724.3415/3027
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Commission of Neutrals (White)
The Argentine Ambassador and the Chilean Chargé d’Affaires called and showed me telegrams from their Governments asking them to get the cooperation of the Neutrals in supporting the Mendoza formula. They wanted the support to be by joint action of the nine countries working together. The Argentine telegram indicated that there was not much hope of an armistice under present conditions.
I told both gentlemen that I could not talk for the Neutral Commission but only for myself. I had all along thought the Mendoza formula a good one and had thought it a mistake to complicate the situation by making another suggestion while the Mendoza formula was pending, namely an armistice proposal. I said that the Mendoza formula is said to have been accepted in principle by both countries but that the reservations made indicate that there is little chance of its acceptance unless the two Governments change their points of view. I said that I did not think that making the same proposal again by nine countries would in itself change the situation and we would [Page 298] waste a lot of influence which, we would otherwise have in reserve to use on a more propitious occasion; that I was most anxious to see this matter settled and was thinking only of the practical way to do so. I told them I thought this could best be accomplished by sounding out in La Paz and Asunción informally to see whether they would change their views. I said that I was perfectly willing to have the American Legations in La Paz and Asunción cooperate with the Ministers of the neighboring powers in this work provided this met with the views of the Argentine and Chilean Governments. I said that we would have to send explicit instructions so that they would know what to work for. In Asunción, the instructions should be to try to get Paraguay to withdraw her reservation demanding that Bolivia withdraw to Villa Montes and to accept Ballivian-Robore as suggested. Paraguay should be told that her other reservations would be considered when the arbitral compromis is drawn up.
In La Paz the endeavors should be to have Bolivia withdraw its condition No. 5, delimiting the zone, and also Clause A rejecting the Ballivian-Robore withdrawal points. If this is done, then Bolivia should be told that her other reservations are matters to be considered when the compromis is negotiated.
I said that I considered it important to tell both parties exactly what we wanted them to accept and that their other conditions should be considered at the time the compromis is being negotiated or otherwise they might feel that we had tacitly accepted their other conditions which would make the negotiations more difficult.
Both Mr. Espil and Mr. Cohen agreed with me and felt that my suggestion was the right way to deal with the matter. They said they would take the matter up with their Governments and would let me know the results. I told them that as soon as they do so I will be prepared to send instructions.