Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The American Republics, Volume IV

721.23/922

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White)

[Washington,] January 23, 1933.

The Peruvian Ambassador called and said that he had a telegram from his Government dated the twenty-first of January³⁷ which he would like to communicate to me. It stated that if Brazil insists that Leticia should be delivered to Colombia she will fail in her endeavor to prevent war because the Loretanos are decided to oppose forcibly any use of force by Colombia and that Peru can not stand by and do nothing when the interests of Loreto are endangered. The telegram stated that it should be borne in mind that we are dealing no longer with Leticia alone but with the whole of Loreto. Peru, the cable said, would greatly appreciate it if the Powers who favor a peaceful solution should signify their approval to Brazil of the modifications offered by Peru to Brazil’s bases of mediation. These modifications were namely the retention of Leticia by Brazil while negotiations between Peru and Colombia proceed at Rio “for the purpose of rectifying by mutual concession the boundary line established by the Treaty Salomon-Lozano and the appointment of a mixed Peru-Brazilian Commission to investigate at Loreto whether the Loretanos would accept the return to Leticia of Colombian authorities”. The telegram states it would seem also prudent to have the Colombian ships detain their advance while mediation is pending and expresses the fear, if a clash occurs, that all Peru’s efforts to maintain peace will have been in vain. Manzanilla’s telegram ends “I am, as you know, fundamentally a man of peace and have been working indefatigably to that end, but I need the assistance of all those who are equally devoted to the same cause”.

The Ambassador stated that he hoped we would support this change suggested by Peru. I told the Ambassador, very frankly, that I was not prepared to support it. I said that, first of all, if there is to be a change in the Brazilian proposal, we would want Brazil to advise us thereof, and, in the second place, I could not support a proposal which had as its basis the obligation on the part of Colombia to negotiate the return of Leticia to Peru.

The Ambassador said that this proposal did not say that Leticia should be returned to Peru and I told him that while it did not say so in so many words that was certainly the object sought by the Peruvian Government and I said that this came out clearly in the telegram Manzanilla had sent to the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs in reply to the latter’s cable some days ago. The Ambassador said that he had just received the texts of these messages by airmail from Lima and had not yet had time to study them. I told the Ambassador that we had received them by cable some days ago and that it was very evident therefrom that that is what they really want. I said that we supported the sanctity of treaties and any agreement on the basis Peru suggested would mean support of the use of force as an instrument of national policy and for the acquisition of territory. We had a brisk discussion on this matter and the Ambassador again came back to the point that the Peruvian proposal did not definitely say that Leticia had to be given over to Peru. I told him that it was absolutely transparent in the proposal and that we would not support it. I told the Ambassador that as he had been the Peruvian Commissioner at Arica when an attempt was made to hold a plebiscite in the Provinces of Tacna and Arica³⁸ he could appreciate that the Peruvian position now is entirely analogous to that adopted by Augustine Edwards, the Chilean Commissioner, when he welcomed General Pershing on his arrival in Arica by saying that he was very glad General Pershing had come to hold elections which would confirm Tacna and Arica under Chilean sovereignty. General Pershing was aghast and, thinking he had misunderstood, asked Edwards what he meant. The latter explained that the President of the United States knew that whoever controlled elections in South America always won and when he held in his Award that there should be elections and the territory should be controlled by Chile he naturally meant that the elections would only be a formality for confirming Chilean sovereignty over the Provinces. In that dark day for Peru, we had stood out against any such subterfuge and had said that the Award meant exactly what it said—that there was to be a free and fair plebiscite. The Peruvians should recall this incident and understand that we are not taking any new position disadvantageous to Peru but are merely maintaining the same straightforward position which we held for Peru’s benefit in the case cited at Arica several years ago. The Ambassador admitted that this was correct.

The Ambassador then said that he had turned down so many proposals of his Government he wondered if there was not something that could be said regarding the Peruvian proposal. I told the Ambassador that of course if Colombia would accept the Peruvian proposal we would be delighted—that we had no proposal that we would insist upon as such. Our only desire is to bring about peace and any formula that will do that and be accepted by the two countries will have our warm support. I said that I thought the Brazilian proposal was the one that was fair and most apt to bring this about and that I hoped his Government would accept it. He said they had not accepted so far; that they wanted this change, and he did not think that they would accept the proposal as put up by Brazil, but that if some change could be made in it it might be easier for them to accept. I told the Ambassador that I thought Colombia was absolutely in the right in the Leticia matter; that they are the aggrieved party, and that if Peru is looking for a way out we will naturally be glad to help her but the proposal will have to be one that can reasonably be accepted in Colombia. I told the Ambassador that if Brazil modified its proposal in the sense that Leticia would be held by Brazil while the negotiations were carried on in Rio on the basis already proposed by Brazil, that is, without any prior agreement to modify the boundary or to turn Leticia back to Peru, I thought we would be prepared to support that proposal on the understanding, of course, that in that case the negotiations would have to be limited in time, and it would have to be agreed that if, at the end of the stipulated period, no agreement had been arrived at between the two countries, then Brazil would be authorized to return Leticia to Colombia. I said that I would want to know, first of all, from Brazil that Brazil made this proposal, and secondly, we would want to know in writing that the Peruvian Government specifically accepted it before we would take it up with Colombia. I said that I did not know whether it would be necessary for us to take it up with Colombia—if Peru accepted it, I thought Colombia might possibly accept it also. In any event, if Brazil made this proposal and Peru had definitely accepted it and Colombia was hesitating about accepting it, I would not mind advising Colombia to accept.

The Ambassador did not think that this would meet the Peruvian wishes but said it was at least something and he hoped it might succeed. I told him that it was useless for him to try to get us to support the changes which his Government wanted. The Ambassador left with me a copy of the telegram he had just received and also, in order to clear up any possible misunderstanding regarding his conversation with me on the nineteenth, left with me a copy of the telegram he had received from his Government dated January 18, referred to in that conversation. These two telegrams are attached hereto.³⁹

In the course of the conversation, when I mentioned to the Ambassador that the territory on the Sucumbios River had been asked for by Peru not in order to join it with Peru but in order to have something to give to Ecuador when negotiations were entered into between Ecuador and Peru to settle their boundary dispute, in compensation for something which Peru might desire elsewhere, the Ambassador said he never had attached any importance to the argument advanced by Peru regarding that territory and had advised both his Government and Maúrtua to leave out reference thereto in presenting their cases.

F[rancis] W[hite]

37. Not printed.
38. See Foreign Relations, 1925, vol. i, pp. 369 ff.
39. Not printed.