724.3415/3331: Telegram
The Ambassador in Brazil (Gibson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:40 p.m.]
83. Embassy’s telegram No. 80, September 26 [12], noon. Minister of Foreign Affairs tells me Chaco negotiations are now in a state where there are “greater possibilities of success” than at any previous time. In strictest confidence, however, he expressed his concern over the failure of the other mediating powers to exert their full and effective influence for peace. Last night he talked with considerable vigor to the representatives of the other mediating powers in an effort to get them to concert their efforts.
Because of the difficulty of keeping these powers in line for protracted negotiations Mello Franco was obliged to agree some days ago that if his efforts were not successful by September 30th the whole dispute should be referred back to the League of Nations but this time limit which he accepted with reluctance renders the matter urgent. The situation is now as follows:
Bolivia has accepted the Brazilian proposals “principle” with three modifications:
- (a)
- Northern limit to be moved 25 kilometers to the south of Bahía Negra;
- (b)
- Western limit to be 61 degrees instead of 62 degrees;
- (c)
- Unless plenipotentiaries are able to agree on a zone any territory claimed by either party to be submitted to arbitration.
Paraguay admits principle of arbitration for “entire Chaco question”; contends that Chaco has “natural limits” which are still to be determined and therefore sees no advantage in preliminary agreement as to zones; maintains that all causes of conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay existing or still to arise should be included under the expression “entire Chaco question”.
[Page 359]The Minister is now engaged in a determined effort to persuade Bolivia and Paraguay to withdraw reservations which he says are not in themselves vital but which if maintained render illusory hopes of any agreement within the time limit. He is pressing for simple acceptance without reservation of the proposal reported in my telegram 80.
The Minister feels strongly that he should not without a struggle admit the inability of the American countries to settle their own problems by referring a confessed failure to the League. As of more immediate concern he is anxious to get the conflict at least “into the state of agreement to settle by peaceful means” before meeting of the Montevideo Conference, success of which he fears will be seriously prejudiced if it opens with the Chaco conflict unliquidated.
He feels on the other hand that there is a genuine chance of reaching a successful solution of this question in America if a clear and friendly interest is shown by the mediating powers and by our Government. He would not expect us to commit ourselves in any way as to the Brazilian proposal or its details or as to the various reservations which have been made, but he would greatly value any support from Washington in the form of messages to La Paz and Asunción, however informal, expressing the hope that the two contending Governments will make a maximum effort to facilitate agreement and find a mutually advantageous solution.
I gather that if there are any favorable developments the Minister feels fairly confident he could persuade the mediating powers to extend the period of negotiations beyond September 30th.
In view of the urgency of the matter I would appreciate a telegraphic indication as to any action the Department may feel warranted in taking.
I am impressed by the fact that Mello Franco is both practical and sincere in his effort to end this conflict and promote better relations among the American countries. His is the only plan now under consideration. Further, it is to be borne in mind that the Minister is now in a tight corner and needs help. Any friendly support we may give him will be a good investment for our future relations.