721.23/1158a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Minister in Colombia (Caffery)
26. Guzmán came in this afternoon to say that after the Peruvian attack on the Colombian forces in Colombian and Brazilian waters yesterday the situation had now developed into actual warfare. He said that he wanted to explain, merely for the Department’s information, the situation in which the Colombian forces find themselves and the “possibilities” that Colombia might have to attack and occupy the Peruvian posts along the Putumayo, such as Güepi and Puerto Arturo. He said that it was absolutely necessary to keep the lines of communication open between the Colombian advance base at Caucayá and the Colombian forces at Tarapacá as otherwise these [Page 480] latter forces would be without supplies and could be isolated and destroyed by Peru.
He was told that, of course, the question was one for the Colombian Government to determine on its own responsibility. Mention was made of the Colombian note to the League of Nations dated January 24 in which it was stated that the Colombian flotilla “is, therefore, about to operate within Colombian territory. It is no way threatening any Peruvian territory nor does it propose to attack any foreign country or government” and also of the League’s telegram of February 3 to the Peruvian Government which stated that the League “has received formal assurances from the Colombian Government that it has no intention to violate or to threaten any Peruvian territory”. Guzmán said that the situation had totally changed since the Peruvian attack yesterday and that it was precisely because of this changed situation that he desired to inform the Department (and that Colombia was also informing the League) of the possibilities that Colombia in order to protect her own forces and to reestablish her authority in Colombian territory might now find it necessary to occupy the Peruvian positions mentioned. He stated that Colombia, of course, would not hold such positions but would turn them back to Peru once the question is finally settled.
The conversation brought out the possibilities of Colombia’s position before world opinion being adversely affected in case she took the initiative in attacking these Peruvian positions and also that attacking the posts in question might extend the field of conflict and possibly render more difficult a settlement than if the conflict were localized in the Tarapacá-Leticia sector. However, Guzmán said that it was the Colombian point of view that if Colombia occupied these posts it might shorten the conflict and hasten a solution. As stated above, Guzmán was told that the responsibility in the matter was, of course, for Colombia to determine.
Guzmán did not make it clear whether he was acting under instructions in informing the Department of the foregoing, or whether on his own initiative he was anticipating probable developments.