721.23/726
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White)
I telephoned Ambassador Morgan at Rio at 12:30 this afternoon. Mr. Morgan said that he had just sent two cables to the Department and the first one was with regard to the Chaco matter.20 He said that the Argentine Government had informed the Brazilian Government that it would shortly make a proposal regarding a solution of the Chaco controversy and that the Brazilian Government would reply stating that it would be glad to receive any suggestion looking toward the termination of this conflict.
I told Mr. Morgan that what the Neutral Commission hoped was that the four countries which border on Bolivia and Paraguay would come to an agreement among themselves concerning a means of stopping the fighting in the Chaco and bringing about a definite peaceful settlement thereof, and that they would then communicate with the Neutral Commission so that all could join in making the same proposal and bringing pressure to bear on the two countries to stop the fighting and settle the controversy.
Mr. Morgan said that he was glad to have this information and that he would take the matter up at once with the Brazilian Government, advising them of the way we look at it. He said that this coincided exactly with what the Bolivian Minister had just said to him and he thought that the Bolivian Minister was perhaps making similar observations to the Brazilian Government.
I then told the Ambassador that the matter I had principally in mind in calling him up was the question of Leticia. I said that we are very much concerned over the fact that Colombian troops are proceeding steadily up the Amazon and a conflict is getting nearer and nearer, and there seems to be complete disagreement between Colombia and Peru and no definite understanding regarding the Brazilian proposal. I said that the first Brazilian proposal, namely, that Peru turn Leticia over to a Brazilian representative, that the latter, within a reasonable [Page 396] period, turn it over to Colombia, and that negotiations be opened in Rio for a settlement of outstanding differences, had been accepted by Colombia but definitely rejected by Peru. Brazil had then made a second proposal, namely that Leticia be turned over by Peru to Brazil, and that, while the territory was in Brazil’s hands and up to a maximum period of three months, negotiations be carried on in Rio to come to some agreement. I said that on Saturday Mr. Morgan had been informed by Brazil that this was acceptable to Colombia and we were asked to support the proposal in Lima, where acceptance was being delayed while the Peruvians were trying to stipulate that should the negotiations not result successfully Brazil would then turn Leticia back to the Peruvian rebels. I said that this latter stipulation would of course be absolutely unacceptable to Colombia as Leticia is Colombian. If Colombia had accepted the second formula proposed by Brazil, however, we had been prepared to support the proposal in Lima, but we had found out upon inquiry from Mr. Caffery that this proposal had not been accepted by Colombia. We had repeated to Mr. Morgan Caffery’s cable stating just what the position of Colombia is.
Mr. Morgan said that the Colombian Minister had received on Saturday, after our conversation, a telegram from his Government setting forth its views, which he is putting in a memorandum and is to deliver to the Foreign Office, but it had not been delivered by two o’clock Rio time today. The Ambassador understood that this sets forth the position in the same terms as Mr. Caffery’s telegram. Mr. Morgan said that the difficulty now is regarding the negotiations while Leticia is in Brazil’s hands and what will happen to Leticia if the negotiations fail. He said that the Peruvian Minister in Rio had suggested that there be preliminary negotiations between himself and the Colombian Minister to see if they could settle this matter between them. These would be negotiations preliminary, of course, to the negotiations that would take place after Leticia is turned over to the Brazilians. The Colombian Minister has reported this to his Government and has asked for instructions and he is still waiting for them. I told Mr. Morgan that in view of the experiences we have had it would be well if he could suggest discreetly that any proposals be in writing; that we have had considerable difficulty with the Peruvian representatives here and we therefore deemed it essential to have everything in writing in order that there might be no mistake. I said that it seemed necessary, first of all, for the Brazilian Government to straighten out the misunderstanding and to tell us definitely in writing the terms of its proposal. I said that we are willing and anxious to support Brazil to the utmost in settling this matter but we do not want to have any misunderstanding or crossing of wires. I said that if the first Brazilian proposal should be revived we would support it. If that is impossible and [Page 397] some other proposal is now made and we are advised regarding it definitely in writing, we will do what we properly can. I emphasized to Mr. Morgan that the Brazilian Government should understand that in the meantime we are doing nothing and that it is up to the Brazilian Government to straighten the matter out and tell us just what it wants us to do. I also emphasized that Colombian troops are steadily advancing and that therefore time is of the essence if a conflict is to be avoided. Mr. Morgan said he thought that our position was correct; that as the Brazilians have taken hold of the matter we should leave it to them until they tell us just what they want us to do. He said that he would see the Foreign Minister without delay.
I asked Mr. Morgan just what steps Brazil was prepared to take to stop a conflict; whether the troops being sent to the upper Amazon were, as reported in the press, to preserve Brazil’s neutrality, or whether Brazil was contemplating taking effective measures to stop a conflict between Colombia and Peru. The Ambassador said that the troops were going to preserve Brazil’s neutrality and to make sure that no fighting takes place in Brazilian territory. Outside of that, if the Peruvians and Colombians want to fight, the Brazilians will let them do so.
Mr. Morgan said that his two telegrams were already en route and that he would also promptly advise me of any further information he may get. I again emphasized that time is essential and also said that I understood that the Colombian Government was contemplating taking other proceedings; that we had advised that nothing be done while the Brazilian attempt is being tried out to see whether it does not offer the basis for a solution, but that we could not take the responsibility of telling Colombia to hold off much longer. Mr. Morgan asked just what action they were contemplating. I told him that I was not prepared to say just yet but that for his own personal information I would say that they were contemplating other steps and that we had asked them to hold off for the time being but that we could not continue to do so as it might involve some responsibility on our part if we did. Mr. Morgan said that he understood.