Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

893.01 Manchuria/1143

The Military Attaché in Japan ( Crane ) to the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department ( Smith )⁴⁴

No. 7393

[ Tokyo ,] July 5, 1934.

1. The undersigned left Tokyo on May 30, 1934, via Kobe and Dairen for Manchoukuo visiting the following points of interest in the order named: Mukden, Harbin, Tsitsihar, Peian, Harbin, Hsinking and Kirin and returned to Tokyo June 24, 1934 by way of Seishin, Keijo, Fusan and Shimonoseki. All travel was by rail except from Kobe to Dairen and from Fusan to Shimonoseki which was by boat.

2. An application to the Japanese War Office for permission to inspect units of all branches of the service in the Kwantung Army serving in the Kwantung Leased Territory and in Manchoukuo was refused but permission was given to inspect one regiment each of infantry and field artillery of the Army of Chosen stationed at Ryusan in the outskirts of Keijo. The same action had been taken on requests by the British and French Military Attachés to inspect units of the Kwantung Army.

3. The time available for travel in Manchoukuo was limited by the funds available so under the circumstances it was decided to visit accessible points of importance in a military way due to the distribution of the Japanese Army and to travel over as many as possible of the new railways of northern Manchoukuo. The time element precluded a trip to southwestern Manchoukuo, which moreover was deemed much more readily accessible to the Military Attaché in Peiping. The official visit of Prince Chichibu to Manchoukuo during the first half of June absorbed the complete attention of the Japanese Army from Hsinking southward so that the new capital, location of the Kwantung Army Headquarters, could not be visited until after the Prince’s departure and even then General Hishikari was in Dairen with Prince Chichibu. General Kawashima, Commander of the Chosen Army, and the Commander of the 20th Division of that Army were absent, unfortunately, on inspection trips. Commanding Generals of the 3d and 16th Divisions, members of their staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the Kwantung Army, members of the Intelligence Section of the General Staff Kwantung Army, the Commanding General of one Independent Railway Guard unit (six battalions) and local representatives of the Special Service Section Kwantung Army (Tokumu Kikan) were interviewed under pleasant circumstances. It was apparent after a couple of calls that members of the Special Service Section would talk more freely than officers of divisions and were, on the whole, better informed on conditions and developments due, no doubt, to the character of their respective duties and the very recent arrival of the 3d and 16th Divisions in Manchoukuo.

4. Special Service Section officers were notable in a number of respects. As personal representatives of the Chief of Staff Kwantung Army under whom the Tokumu Kikan operates to plan and supervise all phases of the development of Manchoukuo, these officers were not under the Commander of troops in their area although their relations seemed to be intimate and friendly. General Doihara and other officers of the section were uniformly intelligent, keen, and well informed General Staff officers and, without exception, had been Manchuria specialists for years. Offices of the Tokumu Kikan were usually inconspicuous with a small staff of military and civilian personnel.

5. The following impressions were gained from Japanese officers mentioned in paragraph 3, American and European consular officers, newspaper correspondents and businessmen and from personal observations:

a. The Japanese Army proudly accepts the credit for what it considers the improved condition of Manchuria as compared to conditions prior to the incident of September 18, 1931. Officers rarely refer to the Manchoukuo Government and, when they do, admit freely that the functioning of that Government depends on Japanese in its employ. Neither Japanese nor foreigners think that the population of Manchoukuo as a whole has any particular interest in the Government of the country. Individuals want peace and security so that they may live and work without fear of interference but what Government provides that condition is immaterial to the vast majority of people. Japanese officers accentuated the determination of the Army to establish and maintain a clean, effective government free from graft, that will protect the people and give them practical education. Higher education, except for a few students particularly qualified to benefit by it, was not favored and the United States and Japan were pointed out as examples of countries with more highly educated people than is good or useful.

b. Japanese have little confidence in the Manchoukuo Army or police force, believing that soldiers and police alike lack any deep sense of loyalty to their country. Efforts to inculcate patriotism are being made in schools and elsewhere but progress is slow. Estimates of how long it will take to produce reliable, patriotic Manchoukuo’ troops varied from ten years to three generations. The certainty with which men of all ranks now receive their prescribed pay has had a very favorable effect on the trustworthiness of enlisted men who were accustomed to having most of their pay retained by their superior officers. On the other hand superior officers find it a hardship to have to try to meet their expensive obligations from their prescribed pay. Great difficulty is being experienced by the Japanese in doing away with nepotism in military and other government services.

c. Lack of confidence in the loyalty and efficacy of Manchoukuo troops is indicated by the custom of having the military guards on railway trains composed of detachments of Manchoukuo and Japanese soldiers of about the same strength. A similar practice is followed in the railway police squad which accompanies every passenger train of the Manchoukuo Government Railways—Japanese compose half of each squad. On the North Manchuria Railway (C. E. R.) trains police squads consist of Russians and Manchus. On the South Manchuria Railway military and police guards are entirely Japanese.

d. The Japanese Army feels that excellent progress has been made in the extermination of banditry. All large bandit groups have been broken up and only in eastern Kirin where concealment is afforded by densely wooded country are small bands active. The usual seasonal increase in banditry is expected during this summer but the present outlook is for far less activity than during the same period last year. Credit for this improvement is given to vigorous bandit extermination campaigns and to the present system of holding localities responsible that bandits are neither housed nor fed. Ten households are grouped under a leader for mutual protection and supplied with prescribed weapons. All other weapons are required to be surrendered and are paid for by the government at prices ranging from 10 yen to about 30 yen. Household groups protect themselves, assist police and troops in operation against bandits and in case it is discovered that anyone in a group has fed or otherwise aided bandits all members of the group are fined. With the decrease in the size of bandit groups troops of Japanese divisions have been withdrawn from scattered posts in outlying districts and concentrated in regimental or larger garrisons while anti-bandit operations have been turned over more and more to the Japanese Consular Police and Independent Railway Guard Battalions and Manchoukuo police and troops. Of course Japanese divisional units are still employed against bandits when it is advantageous.

e. The secrecy surrounding the composition and distribution of the Japanese forces in Manchoukuo is nearly as strict there as in Tokyo. No mention is made of the numerical designations of divisions or component units; neither officers nor men of such units wear the customary numerals on their collars; units are referred to by the name of their commanders and the exact size of units rarely is published. The only numerical designations in use are those of Independent Railway Guard Battalions, of which there are 18. The presence in Manchuria of the 3d, 7th and 16th Divisions was confirmed but nothing could be learned of their organization, strength and equipment. It was learned that Japanese aviation was organized into five battalions, probably of two squadrons each, numbered from 9 to 13 inclusive and commanded by colonels or lieutenant colonels. The limited information obtained on the distribution of units will be incorporated in a report under 6180—Distribution of Troops. In general, the distribution previously reported is approximately correct. Japanese railway police employed by the South Manchuria Railway Company and by the Manchoukuo Government Railways were much in evidence at stations and on trains throughout the extent of those lines. These men are young Japanese Army Reservists and have the same individual equipment as Japanese infantrymen, but wear a slightly different uniform. Another similarly armed force of Japanese noted in air cities was the Consular Police. The strength of Railway and Consular Police could not be learned accurately but an estimate of 10,000 by an American is believed to be reasonable. The members of both police forces were better armed and presented a much more military and effective appearance than Manchoukuo troops or police. The presence in Manchuria of such large armed Japanese police forces of trained men naturally would be a great assistance to the Kwantung Army in time of war by relieving it to a considerable extent of responsibility for the protection of railways and the maintenance of order in cities and towns.

f. The following railroad lines were traversed:

(1) South Manchuria Railway (Dairen–Hsinking).

(2) North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) (Hsinking-Harbin-Tsitsihar Station).

(3) Manchoukuo Government Railways (Tsitsihar–Peian–Harbin and Hsinking–Kirin–Tunhua–Tumen).

(4) Chosen Government Railways (Tumen–Seishin–KeijoFusan).

The South Manchuria Railway was an excellent line in every respect and was the only one in condition to support heavy, high speed traffic.

The North Manchuria Railway was obviously run down. Trains ran slowly over a fair roadbed.

The Manchoukuo Government Railways were unexpectedly good. The rolling stock was in good condition, one first class train and one mixed passenger and freight train ran in each direction, schedules were adhered to strictly, stops were brief, roadbed was fair to good, speed was slow. No double tracking was seen. On the TsitsiharPeian–Harbin line there was a single siding at every station, or about every 13 kms., and two or more sidings at the nine most important stations. On the Hsinking–Kirin–Tumen line stations were about 12 kms apart, all had at least one siding and most had two or more sidings. Sidings seemed to be uniformly about 500 or 600 yards long. On the older sections much work had been done recently improving bridges and relocating the line to decrease grades and eliminate curves. On the Tsitsihar–Peian–Harbin line, passing through absolutely flat and gently rolling rich farm land, sand ballast was used, while from Hsinking eastward to Tumen ballast was of gravel or, to a lesser extent, crushed rock. The latter line is designed to carry heavier traffic than the former.

Every wooden bridge and other bridges of importance are protected by one or two sand bag, brick, or concrete pill boxes. All trains carry armed railway police and detachments from special railway guard battalions. On the South Manchuria Railway police and guards are Japanese; on the North Manchuria Railway police are half Russian and half Manchoukuo, military guards Japanese and Manchoukuo; and on the Manchoukuo Government Railways police and guards are both part Japanese, part Manchoukuo. Police averaged about 10 men per train. Guards vary in strength from about 10 men on quiet lines to at least 20 men in disturbed areas. On the Hsinking–Tumen line, only, every train, both passenger and freight, includes an armored box car. Armored trains, consisting of a locomotive, with steam up and five or six armored cars, were distributed along the Manchoukuo Government Railways at intervals of about 100 kms. None were noted elsewhere.

g. The new ports of Seishin and Rashin in northeastern Chosen, on the most direct line between Japan and Manchoukuo, were inspected. At Seishin the breakwater of concrete blocks was complete in outline and work was in progress placing the top layer of blocks. A stone and concrete quay has space for five ships of about 3,000 tons each. Six fireproof warehouses have been completed (five for which space is available on the waterfront and one in a parallel line), at least one more in a parallel line is under construction and space is available between tracks for several additional ones. The tracks indicate that a total of about 10 warehouses in two lines will be built. Double tracks extend along the land side of both lines. No provision seems to have been made for handling cargo lightered ashore from ships anchored in the harbor. The harbor, while small, has excellent facilities for handling a few small ships. A tremendous amount of work is in progress at Rashin, but living quarters for South Manchuria Railway employees on the job are practically the only permanent structures completed. The low ground, formerly rice fields, at the head of the bay is being filled in with rock and dirt carried by many narrow gauge railways from hills in rear. In places the fill is as much as 10 feet and it must average five feet. Water front construction had not advanced far enough to give any idea of the facilities to be provided there. The tunnel for the railway to connect Rashin with Yuki is expected to be completed late in 1934. Considering the project as a whole, it is difficult to visualize it reaching a useful degree or [of?] completion during 1935.

h. Anticipation of war with Soviet Russia this year or next was not admitted by any Japanese officer interviewed nor were any signs seen or heard indicating preparations for such a war. Everyone was absorbed in Manchoukuo and its development. Irritation was expressed at annoying incidents along the Manchoukuo–Soviet border but irresponsible individuals and not the Soviet Army were blamed. The general impression gained was that the Kwantung Army is settling down to the job of making over Manchuria and is not particularly concerned with preparations for war in the near future. The only place visited where there was a feeling of tension was Harbin and there it was due to memories of kidnappings and not to fear of war.

i. The recognition of Manchoukuo by the United States was not mentioned by any Japanese.

6. The Kwantung Army, the Chosen Army and the office of the Governor General of Chosen were most generous with assistance in travelling and with entertainment.

William C. Crane

Major, General Staff

44. Copy transmitted to the Department by the War Department; received July 31.