721.23/1668: Telegram
The Chargé in Great Britain (Atherton) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 3—4 p.m.]
96. In an informal and friendly conversation I have just discussed Department’s 86, May 2, 5 p.m.,64 with Craigie,65 who in turn for the last 2 days has been discussing this question with Santos, Colombian representative at Geneva. Craigie informed me that the British Government was not prepared to support the Colombian formula in its present form, but upon consideration of three points which he discussed with Santos and which I set forth below, British would be prepared to urge acceptance not only at Geneva but also at Lima:
- 1.
- As regards the major objection set forth in my telegram 90, April 29, 1 p.m.,66 Craigie had suggested to Santos that Colombia should, by exchange of letters with the League outside the agreement with Peru, delegate authority over the territory to the League for a definite period and purpose. This would save Peruvian amour propre and would permit the Commission to take over the administration of the territory in the name of the League, Santos felt personally his Government would accept this if it were previously accepted by Peru.
- 2.
- An oral agreement should be reached between Santos and the President of the League Commission whereby the latter would express his intention only to employ Colombian troops in the territory (with a reservation for neutral officers if desired). Santos personally felt this provision would probably be acceptable to his Government if the announcement of the employment of Colombian troops were made almost simultaneously with the publication of the Colombia-Peru agreement.
- 3.
- Craigie pointed out to Santos that arbitration provided the most lasting method of settlement of the dispute if both sides would agree beforehand to stand by the decision. The alternative to this would be a further statement of League opinion in favor of Colombia, which perhaps might not be accepted by Peru, but nevertheless at that time Colombian troops would be in occupation of the territory and it would then be incumbent upon Colombia to keep sufficient force to repulse any aggression by Peru whose nearest forces were some 200 kilometres distant.
Craigie was entirely cognizant of the Department’s point of view as set forth in previous telegrams, but expressed as the British viewpoint [Page 524] that if an attempt were made to settle the dispute on purely academic and legal viewpoints it might lead to no settlement at all but rather a resort to force. This he felt should be avoided and could be avoided if some way were sought for the Peruvians to withdraw without loss of too much amour propre.
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