761.94/765
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 23.]
Sir: During the past year the Embassy has fortnightly reported the progress of events in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union in an effort to keep the Department currently apprised of the development of such controversies as those involving the Chinese Eastern Railway, incidents on the Soviet–“Manchukuo” border, the fisheries in Soviet territorial waters, and the yen-ruble exchange rate. All of these questions have defied settlement up to the present, have given rise at one time or another to complications of a provocative, occasionally bitter nature, and have tended to obscure the underlying causes of conflict between the two dynamic powers of the Far East. It is not the object of this despatch to discuss these basic factors, but rather to interpret their imprint on the general situation and to appraise once more the possibility of a second Russo-Japanese war. Such was the purpose of my confidential despatch No. 670 of February 8, 1934,39 supplementing my confidential letter of October 6, 1933, to the Under Secretary of State.40
In discussing the likelihood of a conflict I have previously adduced three potential incentives, namely: (1) the collective force of continual irritating incidents, or even some individual incident; (2) the increasing menace of the spread of communism southward from Outer Mongolia along the western boundary of “Manchukuo”, and the aversion to and apprehension of communism which exists in Japan; and (3) the possibility that Japan recognizes in Soviet Russia a permanent obstruction to Japanese plans or ambitions for eventual further political expansion and is determined that this obstruction must be removed at the most advantageous moment. It will be noted that these [Page 205] potential incentives presuppose on the whole that any conflict would originate through a considered decision of the Japanese Government, barring the possibility of complications brought on by irresponsible elements.
On June 22 the Belgian Ambassador, Baron de Bassompierre, who has had some thirteen years experience in Tokyo, and whose opinions for that reason, if for no other, merit consideration, came to see me, evidently impressed by the contrasting theory that a conflict might at any moment be initiated by the Soviets. An informant in whom he placed confidence had become convinced, as the result of observations in Manchuria, that such an attack was imminent. Baron de Bassompierre further attached significance to the statement of a Soviet official to the Polish Minister that the Soviet Union no longer wished the conference for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway to succeed, and he also considered important a blunt question reportedly asked the Soviet Ambassador by the Foreign Minister on June 16. The question was, “Does the Soviet Union wish to fight Japan?” Without commenting, at this juncture, on the negative reply which the Minister received, rumors of an imminent Soviet attack have attained sufficient currency in Tokyo to merit a brief discussion of this supposition. The matter is also brought to the attention of the Department in the belief that similar rumors may have reached Washington and in order to invite the comment of the Embassy in Moscow where Soviet leaders are said to be convinced of the inevitability of war.
Presumably, a Soviet attack could occur only if the members of the Soviet government, notably Stalin, should become convinced that a conflict was unavoidable and should conclude that the Soviet forces had reached a degree of preparedness relatively greater than that of the Japanese. At a luncheon on June 26 members of my staff received from the Counselor and a First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy an implication of the Soviet feeling of the inevitability of war.
On the other hand, several factors tend to invalidate the suggestion of the Belgian Ambassador. In the first place the Japanese do not expect a Soviet attack. The Military Attaché of this Embassy, on returning from his recent trip in Manchuria, nowhere found indications of anticipated trouble or preparations for imminent hostilities, and in conversation with the Kwantung Army staff officer in chargé of Russian affairs was given the distinct impression that the Kwantung Army viewed the recent succession of border incidents as more irritating than dangerous. This officer further stated that he believed these incidents to be the work of irresponsible elements and not of the Soviet army high command. Inasmuch as the thoroughness of the Japanese intelligence service has been amply demonstrated, the likelihood of a surprise attack seems negligible. In the second [Page 206] place reference is made to the attached memorandum41 of a conversation between my secretary, Mr. Parsons, and Mr. Philip Adler, a correspondent of the Detroit News, who has recently travelled from Moscow over the Trans-Siberian Railway. Incidentally, Mr. Adler told the story of a Soviet acquaintance, an officer in the Far Eastern Red Army, to whom he mentioned that prior to leaving Detroit he had made a wager on the outbreak of war between Japan and the USSR before summer. The officer replied that Mr. Adler had come closer to winning his bet than he realized because, although due for furlough in April, leave had been cancelled, and for a month, until approximately the 25th of April, the frontier troops had lived in daily expectancy of the outbreak of hostilities with Japan. Mr. Adler had only lately heard that this officer had just been allowed to take his leave. Finally no information has reached Tokyo to the effect that Soviet Russia has abandoned or is likely to abandon her policy of remaining at peace with the world in order to concentrate on her vast internal problems.
To revert to Japan and the three potential incentives to war, it is probable that the collective force of continued irritating incidents no longer constitutes so serious a threat to peace. A chronic appendix is less likely to lead to an operation than an acute one. The recent firing on “Manchukuo” ships in the Amur and the shooting which resulted in a bullet striking the Japanese Consulate at Habarovsk were incidents of a provocative nature which at certain times might have produced or might have been made the excuse for a general outburst of national feeling in Japan. On the contrary they were not made the basis of propaganda nor did the newspaper accounts provoke an abnormally severe wave of anti-Soviet feeling save for the pseudoriot produced at the Soviet Embassy* by six indignant fanatics.
The second potential incentive to war, communism, while feared and hated by Japanese leaders, is not a problem of immediate gravity. Nevertheless, as recently as June 21, the vernacular papers in Tokyo reported that during the examination of one Masaru Kato, an alleged communist, it was revealed that a former First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Moise Galkovitch by name, had regularly supplied materials and money to aid the publication of a magazine called the “Soviet Friend”. Wholesale arrests of “communists” continue to be announced from time to time with the lifting of press bans, and a recent patriotic propaganda film Daigorei (The Great Order) conjures up an approaching national crisis, relying largely on long scenes depicting Soviet military preparations accompanied by spoken diatribes against [Page 207] the “poisoned fangs” of the Soviets. But these things too are chronic, not acute.
There remains then the third potential incentive to war, the possibility that Japan recognizes in Russia an obstruction which must be removed at the most advantageous moment. In view of the pressing problems which Japan must face both international and domestic, and in Manchuria, it is open to question whether such a moment could arrive within the next two years. According to observations of the Military Attaché, the new port of Rashin in Korea is only in the preliminary stage of development while that of Seishin has but limited capacity. The Korean approach to Manchuria is considered indispensable in case of war. Secondly the new railroads of Manchuria are believed to be carrying no war materials and in fact but little freight of any kind at present, while the Kwantung Army is apparently settling down to the task of consolidating Manchuria rather than preparing for imminent hostilities. The technical aspect of the situation in Manchuria, therefore, precludes the likelihood of an imminent Japanese attack, as does the formidable nature of Soviet defensive preparations.
The situation in Tokyo militates even more strongly against war. First of all, General Hayashi, the Minister of War, is a man of practical sense and is well aware that the Japanese military machine has not yet reached the zenith of its combat efficiency. He also apparently wields great influence with all military factions and, in comparison to that mystical firebrand, General Araki, is an influence for peace.
In the second place, the last months of the Saito Cabinet, which have witnessed a series of political crises, have revealed that the pacific influences around the Throne have regained their position in large measure as the source of political power in Japan. The Genro, Prince Saionji, with Count Makino, Baron Hayashi, Admiral Suzuki, and Baron Ikki have kept the Saito Cabinet in office for months despite a storm of criticism and the all but open opposition of the army and navy. A war with Soviet Russia would now almost certainly require their consent, a consent which would not be forthcoming.
In the third place the nation is confronted with the approach of those problems which General Araki propagandized as “The National Crisis of 1935–1936”. The people as a whole will be concerned with naval problems, with the development of the already acute trade rivalries, with an intensified agrarian problem which the catastrophic drop of silk cocoon prices this year clearly indicates, and with the triangular relations between Japan, “Manchukuo” and China—or perhaps more properly, North China.
In the fourth place Japanese history has shown that the process of expansion which commenced after the Meiji Restoration has progressed [Page 208] by waves of violent action succeeded by necessary periods of consolidation and recuperation of the national energies. Beginning with September 18, 1931, the nation has been kept in an abnormal, at times fanatical, state of mind for a longer period, perhaps, than ever before. The reaction, as already reported,† has come. It should be the more thorough for having been delayed by artificial stimulants.
In conclusion, the Foreign Minister continues to negotiate the immediate points at issue with Soviet Russia. No less than three conferences are at present in session, one in Tokyo for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a second in Moscow for revision of the yenruble exchange rate, and a third in Heiho in regard to the “Manchukuo”–Soviet waterways. There is no indication which has so far come to light in Tokyo that attempts to settle these problems through diplomatic channels will be abandoned. Yet, Japan is certainly committed to continental Empire, she faces Russia once more along the Amur, and, already she has crossed the Hsingan Range separating Manchuria proper from the vast plains of Mongolia and Siberia. These plains, it will be remembered, are the region in which Communism is spreading southward towards Japanese spheres of interest, carrying with it not only an ideology abhorrent to the Japanese but the threat of economic and political predominance which the Japanese must some day face or else retreat. Nevertheless, at the present writing, I believe that this eventual conflict, which appears probable, will be delayed for a period of years which it is now premature to estimate. The likelihood of war in 1934 appears definitely to have passed, barring always the emergence of unforeseen, unpremeditated factors. What may happen in 1935 it seems to me unwise to predict. The Saito Cabinet is about to fall. The new line-up, if important changes occur, may be significant.
The incidents and developments of the past two weeks are being outlined in the Embassy’s monthly political report for June, No. 869, July 2,42 to be despatched in this pouch.
Respectfully yours,