893.01 Inner Mongolia/27
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 6.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 793 of May 18, 1934,50 on the subject of Soviet-Japanese Relations in which were outlined [Page 221] the terms of an alleged Sino-Soviet agreement concerning the improvement of communications facilities by road and also by radio in Inner Mongolia. It has not been possible up to the present to confirm the existence of this agreement but, nevertheless, several reports have reached Tokyo, notably on June 14 and 23, to the effect that work has started on the route between Urga and Kalgan. These reports stated that the provincial governments of Chahar and Suiyuan had been instructed by the Nanking Government to cooperate with the Soviet Consul at Kalgan in supervising the construction work. The persistence of the reports is cited as evidence that activity of this kind may indeed be going on. Consequently the following brief discussion is submitted in the belief that this matter in particular and the course of events in Inner Mongolia in general are of importance to the development of Japanese continental policy.
Since the action of the Japanese military in September 1931, there has been no direct line of communication between China and Soviet Russia save by caravan routes partially adapted to motor vehicle traffic. The construction of a modern motor road between Kalgan on the Peiping–Suiyuan Railroad and Urga would provide a direct line of communication with facilities for quick travel between China proper and Siberia over a route shorter than the former detour via Manchurian railways.
The interest of Soviet Russia in this project is of significance in that it indicates that there has been no change in the basic policy towards China of the régime which has successfully alienated the vast regions of Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia and which for a time retained the dominating voice at the councils of the Kuomintang, the focal point of Chinese politics. Perhaps the word “Imperialism” is inapplicable to Soviet Russia but, in regions where Soviet penetration has not been opposed by the military force of Japan, China has had to bear the impact of Soviet encroachments approaching imperialism. The development of the Urga–Kalgan route would facilitate the penetration of ideas, materials, and, if need be, armed forces into Inner Mongolia and North China.
To the Japanese military such a project must appear as a rival bid for influence in regions contiguous to “Manchukuo”. The western flank of Manchuria is a region of great strategic importance in the event of a Soviet-Japanese war, and it is open to question whether the Japanese would permit Soviet-Russia to enter the Suiyuan and Chahar regions unmolested, thereby extending Soviet influence along a third side of “Manchukuo”. The Urga–Kalgan route could easily be cut by the Japanese, but such a step would cause a crisis between Japan and the USSR.
If we may believe that this route is now being developed, there follows of necessity an intensification of the rivalry of China, Japan, [Page 222] and Soviet Russia for the favor of the Mongol inhabitants of Inner Mongolia. For the time being such rivalry as already exists (principally between China and Japan) facilitates the Mongol drive for autonomy. Considerations of this kind brought about in April of this year the organization of the autonomous government at Pailingmiao as a counter bid against Japanese concessions to the Mongols in the semi-autonomous “Manchukuo” province of Hsingan. Nevertheless the measures taken suggest that the net of competition is tightening around this region, presaging an ultimate conflict unless the momentum is arrested in the early stages by decisive action. Such action could most likely originate with the Japanese and, as mentioned in the paragraph above, would be critical. The region seems therefore one of the potential danger spots of the Far East. It would become so in fact with the completion of projects such as are envisaged by the alleged Sino-Soviet agreement.
It is hardly necessary to repeat that the arguments of this despatch are based upon information as yet unconfirmed and that the matter is in any event of large rather than immediate importance. To support this statement it is only necessary to remember that Soviet influence is as yet negligible in Inner Mongolia as compared with such influence in Outer Mongolia and that these two regions are believed to be definitely hostile to each other. Accordingly the despatch is submittted merely in the hope that it may provide a useful hypothesis for consideration with such other material as may appear.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩