Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1934, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/6695

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 771

Tokyo, May 4, 1934.
[Received May 19.]

Sir: Reverting to my despatch No. 751 of April 20, 1934, as well as to my telegram No. 71 of April 18, 5 p.m., and subsequent telegraphic correspondence concerning the “unofficial” statement issued to the press by the spokesman of the Foreign Office on April 17 regarding the Japanese attitude towards the rendering of assistance to China by other countries, I have the honor to submit the following report more as a record of the facts and developments than as an appraisal of their results. Such an appraisal and a general survey of the situation can, I feel, better be made after the domestic and foreign reverberations from the affair have run themselves out.

From information gathered from many sources I am now convinced that the background of Mr. Amau’s statement was as follows:

The Japanese Government for some time had been increasingly anxious over the reports of foreign activity in China. Mr. Rajchman was reported to be on his way to Geneva to report to the League of Nations on the question of technical assistance. Mr. Monnet also of the League of Nations was said to be active in Shanghai in organizing an international syndicate for the purpose of financing a public works program in China. A considerable number of officers with the German General von Seeckt were understood to have arrived in China for the purpose of giving military instructions, while foreign firms were active in selling to the Chinese Government airplanes, automobiles and other potential accessories of warfare. From all of these activities Japanese interests were at the insistence of the Chinese Government understood to be excluded. Accordingly an instruction was sent with the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Ariyoshi, Japanese Minister in China, conveying the attitude of the Japanese Government toward these various activities in particular and to the relations of foreign countries with China in general. (I have been informed from a reasonably reliable source that the instruction, before being sent to Mr. Ariyoshi, also received the approval of the Cabinet.)

For some time past Mr. Amau, the spokesman of the Foreign Office and Chief of the Bureau of Information and Intelligence, had been pressed by Japanese newspaper correspondents for a statement of the attitude of the Japanese Government towards these various activities. This pressure appears to have come to a head on April 17 when Mr. Amau with the approval of Mr. Shigemitsu, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave to the Associated Press correspondent the gist of the instruction, in a rough oral translation. Later on the same day he gave to the Japanese correspondents the text or substance of the instructions to Mr. Ariyoshi, and on the 18th he made for the foreign press correspondents a written translation into English of the same document. This translation was at first given out on Foreign Office stationary as an official communication, but it was later labelled “unofficial” and all but a few copies, one of which is now in possession of the Embassy through the courtesy of Mr. Fleisher, correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune, were recalled. At first Mr. Amau stated to the Associated Press correspondent that his statement (or the diplomatic instruction on which it was based) had received the approval of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it will be observed that later^* he modified this assertion by stating to Mr. Dickover⁹⁵ that his oral statement of April 17 did not have the approval of Mr. Hirota. I myself am now convinced that while Mr. Hirota had approved the original instruction to Mr. Ariyoshi, he was not consulted before Mr. Amau’s statement of April 17 was given out and in view of his policy and efforts to improve Japan’s relations with other countries, I doubt very much if he would have approved of the issuance of this public statement at the present time. Mr. Shigemitsu and Mr. Amau seem to have had no conception of the effect which it would produce abroad. There are others who believe that the announcement was a carefully considered step taken with the full approval of Mr. Hirota who later was obliged to make Mr. Amau the scapegoat. I do not share these views and find that most of my colleagues now agree with me on this point. Mr. Hirota’s confidential statement to me of April 25^† to the effect that the statement had been issued without his own knowledge or approval and that an erroneous impression of the Japanese Government’s policy had thereby been given to the world, impressed me as being sincere. In such a case one can only be guided by one’s personal impressions. My impressions of his sincerity were quite clear. My British colleague who at first reported to his Government that the announcement had been made with Mr. Hirota’s approval, later altered his opinion and cabled his Government accordingly.

Whatever the truth of the matter, there is no doubt that Mr. Hirota has been placed in a difficult position. There are many among the Japanese themselves who consider that the Foreign Office committed a thoroughly awkward blunder which was not helped by its subsequent awkward handling. But Mr. Hirota is, so to speak, between the devil and the deep sea because of the chauvinists and the military on the one hand and the moderates on the other and it would have placed him in a thoroughly dangerous position to have publicly disavowed Mr. Amau’s statement. The word “assassinations” has been used in the comments of some observers. The Minister, however, said to me in confidence but in apparently complete frankness^‡ that the policy of the Government is complete support and observance in every respect of the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and that Japan has no intention of seeking special privilege in China nor of opposing the bona fide trade of other foreign powers nor of interfering in any way with China’s administrative or territorial integrity. This he said is the precise policy of the Emperor,⁹⁶ which he himself is doing his best to carry out and that he intends to do so even at the possible cost of his own life. He added that in carrying out this policy he has the full support of the Minister of War. Mr. Hirota went on to say that naturally the maintenance of peaceful conditions in China is especially important to Japan in view of her own propinquity and that certain foreign influences, which he did not specifically mention, are constantly trying to stir up trouble for Japan. His endeavor, he observed, is to counteract these influences so far as possible while fully respecting the rights and legitimate interests of other countries.

The further steps in the affair have been fully dealt with in the various telegrams from this Embassy. The doubts and misunderstandings which arose with regard to the precise nature of the spokesman’s original statement can be explained only by the shifting positions taken by Mr. Amau himself. The facts have been explained to the Department as clearly as possible.^§

The Department’s aide-mémoire^║ was decoded at 5 p.m. on April 29, and although the Foreign Office was closed owing to that day being both Sunday and the anniversary of the Emperor’s birthday, I was fortunately able by writing an urgent personal letter to obtain an interview with the Minister at his residence at 6:30 when I presented the aide-mémoire. The Minister’s only comment after reading it was that the whole affair had caused “great misunderstanding”. He said at that time that he would reply in due course, but according to conflicting press reports it does not yet appear to have been definitely decided whether a reply will be made or not.⁹⁷ The chauvinistic elements appear to desire to leave the matter as it is. They claim that Japan has stated her policy and that that settles the matter. The more reasonable elements, however, realize that the matter can never be settled or “closed” as long as Japan’s views are so at variance with those of other countries in general and of the United States in particular. They therefore believe that it would be better to discuss the question further and if possible to remove the seeds of future discord. In any case there are indications that the authorities are considering their next step, if any, with the greatest care and it will probably be discussed not only by the Cabinet but by the Privy Council in view of the importance which the matter has now assumed.

For my own part I may say that the substance and tone of the Department’s aide-mémoire have my full concurrence and admiration. I believe that it was absolutely called for by the circumstances and that it was expressed with a clarity and moderation which not only puts our Government on precise record without giving needless offense, but which will undoubtedly sink into the Japanese consciousness whatever the public reactions may be.

I was last night informed by my French colleague that his Government has handed to Mr. Sato, Japanese Ambassador in Paris, a communication setting forth the views of the French Government in the light of the situation which has arisen from Mr. Amau’s statement of April 17, but this communication has not yet been published here.

At a later date the Embassy will no doubt be in a better position to appraise the significance and results of this whole affair and to report thereon to the Department.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

1. Embassy’s telegram #78, April 26, 9 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]
95. Erle R. Dickover, First Secretary of Embassy in Japan.
96. Embassy’s telegram #75, April 25, 1 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed in Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 227.]
97. Embassy’s telegram #75, April 25, 1 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]
96. Marginal notation by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs: “Then why did Hirota approve the instruction to Ariyoshi—which instruction is the important item in the whole story? SKH.”
97. Embassy’s telegrams #77, April 26, 5 p.m. and #78, April 26, 9 p.m. [Footnote in the original.]
98. Department’s telegram #59, April 28, 7 p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed in Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 231.]
97. Marginal notation by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs: “Grew says nothing about having said ‘No reply expected’ (which [Japanese Ambassador] Saito has said that Grew said).”