Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The American Republics, Volume IV

724.3415/3045

The Bolivian Minister (Finot) to the Secretary of State⁸¹

undated

[Translation]

Memorandum

In connection with certain steps which are being taken in order to obtain from Bolivia the withdrawal of the fifth clause of the memorandum in which she recently replied to the proposed arrangement which was submitted to her by the Governments of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Peru for a solution of the conflict which she is sustaining with Paraguay, the Minister of Bolivia at Washington wishes to inform the Department of State as to the reasons upon which his Government bases its maintenance of the points of view which, on this matter, I have invariably supported in the course of the negotiations to settle the Chaco dispute. The said fifth clause establishes the zone which Bolivia would be prepared to submit to arbitration and constitutes a specific basis upon which the negotiations looking to an arbitral agreement may be developed.

From the first moment of the present stage of the negotiations looking to peace, the Government of Bolivia has suggested the propriety of consulting Paraguay on the same point, in order to know her claims and to know whether it is possible to fix upon a reasonable basis for negotiations. Bolivia has gone ahead, for her part, and proposed this basis, in the desire that the friendly negotiations be guided in a practical and advantageous manner, facilitating action toward peace, which cannot be completed without a previous understanding on the manner of solving the territorial difference.

Arbitration having been accepted by both sides as the only possible solution, the difficulty of determining the arbitrable zone is the stumbling block in the way of reaching an understanding; and even though it is true that the viewpoints of Bolivia and Paraguay appear absolutely divergent and irreconcilable, it is the duty of those acting as mediators to ascertain which side is right—for one side must be, as in any human litigation—in order to induce the recalcitrant party to moderate its claims in order not to hinder a possible solution.

Paraguay proceeds on the supposition that the Chaco is hers and admits of arbitration only for determining the limits of her right, or what is the same thing, considers the litigation as decided in her favor. Bolivia, on the other hand, although convinced that the territory in question belongs to her, is prepared to submit it to arbitration with no other requisite than the indication of the extent thereof. This is the true situation of the parties, which the mediators are bound to examine carefully and to appreciate with an elevated and impartial judgment.

The Paraguayan thesis consists in affirming that the Chaco dispute is not a “territorial” dispute, but a “boundary” dispute. It seems difficult at mere sight to discover the cause of such definition, as it should be understood that any boundary encloses or delimits territories. Little by little as we go deeper into the purpose of this tendency which is as strange as it is obstinate, we can clearly note the motive on which it is based. If Paraguay admitted that the dispute is “territorial” as Bolivia submits it, alleging titles to the Chaco, there would be danger that a legal decision might deprive the former of the clandestine possession of the territories which she has held under the protection of a favorable geographic situation. If the dispute were one “of boundaries”, as Paraguay understands it, that is, limiting it to “determining the boundaries which in 1810 separated the Paraguayan Chaco, which was part of the colonial province of the same name, from the provinces which constituted the Republic of Bolivia”, Paraguay’s right would be recognized in the arbitration compromis, and there would remain to be determined only how much this right includes.

But the Bolivian claims are not directed to seeking a boundary of the supposed rights of Paraguay over the Chaco; they are directed toward regaining the rights of Bolivia over the territory bounded on the east and south by the great rivers Paraguay and Pilcomayo, the former being the natural boundary between the colonial province of that name, which became the Republic of Paraguay, and the District of Charcas, later the Republic of Bolivia. The primary question consists in ascertaining whether Paraguay has a right to the territory of the Chaco, and not in establishing a limit of that right, recognizing it as existent by the decision of one of the parties.

To admit territorial litigation over the Chaco means for Paraguay admitting the possibility of losing, in the courts of international justice, all or part of the territory of which she has possessed herself by force. For that reason she insists in maintaining that the question is one “of boundaries”; for that reason she rejects arbitration with the demarkation of territory, a cardinal point in the Bolivia defense, since an arbitration on this basis will have to decide to whom the territory under litigation lawfully belongs, and Paraguay admits the arbitration but on condition that she be guaranteed that she is to retain possession of the Chaco.

Bolivia does not wish to designate boundaries in the Chaco, for she maintains that it belongs to her in to to. If Bolivia, in diplomatic acts which Paraguay, blinded by ambition and with restricted vision, refused to ratify, yielded a part of the Chaco, she did it by way of compromise, and out of love of peace and on the altar of fraternal policy which her adversary never could appreciate, as she was sure, up until a short time since, that Bolivia was incapable, on account of the distance and the natural obstacles which appeared to be insuperable, of defending her patrimony against audacious invasion. The present conflict provoked by Paraguay, is showing that that country miscalculated and that it is now time to open her eyes to reality.

Having explained the fundamental reason why Paraguay resists a determination of the arbitrable zone, there exists still another circumstantial or tactical reason, which also holds the key to her attitude. On the basis of the antecedents of other arbitral decisions and having in view the tendencies of any arbitrator, who generally is inclined to divide the matter in litigation equitably between the parties, she has made her calculations embracing within her claims an eñormous portion of unquestionable Bolivian territory, without delimiting them to the north or the west in order to make sure in this way, in case of a judgment of Solomon, that she would be assigned all or almost all of the Chaco which is in litigation. The stupidity of which the Government of Bolivia would be guilty is obvious if she should permit herself to be taken in by such a dangerous game. For this reason, therefore, it is for her a cardinal point in the controversy that there cannot be arbitration without the delimitation of the zone.

The curious part of the case is that Paraguay, always contradictory in her defense, has subscribed with Bolivia and approved a formal compromis, now in full effect, which binds her to accept arbitration over a limited zone. The Gutiérrez-Díaz León Protocol, signed at Buenos Aires on April 22, 1927,⁸² through the good offices of the Argentine Government, says literally in Article 4: “Should it be impossible to arrive at an agreement respecting the final determination of the international frontier, the plenipotentiaries shall state the reasons for the disagreement and shall fix the exact zone which will form the subject of the decision of an arbitral court to be appointed by mutual agreement” And if Paraguay herself has agreed to respect this basis of arbitration how is it possible that there should be any mediators or friendly adjusters who would pretend to obligate Bolivia to accept an arbitration without reservations, without limitations, over all the territory which the adversary has the idea of bringing into litigation? Can there be a government in the world which would dare to submit the national patrimony to trial without reservations and without limitation?

It is said and is repeated that the rectitude and respectability of the court will suffice to avoid any danger of that sort. And who is prepared to guarantee the result of an arbitration initiated under such strange conditions, without any precedent whatever in the history of international differences?

These clear, logical, elementary reasons cannot fail to be acknowledged and appreciated by the friendly governments who are trying to reach a peaceful settlement of the Chaco conflict. In view of Paraguay’s obstinacy in a contrary sense, it is not reasonable to try to secure Bolivia’s deviation from her justifiable attitude. It is obvious that any mediation should be directed to bringing it about that the zone of the litigation be circumscribed, trying to guide Paraguay along the path of reality and logic.

The Government of Bolivia cannot believe that the attitude of any one of the friendly Governments who are trying to induce her to change this fundamental point of her policy is inspired by the purpose of doing her an irreparable injury. It is inclined to assume, on the contrary, that an imperfect knowledge of the problem is involved, and for this reason attempts once more to explain the bases for her justifiable conduct.

Those who are acquainted with the Chaco problem know perfectly well that only the determination of the arbitrable zone can lead to a real and final solution, and that it is toward this objective that the friendly efforts toward peace should be directed. Bolivia accepted the formula of the pact of non-aggression prepared by the Commission of Neutrals in Washington⁸³ which would have prevented the armed conflict, while Paraguay rejected it and executed the aggression which began the present struggle; Bolivia accepted with small changes of form the peace proposal formulated by the same Commission, while Paraguay withdrew from Washington in an angry attitude. All these are antecedents which permit impartial determination as to which of the parties is the one which should be induced, by persuasion and by the moral influence of the mediators, to reduce its claims and moderate its intransigency out of regard for justice and peace.

It seems that the action of certain Governments of the neighboring countries is directed also to obtaining Bolivia’s consent to withdraw her troops from the Chaco, while the adversary concentrates his on the banks of the Paraguay River. On repeated occasions Bolivia has explained the reasons on which she bases her non-agreement to the evacuation of the Chaco, which would leave Paraguay in virtual possession of the disputed territory, inasmuch as she could recover it with extreme facility, while a new mobilization would be ruinous in the extreme to Bolivia. It is impossible to think about concentrating the Bolivian effectives at the points indicated by the proposal of the neighboring countries, because adequate means of installation and obtaining supplies would be lacking there. Under such circumstances the withdrawal of troops would mean, therefore, evacuation and demobilization. There is no reasonable motive for demanding such measures as long as there is no guarantee that the territorial dispute will be satisfactorily defined. Once this guarantee is obtained demobilization will take place as the result of the convenience of the parties, since the reason for the struggle will have disappeared.

In conclusion, the Minister of Bolivia calls the attention of the Department of State to the fact that, after Bolivia’s having accepted the good offices of the neighboring nations and the Commission of Neutrals of Washington together, one or more of the Governments who have bound themselves to carry out coordinate action, are trying now to initiate a separate policy, disjointing the efforts toward peace and weakening their efficacy.

The Government of Bolivia would be pleased if every proposed settlement were presented to it conjointly by the four governments of the neighboring nations and with the consent of the Commission of Neutrals, whose good offices it considers in force and cannot consider them as having been discarded.

81. Handed to the Chairman of the Commission of Neutrals on April 11; transmitted to the Commission of Neutrals on April 23, at the request of Sr. Finot. (724.3415/3045a)
82. For text, see despatch No. 275, April 29, 1927, from the Chargé in Argentina, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. i, p. 316.
83. Draft Pact of Non-Aggression of May 6, 1932, Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. v, p. 8.