–36 for the succeeding five years, or a total of ¥24,000,000. 100,000 gross tons of new ships will be laid down each year.

Whereas the first construction program of 200,000 tons was of a commercial character, this second program is seemingly dictated by considerations of strategy. Most of the deep water trades operated by Japanese lines are served with tonnage laid down since the War. There is no crying need for new bottoms in the foreign trade. Nippon Yusen Kaisha will doubtless want several new liners for the European and Australian runs, but otherwise there is no particular place for new liner tonnage. It is certain that the Navy is not interested in the building of little coasting boats, although the Army would probably be pleased to see the construction of small ships suitable for operations across the Sea of Japan. The only remaining conclusion, therefore, is that the second and greater construction program will be more for military than for economic ends. It would be an interesting speculation to wonder if the Japanese Government is encouraging the building of merchant ships as replacements for existing vessels which might presently be lost other than by shipwreck and storm.

Should Japan carry out the second construction program under the same terms as the first it would have more than seventy new merchant vessels of 7,000 gross tons and of the same excessive speed. As has been pointed out, there are already built or building fifty four commercial ships under the Japanese flag on the Pacific which can make 18 knots or over. In the event of conflict it is not difficult to perceive the uses to which this great fleet would be put. The three great Nippon Yusen Kaisha liners of 17,000 gross tons, with a reputed speed of 21 knots (the writer would not credit them with anything over 19) would serve as express transports or merchant cruisers. The three 11,600 gross ton N. Y. K. liners in the North Pacific service would be used for cruiser or transport work, as would the swift O. S. K. Dairen liners, Ussuri Maru and Ural Maru. The China Sea liners Shanghai Maru and Nagasaki Maru, the fastest ships in the merchant marine, would be used for convoy duty as converted cruisers. Such vessels as the old ex-Italian liners Yamate Maru and Asahi Maru, as well as the former German liner Taiyo Maru and the N. Y. K. South American motorship Heiyo Maru would be devoted to transport service. The thirty-one express ships built under the subsidized construction program, as well as the eight 18½ knot O. S. K. New York ships and the new fleet of Daido Kaiun would be allocated to purposes of fleet train and to the carrying of war supplies from abroad at maximum speed.

On the American side of the Pacific the picture is not so encouraging. While the Japanese Government subsidizes the construction of 19 knot motor ships, the American Government subsidizes three antique banana boats, built almost a generation ago and incapable of a speed in excess of 14 knots. While the Japanese merchant marine is implemented with freighters which can beat our passenger liners, the United States subsidizes cargo boats in the Oriental trade which could not better 15 knots even if towed. While the Dollar Line receives a subsidy of $4,733,232 a year it finds it impossible to replace a fleet which is steadily deteriorating. In the event of conflict the only ships upon which the American Navy could rely would be the eight 535’s of the Dollar Line, still able to turn out from 17 to 18 knots, the Hoover and Coolidge, which have made 22 knots, the three magnificent Oceanic liners, Monterey, Mariposa and Lurline, all of 22 knots, the Matson liner Malolo of 21 knots, the old and uneconomical H. F. Alexander of 21 knots, the three Panama Pacific liners of 20 knots, the four new Grace Santas of 17 knots and the three new United Fruit liners on the West Coast run, which could do 18 in a pinch. We have no fast cargo ships per se. We have no fast tankers. We have in the Navy itself no fast fleet train.

In summary, therefore, it will be perceived that in response to the demand of dockyards, shipping companies and the Imperial Navy the Japanese Government subsidized the construction of 200,000 gross tons of extraordinarily fast motor cargo liners. It appears probable that the program will be extended to the building of 500,000 additional gross tons in the next five years. With twenty-seven motor cargo ships built or building which can make from 18 to 19 knots and with a total of fifty-four ships on the Pacific capable of 18 knots or over, it has been seen that the Japanese Navy has been provided with unequalled potential fleet train. The new ships might instantly be used as supply vessels or tankers for a fleet, as transports for the Army or as a vital line of communications, an essential artery, bringing to Japan munitions, oil and supplies.

In the forthcoming negotiations between the great naval powers the strategical value of the new merchant fleet of Japan should not be forgotten.

67. Approved by the Consul at Kobe; copy transmitted to the Department August 15; received October 4.
68. Approved May 22, 1928; 45 Stat. 689.
69. Notoro is now an aircraft tender. [Footnote in the original.]