710.G Economic and Financial Problems/48
Memorandum by Mr. J. Butler Wright33
Memorandum of Conversations Between the Secretary of State and Members of Various Delegations Concerning the Twofold Proposal Regarding Economics and the Signing of Existing Peace Treaties
On Saturday, December 9th, 1933, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, who had been informed that the Secretary hoped for an opportunity to discuss certain matters with him, called upon the Secretary at his office at the Hall of Congress and was there informed of the aforementioned proposal in greater detail. The Secretary said that he was of the opinion that both the economic and peace proposals should be put forward at the same moment, and then suggested to Dr. Saavedra Lamas that if the latter might find it possible to give his valuable support to the economic proposals to be advanced by the Secretary, he (the Secretary) would be glad to give tangible support to the peace proposal by signing the “Anti-War Pact”, although it would probably be necessary to enter several reservations thereto. The conversation, after dealing in general terms with the chief points of the Secretary’s proposal, turned to the more delicate negotiation of the proposed concerted peace movement, the desire of the Secretary being that in return for such cooperation in economic matters as might be possible and for our signature to the Anti-War Pact, Dr. Saavedra Lamas would consent to undertake to sign and recommend the ratification by Argentina of the Gondra Treaty of 1923, the Conciliation and Arbitration Treaties of 1929, and the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact—in view of the fact that Argentina had not ratified the first, had not participated in the Conference of 1929 or signed either the Conciliation or Arbitration treaties, and had never adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
[Page 179]Dr. Saavedra Lamas showed immediate and, apparently, genuine interest in the proposal and suggested that if the Secretary might send to him as soon as possible the Spanish text of his economic proposal, Dr. Saavedra Lamas would, at the same time, submit to him a draft of a proposed resolution for such concerted action in favor of peace. The conversation—after digressing into certain channels which touched upon the obstacles interposed by European nations against the raw products of Argentina; the problem presented by high customs tariffs as affecting the United States and other countries of the Americas; the effect of temporary and emergency measures adopted by all countries in general and particularly by Argentina and the United States; the program of control of exchange; and the stimulating effect that such concerted action on both of the instruments for peace might have upon the Conference, as well as upon public opinion in the respective countries, closed with the understanding on the part of both participants that each would furnish the other with a draft proposal.
Later in the afternoon of the same day (December 9th), during a conversation on other matters with Dr. Mello Franco, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, held at Dr. Mello Franco’s request at the office of the American Delegation in the Hall of Congress, the Secretary took the opportunity to seek his opinion with regard to the advisability of an effort to bring before the Conference, in a more concrete and stimulating form than formerly, resolutions concerning remedies for the present economic situation and for the advancement of peace.
The Secretary said to Dr. Mello Franco that the traditional relations between Brazil and the United States had long been so intimate and friendly and, in the conversations in Rio de Janeiro Dr. Mello Franco had been so frank and helpful, that he felt impelled to seek his opinion before approaching certain of the other Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the same sense. The Secretary then said that as he was in receipt that morning of definite instructions from President Roosevelt as to the nature and extent of the economic proposals which the United States could make at this time, he was considering the advisability of offering at an early date a resolution intended to advance constructive suggestions concerning the present economic situation of the Americas—especially as regards tariffs, customs barriers and other important factors underlying international commerce. In order that correspondingly constructive proposals might be advanced along all other subjects at the same time—thus achieving the momentum of more or less simultaneous proposals—he hoped that concerted action might be taken to secure, at a plenary session of the [Page 180] Conference, the adherence of all States which had not signed or ratified the existing peace treaties. The Secretary said nothing as to the manner of introducing such a proposal, confining himself to an inquiry as to whether Dr. Mello Franco would approve such a proposal. Without discussing in any way the details of either proposal, Dr. Mello Franco gave the impression that he appreciated the Secretary’s courtesy in seeking his opinion and that he was generally in accord with the proposal.
On Saturday morning, December 10th, the Secretary sent to Dr. Saavedra Lamas, at his hotel, a text in Spanish of his proposal.
In the early afternoon of that day an opportunity was afforded for Mr. Wright to approach the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs, Señor Cruchaga Tocornal, along the same general lines, and it was ascertained, although the proposals were not discussed in detail, that the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs was rather enthusiastically in favor of the proposals.
On the same evening, Dr. Saavedra Lamas called again upon the Secretary and stated that although he had not had an opportunity for a detailed examination of the Spanish text of the proposal, certain observations occurred to him which might best be brought out by reading the proposal in Spanish, paragraph by paragraph. This was accordingly done—the participants in the discussion being the Secretary, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, Señores Antokoletz and Podesta Costa of the Argentine Delegation, Mr. Wright, Mr. Cumming, and Dr. Mc-Clure. Perusal of the text disclosed that Dr. Saavedra Lamas appeared to be more interested in “editing” the document than in any other regard as far as most of the proposal was concerned, and notes taken by Mr. Cumming during the conversation show that in general the sense of the proposal was approved by Dr. Saavedra Lamas, and that but two paragraphs appeared not to be clearly understood by him. He clearly intimated that the Spanish version was at fault with regard to one paragraph, in connection with which he observed that as a recital of conditions it was satisfactory but as an outline of policy or a recommendation for action it was not. The Secretary informed him that although he desired that the paragraph in question be retained for illustrative purposes and in order to strengthen the document, its inclusion was not absolutely essential. Dr. Saavedra Lamas then proposed that he should redraft the Spanish text in a manner which he believed would not in any way impair its intent but would render it more consistent with customary phraseology in such matters. This suggestion was agreed to.
Turning then to the subject of the invitation that all existing American peace treaties be signed by the Delegates of the participating States and ratified by their respective Governments, Dr. Saavedra [Page 181] Lamas, in rather dramatic fashion, submitted one copy of a text in Spanish of a resolution in which, after suitable preamble, the States participating in the Conference were earnestly invited to sign, ratify and fulfil the existing peace treaties, which he enumerated by name, place of signature and date, and which included the four treaties to which reference has been made above. The proposal seemed to meet the Secretary’s suggestion in every respect, but Dr. Saavedra Lamas left no copy with the Secretary, and it was read in translation only once: he made no mention of any objection to reservations on our part.
On Monday afternoon, December 11th, Dr. Saavedra Lamas sent to the Secretary a redrafted Spanish text of the Secretary’s economic proposal which, when examined and compared in translation with the English text, appeared to have lost much of the force of the Secretary’s English proposal, to have taken almost indefensible liberties with the arrangement of phrases and their intent, and to have omitted two entire paragraphs (one of them being the paragraph to which reference is made above); in short, a document much inferior in phraseology, intent and vigor, to the Secretary’s original proposal.
Dr. Saavedra Lamas was, therefore, informed by telephone that the Secretary would like to discuss the matter further with him, and he called upon the Secretary on the morning of Tuesday, December 12th, for that purpose. It was obvious from the first that pride of authorship was the dominant factor in Dr. Saavedra Lamas’ proposal, and after considerable conversation he observed that he would have no objection to the re-translation by a more competent person of the original text (in view of the fact that there appeared to be no divergent points of policy) and it was agreed upon that the Secretary’s proposal as originally drafted in English and the Spanish text which should result from the aforementioned re-translation would be introduced by the Secretary at the meeting of the Ninth Commission on Tuesday, December 12th.
With regard to the proposal to invite all non-adhering countries to sign and ratify the existing peace treaties, Dr. Saavedra Lamas said that he was, of course, prepared to fulfill his part of the understanding by making such a proposal at the earliest opportune moment, but that he felt that considerable care should be exercised in first sounding out the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of other Governments—especially Brazil and Chile, and quite possibly Mexico—on account of the policies of these Governments with regard to international peace treaties. He seemed to attach particular importance to the attitude of Brazil, saying again that Mello Franco was thinking of leaving at an early date and that a certain feeling of pessimism had become apparent in the minds of some of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. He was quick to add, however, that he believed that the proposals concerning economics and [Page 182] peace which the Secretary had suggested would do much to revivify the Conference. He said that he would approach several of his colleagues in this sense at the earliest possible moment, and that as it was the Secretary’s intention to present his economic proposal on Tuesday, December 12, at the Subcommittee of which he (Dr. Saavedra Lamas) was Chairman, he would take great pleasure in supporting it from the Chair and would at that time announce the intention of the Argentine Delegation shortly to present to the Conference a proposal that the existing peace instruments, which he would enumerate, be signed and ratified by the participating nations.
The Secretary did not inform Dr. Saavedra Lamas that he had already sought the opinion and obtained the support of Dr. Mello Franco and Sr. Cruchaga, as set forth earlier in this memorandum.
Meanwhile, it having been deemed wise to inform the Uruguayan Delegation of the proposed procedure, to learn its opinion, and to bespeak its support, the Secretary asked Sr. Marques Castro, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and a member of the Uruguayan Delegation, to call upon him on the same afternoon (December 11th), which he did at seven o’clock. In a conversation which lasted nearly two hours, the Secretary first informed Señor Marques of the nature of the proposal from the standpoint of strategy—explaining that it was believed that the proposed procedure would not only lead the Conference toward constructive accomplishment but that each part of the proposal would help the other, with the additional hope that the action regarding peace measures might assist in a solution of the Chaco problem, toward which the Secretary was aware that the President of Uruguay was directing every effort.
Turning then specifically to the economic proposal, the Secretary handed to Sr. Marques a copy of the English text, and a copy of the Spanish text as it had originally been prepared (by the Translator of the Delegation)—explaining that the Spanish phraseology might be improved before presentation (in accordance with the understanding reached with Dr. Saavedra Lamas, see above). The Secretary also improved the opportunity to inform Sr. Marques that he had read with interest and close attention the text of the draft of a proposed Commercial Treaty between Uruguay and the United States which was handed to Mr. Wright by the President of Uruguay several days ago, the provisions of which bear close relation to the proposal advanced by the Uruguayan Delegation in the IX Subcommittee and are generally related to the proposals to be advanced by the Secretary. Señor Marques appeared immediately aware of the relation—as well as the difference—between these three phases of the general topic, and a general discussion ensued in which were made clear the positions of the Governments of the United States and of Uruguay with regard to [Page 183] the two general proposals. The Secretary also informed Sr. Marques that he would give early consideration to the draft of the proposed Commercial Treaty.
Referring then to the proposal concerning the peace treaties, Sr. Marques said that he could assure the Secretary that his Government would be in favor of such concerted action and he interposed no objection to the proposal that, as a part of such concerted action, Uruguay should sign the Briand–Kellogg Pact. He said, further, that he concurred in the opinion that such concerted action would accomplish the adherence by Argentina to the Gondra Treaty of 1923, which he believed was by far the best instrument for the purpose intended. (In this connection it should be borne in mind that the attitude of the Uruguayan Government with regard to the peace treaties agrees exactly with the opinions and predictions expressed to me by Señores Varela and Regules of the Uruguayan Delegation before the Conference).
On Tuesday, the 12th, the Secretary, accompanied by Mr. Wright, called upon Senhor Mello Franco at his hotel at Carrasco, in order to discuss with him at greater length the developments which had taken place in connection with the twofold American proposal suggested by the Secretary—concerning which the Secretary had spoken to him on Saturday, the 9th, as hereinbefore reported. Senhor Mello Franco was found to be in a rather pessimistic mood—he stated that his presence was urgently desired in Brazil on account of difficulties in connection with the Leticia negotiations, that he feared that the Conference was accomplishing nothing, that he was not comfortably or satisfactorily lodged in his present hotel, and that his delegation was housed at a distance so great that it rendered it difficult to maintain satisfactory contact with them. It seemed at first as if Dr. Mello Franco (a very high-strung and sensitive individual whose physique is far from strong) might be cherishing, in a manner so frequently typical of Latin American temperament, a feeling that he, as a representative of a country traditionally friendly to the United States, had not been sufficiently consulted in advance concerning a matter of so great importance: the Secretary’s tactful method of approach, however, in which he several times recalled to the attention of Dr. Mello Franco that he was the first person to whom the Secretary had spoken concerning such a proposal, soon dispelled any doubt in this connection.
The Secretary then recited at considerable length the sequence of events, conversations, opinions and tentative agreements which are outlined in the foregoing portion of this memorandum, and the various aspects of the subject were discussed at some length. With regard to the economic proposal, Dr. Mello Franco was informed that it was the Secretary’s intention to present the draft of a resolution, [Page 184] with certain appropriate introductory remarks, at the session of the 9th Committee on that (Tuesday) afternoon. Senhor Mello Franco made no observations as to the economic proposal, save to inquire whether Dr. Saavedra Lamas intended to introduce in the same Committee his proposal for the collective signing of existing peace treaties. He was informed in reply that this would not be done for two reasons: (1) because a committee dealing with economic matters would not be the appropriate committee for the introduction of such matters and (2) because Dr. Saavedra Lamas had expressed a desire to approach one or two particularly interested nations before making the definite proposal, but intended to support from the Chair the Secretary’s economic proposal and then to announce that in order further to stimulate the Conference and to advance its aspirations and objectives the Argentine Delegation would shortly introduce a resolution calling upon all States to sign and ratify the existing peace treaties, which he would at that time enumerate. Senhor Mello Franco first observed that, as the Secretary was well aware, Brazil had always faithfully complied with her international obligations and that with regard to previous international peace treaties she had ratified all those that she had signed. (Exception should be here noted, I think, to the ratification of the Argentine Anti-War Pact, which was only signed by Brazil a short time ago, upon the occasion of the visit of the President of the Argentine to the President of Brazil in 1933). Senhor Mello Franco then stated that he had no authority to sign the Kellogg Pact, because when his Delegation left Rio de Janeiro they had no intimation that a discussion of this subject or the signature of this instrument would arise for discussion, but that he would immediately acquaint his Government with the situation as it had now developed and request instructions. The Secretary informed him that the Delegation of the United States had found itself in identically the same situation with regard to the Argentine Peace Pact, but that it had now requested and received permission to sign the Pact, provided it would appear constructively to further the efforts being made in the cause of peace and prove an important factor in the other agreements necessary to secure satisfactory action concerning the economic and peace measures.
Senhor Mello Franco then entered upon a very interesting explanation of the attitude of his Government with respect to the Kellogg Pact, observing that it was his personal opinion that the Brazilian Government which was in power before the revolution of 1932–33 had felt that they should have been previously consulted as to the signing of so important an instrument instead of merely being somewhat summarily invited to sign along with other Governments. As to the attitude of the present Government of Brazil, Senhor Mello Franco [Page 185] did not express himself, nor did he give any intimation as to what he thought the reply of his Government might be with respect to his request for instructions concerning concurrence in the Secretary’s proposal concerning the signing of all peace treaties. Senhor Mello Franco touched but lightly on the subject of reservations to such treaties which, however, enabled the Secretary to observe that if the United States should sign the Argentine Anti-War Pact it would be necessary to enter reservations as to the last two articles thereof.
The first information the Secretary received that Dr. Mello Franco had received permission from his Government to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact was communicated to him by Dr. Saavedra Lamas—Dr. Mello Franco affirming it later.
The record of the Conference shows the subsequent developments in this question.
- Mr. Wright was American Minister in Uruguay and member of the American delegation to the Seventh International Conference of American States.↩