793.94/6602: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 24—4:55 p.m.]
196. I was unable to obtain an appointment with Simon today due to Suvich’s45 visit and accordingly instructed Atherton46 to discuss Department’s 156, April 23, 6 p.m., with Sir Victor Wellesley. Wellesley stated that he would convey to the Foreign Secretary the Department’s statement and gave Atherton his personal viewpoint on the situation, which I repeat merely for background, and request that no reference be made to these personal remarks of a Foreign Office official.
Wellesley stated that the British note to Japan, reported in my 192, April 23, 10 p.m.47 also referred to the position of both England and Japan under their treaty obligations, and more especially the Nine-Power Treaty. He felt that the recent Japanese statement was made by Japan through fear of the development of a united China and an effective military spirit which had been strengthening since the Manchurian campaign. While America and England had a common interest in a strong and united China, this was the opposite from what Japan wanted. It was all very well, according to Wellesley, for nine powers to sign a paper pact but if no teeth were written into it to make it effective, how many nations were prepared to back up today any unsuccessful representations made to Japan in connection with her China policy. Wellesley was obviously very skeptical that Great Britain would consider any use of threats towards Japan except under provocation of some grave incident and equally doubtful as to how far the United States would go, and under these circumstances was apparently of the opinion that individual action was preferable in the [Page 132] present instance. I may add here that the Foreign Office press officer has given such an opinion to several correspondents today, pointing out that concerted representations to Japan might merely put the Japanese back up and obtain no modification of intention on her part. Wellesley stated, in his own opinion, an exchange of views with the United States would be useful but obviously doubted whether any closely concerted Anglo-American cooperation towards Japan was likely in the present instance since England’s attention was more centered in the continental situation. These views Wellesley took care to explain were his personal ones, and that he would ask Sir John Simon to communicate with me as soon as he had had a chance to consider the Department of State’s reply.
The Chinese Minister called on me this afternoon and gave me a résumé of his conversation with Sir John Simon yesterday afternoon which I gather did not contradict the general attitude of Wellesley’s remarks to Atherton. Definitely the Chinese Minister stated that Simon felt that the United States concern was probably greater than that of England.